{"id":181,"date":"2018-04-02T12:28:21","date_gmt":"2018-04-02T16:28:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/?post_type=chapter&p=181"},"modified":"2018-04-02T14:02:46","modified_gmt":"2018-04-02T18:02:46","slug":"case-study-space-shuttle-challenger","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/chapter\/case-study-space-shuttle-challenger\/","title":{"raw":"Case Study - Space Shuttle Challenger","rendered":"Case Study – Space Shuttle Challenger"},"content":{"raw":"Please see the earlier section in this textbook that gives more background on this disaster.\r\n

Introduction to the Case<\/span><\/h2>\r\nOn January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger, exploded at just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seal properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters, insufficient low-temperature testing of the O-ring material and of the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management.<\/span>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nHere are a list of case studies relating to this incident\r\n

Engineering.com<\/h2>\r\nposted this case study in\u00a0The Engineer<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0on October 24, 2006<\/span>\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/www.engineering.com\/Library\/ArticlesPage\/tabid\/85\/ArticleID\/170\/The-Space-Shuttle-Challenger-Disaster.aspx<\/a>\r\n\r\nAdapted from material by the\u00a0Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering\u00a0 at\u00a0Texas A&M University\u00a0 \u00a0NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252<\/span><\/span><\/span>\r\n

Key Issues<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\r\nHow does the implied social contract of professionals apply to this case?\u00a0<\/span>\r\nWhat profressional responsibilities were neglected, if any?\u00a0<\/span>\r\nShould NASA have done anything differently in their launch decision procedure?<\/span>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nTexas A&M Univerisity Case Studies\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/ethics.tamu.edu\/case-studies\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n \r\n

American Society for Engineering Education Case 2014 Study<\/h2>\r\nhttps:\/\/www.asee.org\/file_server\/papers\/attachment\/...\/2013-Paper-ASEE-Shuttle.pdf<\/a>\r\n

<\/h2>\r\n

The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering from the IEEE<\/h2>\r\n

From the IEEE archives: NASA\u2019s resistance to probabilistic risk analysis contributed to the Challenger disaster<\/p>\r\nhttps:\/\/spectrum.ieee.org\/tech-history\/heroic-failures\/the-space-shuttle-a-case-of-subjective-engineering<\/a>","rendered":"

Please see the earlier section in this textbook that gives more background on this disaster.<\/p>\n

Introduction to the Case<\/span><\/h2>\n

On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger, exploded at just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seal properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters, insufficient low-temperature testing of the O-ring material and of the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Here are a list of case studies relating to this incident<\/p>\n

Engineering.com<\/h2>\n

posted this case study in\u00a0The Engineer<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0on October 24, 2006<\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.engineering.com\/Library\/ArticlesPage\/tabid\/85\/ArticleID\/170\/The-Space-Shuttle-Challenger-Disaster.aspx<\/a><\/p>\n

Adapted from material by the\u00a0Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering\u00a0 at\u00a0Texas A&M University\u00a0 \u00a0NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Key Issues<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

How does the implied social contract of professionals apply to this case?\u00a0<\/span>
\nWhat profressional responsibilities were neglected, if any?\u00a0<\/span>
\nShould NASA have done anything differently in their launch decision procedure?<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Texas A&M Univerisity Case Studies<\/p>\n

https:\/\/ethics.tamu.edu\/case-studies\/<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

American Society for Engineering Education Case 2014 Study<\/h2>\n

https:\/\/www.asee.org\/file_server\/papers\/attachment\/…\/2013-Paper-ASEE-Shuttle.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/h2>\n

The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering from the IEEE<\/h2>\n

From the IEEE archives: NASA\u2019s resistance to probabilistic risk analysis contributed to the Challenger disaster<\/p>\n

https:\/\/spectrum.ieee.org\/tech-history\/heroic-failures\/the-space-shuttle-a-case-of-subjective-engineering<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"menu_order":6,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[47],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-181","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-standard"],"part":63,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/181","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/181\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":185,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/181\/revisions\/185"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/63"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/181\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=181"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=181"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=181"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/engineeringinsociety\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=181"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}