{"id":68,"date":"2019-08-24T14:25:44","date_gmt":"2019-08-24T18:25:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/?post_type=chapter&p=68"},"modified":"2023-09-29T12:29:56","modified_gmt":"2023-09-29T16:29:56","slug":"aristotle-on-virtue-ethics","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/chapter\/aristotle-on-virtue-ethics\/","title":{"raw":"Aristotle on Virtue","rendered":"Aristotle on Virtue"},"content":{"raw":"

Nicomachean Ethics<\/h4>\r\nBy Aristotle\r\n\r\nWritten 350 B.C.E\r\n\r\nTranslated by W. D. Ross\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n1\r\n\r\nVirtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual\u00a0virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for\u00a0which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes\u00a0about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is\u00a0formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it\u00a0is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for\u00a0nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature.\u00a0For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated\u00a0to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten\u00a0thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything\u00a0else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another.\u00a0Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in\u00a0us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect\u00a0by habit.\r\n\r\nAgain, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire\u00a0the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case\u00a0of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we\u00a0got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them,\u00a0and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by\u00a0first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well.\u00a0For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing\u00a0them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the\u00a0lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate\u00a0acts, brave by doing brave acts.\r\n\r\nThis is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make\u00a0the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every\u00a0legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in\u00a0this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.\r\n\r\nAgain, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every\u00a0virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it\u00a0is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced.\u00a0And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest;\u00a0men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly.\u00a0For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but\u00a0all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is\u00a0the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions\u00a0with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we\u00a0do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence,\u00a0we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings\u00a0of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent\u00a0and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.\u00a0Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This\u00a0is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because\u00a0the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It\u00a0makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or\u00a0of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather\u00a0all the difference.\r\n\r\n2\r\n\u2026\r\n\r\nBut though our present account is of this nature we must give what\u00a0help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of\u00a0such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case\u00a0of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we\u00a0must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective\u00a0exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above\u00a0or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate\u00a0both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the\u00a0case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies\u00a0from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything\u00a0becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet\u00a0every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every\u00a0pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who\u00a0shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance\u00a0and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by\u00a0the mean.\r\n\r\n5\r\n\r\nNext we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found\u00a0in the soul are of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of character,\u00a0virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,\u00a0confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity,\u00a0and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by\u00a0faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling\u00a0these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states\u00a0of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with\u00a0reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly\u00a0if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately;\u00a0and similarly with reference to the other passions.\r\n\r\nNow neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we\u00a0are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called\u00a0on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither\u00a0praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger\u00a0is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man\u00a0who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are\u00a0praised or blamed.\r\n\r\nAgain, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are\u00a0modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions\u00a0we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we\u00a0are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular\u00a0way.\r\n\r\nFor these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither\u00a0called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of\u00a0feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are\u00a0not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then,\u00a0the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that\u00a0they should be states of character.","rendered":"

Nicomachean Ethics<\/h4>\n

By Aristotle<\/p>\n

Written 350 B.C.E<\/p>\n

Translated by W. D. Ross<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1<\/p>\n

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual\u00a0virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for\u00a0which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes\u00a0about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is\u00a0formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it\u00a0is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for\u00a0nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature.\u00a0For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated\u00a0to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten\u00a0thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything\u00a0else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another.\u00a0Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in\u00a0us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect\u00a0by habit.<\/p>\n

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire\u00a0the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case\u00a0of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we\u00a0got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them,\u00a0and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by\u00a0first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well.\u00a0For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing\u00a0them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the\u00a0lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate\u00a0acts, brave by doing brave acts.<\/p>\n

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make\u00a0the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every\u00a0legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in\u00a0this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.<\/p>\n

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every\u00a0virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it\u00a0is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced.\u00a0And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest;\u00a0men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly.\u00a0For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but\u00a0all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is\u00a0the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions\u00a0with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we\u00a0do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence,\u00a0we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings\u00a0of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent\u00a0and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.\u00a0Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This\u00a0is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because\u00a0the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It\u00a0makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or\u00a0of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather\u00a0all the difference.<\/p>\n

2
\n\u2026<\/p>\n

But though our present account is of this nature we must give what\u00a0help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of\u00a0such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case\u00a0of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we\u00a0must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective\u00a0exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above\u00a0or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate\u00a0both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the\u00a0case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies\u00a0from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything\u00a0becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet\u00a0every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every\u00a0pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who\u00a0shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance\u00a0and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by\u00a0the mean.<\/p>\n

5<\/p>\n

Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found\u00a0in the soul are of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of character,\u00a0virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,\u00a0confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity,\u00a0and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by\u00a0faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling\u00a0these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states\u00a0of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with\u00a0reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly\u00a0if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately;\u00a0and similarly with reference to the other passions.<\/p>\n

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we\u00a0are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called\u00a0on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither\u00a0praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger\u00a0is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man\u00a0who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are\u00a0praised or blamed.<\/p>\n

Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are\u00a0modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions\u00a0we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we\u00a0are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular\u00a0way.<\/p>\n

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither\u00a0called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of\u00a0feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are\u00a0not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then,\u00a0the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that\u00a0they should be states of character.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":750,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[47],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-68","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-standard"],"part":66,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/68","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/750"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/68\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":117,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/68\/revisions\/117"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/66"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/68\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=68"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=68"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/philosophyreader102\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=68"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}