{"id":176,"date":"2024-04-10T20:19:46","date_gmt":"2024-04-11T00:19:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/psychologicalroots\/?post_type=chapter&p=176"},"modified":"2024-04-10T23:25:13","modified_gmt":"2024-04-11T03:25:13","slug":"evolutionary-psychology-animal-consciousness","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/psychologicalroots\/chapter\/evolutionary-psychology-animal-consciousness\/","title":{"raw":"Evolutionary Psychology: Animal Consciousness","rendered":"Evolutionary Psychology: Animal Consciousness"},"content":{"raw":"Learning Objectives:<\/strong>\r\n1. Understand the pre-Darwinian conceptions of animal consciousness and how Darwin\u2019s\r\ntheories contributed to a change in the zeitgeist.\r\n2. Describe how various fields of research between 1800-2000 all contributed to developing\r\na border and more nuanced understanding of the consciousness of animals.\r\n3. Explain how the Pre-Darwin and Post-Darwin concepts and beliefs of animal\r\nconsciousness informed the current understanding of animal consciousness.\r\n4. Bonus: What is Sarah\u2019s cat\u2019s name?\r\n\r\nIntroduction<\/strong>\r\nThe study of animal consciousness, along with the implications for the natural world, have been a topic of fascination, research, and debate for centuries, with roots tracing back to ancient times, and receiving increased attention after the philosophical inquiries of Ren\u00e9 Descartes and Gustav Fechner. Furthermore, the advances made by Darwin and his theory of evolution expedited both interest and inquiry into the topic of animal consciousness. The following chapter will delve into the complex and dense history of understanding animal consciousness. We seek to explore the pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, and post-Darwinian conceptions of animal consciousness and self-awareness, with a final focus on current and contemporary understandings and conceptions.\r\n\r\nHistorical Overview<\/strong>\r\nThe debate surrounding animal consciousness in evolutionary psychology has its roots in the mind-body debate of Renes Descartes and the work of Gustav Feckner on metaphysics (Firth & Rees, 2017; Cummings, 2019; Beiser, 2020). Descartes dualism positioned the mind and the body as separate from one another. Today, we would call what Descartes refers to as the mind as consciousness because for him the brain was separate and had sensory and motor functions. The body was like the brain in the sense that it was tangible, it was made of matter. In Descartes' view the body served the function of movement and extension. Therefore, the distinct and opposite functions and make-up of the mind and body meant that both could be present and work to influence each other, but were not reliant on each other. In other words, Descartes thought that the mind could influence movement in the body through will or through an automatic mechanical like process, but that not all living beings had both. For Descartes, animals had a brain and a body but no mind (Firth & Rees, 2017). In opposition to Descartes, Fechner argued that even if we could prove the existence of souls (consciousness), we could not apply that to animals and other things as proof that they are conscious . In other words, nature can still be conscious without anything else being conscious. He believed that we ascribe consciousness to animals on the basis of their similar structure and function to humans, and that could be applied equally to plants. For Fechner, consciousness was a difference in kind depending on what the conscious being was. For example, according to the philosophy of panpsychism, plants, animals, and humans all had consciousness but just in different ways (Beiser, 2020).\r\nDarwin believed that cognitive abilities and emotions in animals were differences of degree not presence or absence (Bekoff, 2003; Smith, 2010). And one of the major ways he tried to prove his theory of evolution was by comparing animals and humans with intellectual disabilities to support his theories (Gelb, 2008). For example, Darwin \u201cnarrated tales of animal heroism including that of a monkey who rescued a zoo keeper from an attack by a much larger and stronger animal, and a baboon who rescued an infant from a threatening pack of dogs. Darwin lauded dogs for their sense of \"conscience\", their loyalty and self-command and suggested that they had more self-awareness than some non-Europeans\u201d (Gleb, 2008, p. 3). Darwin\u2019s mentee George Romanes took over his work and really ran with this theory (Jarret, 2020). After the popularization of Darwin\u2019s evolutionary theory, many researchers endorsed the view of animal consciousness as a matter of differences of degree. What followed, then, was the development of several schools of thought that went on to inform how we view animal consciousness today. Namely, comparative psychology, behaviorism, functionalism, and ethology all provided valuable insight into understanding the degrees of consciousness and self-awareness experienced by animals (Burghardt, 2009). Rather than focusing on the consciousness of animals during this period, researchers focused on studying the specific cognitive processes and abilities of animals. The advances made by individuals in this era paved the way for the more thorough and holistic understanding of animal consciousness that exists modernly.\r\n\r\nPre-Darwinian Conceptions of the Animal Mind<\/strong>\r\nIt was a long time before Charles Darwin\u2019s spread of his views on animal consciousness in 1840. Ancient peoples likely had an idea of what animal consciousness was,, but we will be focusing on the beliefs of two key figures of this discussion: Gustav Fechner, and Rene Descartes. Rene Descartes\u2019 beliefs on consciousness could not be defined as a degree or amount with the same components rather than a type or kind. For example, a bug, compared to a human, does not have the same elements of consciousness as humans, reason, critical thinking, and emotions, but just to a smaller degree. Descartes believed non-human levels of consciousness are to serve only biological purposes in animals and is void of critical thought (Harrison, 1992). This is in line with Aristotle\u2019s viewpoint that suggests animals have a different kind of consciousness, implying an incompatibility between an insect\u2019s experience and capabilities versus that of a human. Descartes believed that the most ancient and basic animals and single-celled organisms to current non \u2013 human organisms have no capacity for reasoning, learning, or fear along with all the cognitive traits humans have (Harrison, 1992). Descartes is also known as the architect of the mind body problem, which questions whether bodily function is a result of mental state, or vice versa. In other words, which phenomena are a subset of the other (Rowlands, 2009). Descartes suggested there were two kinds of \u201csubstance\u201d with their own separate properties: matter, which its main property is that it is spatially extended, and the mind, which its property is to think (Grennan, 2014). The term he used for matter, such as bodies, rocks, and tables, was res-extensa, which directly translates from Latin to \u201can extended thing or substance\u201d (Merriam-Webster, 2024). Descartes called mental components, like thoughts or ideas, res-cognita (Grennan, 2014). This directly translates from\r\nLatin to \u201ca thinking thing\u201d, as in the mind or soul (Merriam-Webster, 2024). The nature of each of these components is that they are a separate essence with different functions, and they can therefore exist without the other. One of Rene\u2019s major viewpoints on the relationship between these two components of living things is that the physical and material components follow their own laws, unless interrupted or influenced by a mind or soul, and in that case the mind or soul determines what the body does (Grennan, 2014). He suspected the pineal gland was a major site of connection between the mind and body because it\u2019s the only part of the brain that isn\u2019t a duplicate of another brain structure.\r\nFurthermore, Descartes did not believe the brain was the mind, but a physical junction between the two. This is because it is a material substance that can be physically altered, while the mind or soul is eternally whole and cannot be materially tampered with. To help support this conclusion, Descartes used what some people called \u201cA Cartesian Method of Doubt\u201d, which entails doubting everything to find truth (University of Notre Dame, 2024). When he would doubt the existence of his physical form, it would prevent him from doubting whether his mind exists, given his ability to doubt in the first place proves the existence of what is responsible for that function. This signifies a difference in properties between these two, and therefore they are two different things. The problem part of this doctrine is that with this logic, if you think of something, that occurrence is a property of you and not what you are thinking of, so there isn\u2019t a proven difference between matter and potential (Grennan, 2014). Instead of viewing the body and self\/mind as the same thing, or a part of one another, the soul can be thought of as a separate skill or ability of the body (Anadale, 2017). This logic lays the framework for Descartes\u2019 view on\r\nthe Mind-Body relationship that pertains to all living things. Gustav Fechner was a physicist as well as a philosopher in his own right. According to\r\nthe Internet Encyclopedia of Consciousness in 2024 (IEC, 2024), Gustav Fechner was a supporter of the idea of panpsychism, that all things material had a level of consciousness, no matter the complexity of an entity. This includes bugs, sticks, and even rocks. Fechner was also a proponent of inductive metaphysics, which uses empirical and inductive inference in metaphysical discussion (Seide, 2020). In other words, it is the usage of empirical observations to build explanations about the nature of existence, consciousness, and the universe. His views were like Darwin\u2019s as they both believed animals were conscious beings (Animal Rights: A History Charles Darwin, n.d.), but Darwin didn\u2019t believe all objects were conscious as Descartes did. (Wikimedia Foundation, 2023)\r\n\r\nEach of these physicists and philosophers laid a foundation for later physicists, philosophers, and psychologists to build and speculate on the nature of our existence. Though\r\nmany of these viewpoints are challenged by modern scholars, they were paramount in giving us a starting point for reasoning some of life\u2019s most complex discussions. Darwin\u2019s Contributions to Conceptions of Consciousness Charles Darwin experienced a number of life events and pursuits that shifted his view on how he viewed humanity in the theory of evolution, and the shift from viewing the \u201chumanity\u201d that we experience as a form of consciousness that is shared among many other living beings. During his circumnavigation voyage on the Beagle Darwin experienced a plethora of life forms that sparked a search for knowledge. In 1836 when he arrived back from his voyage he spent the next several years pouring over several different texts from a variety of sources, and speaking to many different individuals and organizations, one of whom being the Zoological\r\nGardens in London. He became convinced of the fact that the life forms he encountered on his circumnavigation were the result of an evolutionary process of some kind. During a visit to the Zoological Gardens, Darwin spent time with an orangutan named Jenny. During his time with Jenny, there were several human behaviors and traits that were profound. Quoted from Darwin's journal, \u201csee its intelligence when spoken to, as if it understood every word said \u2014 see its affection to those it knows, \u2014 see its passion and rage and sulkiness and every action of despair\u201d (Smith, C. 2010. Pg.6). . A distinction made in his writing was to separate the use of language from consciousness and simply observe behavior. Through his encounters with the Fuegian aboriginal peoples and Jenny, he was able to draw parallels. His view on the Fuegians, albeit dated, was that you could not find a lower level of human being than them. Through this he saw that these \u201csavages\u201d shared a strikingly similar level of behavior with animals he had spent time around. Hensleigh Wedgewood, Darwin's brother-in-law, published a small body of works in 1848 that disagreed with the sentiment of a fundamental level of consciousness in all beings.\r\nWedgewood viewed what he called \u201cbrain think\u201d as nonsense. Darwin was not convinced by this, making the point that there is a certain level of arrogance involved with that outlook, assuming that humans are inherently different in our cognition. He believed that every organ had a function, drawing a similarity between liver bile and the mind, despite the act of \u201cthinking\u201d being difficult to prove, and he believed this was shared in animals. A critical topic that played into this was the concept of \u201cdouble consciousness\u201d, creating a distinction between the \u201chabitual\u201d and \u201cconscious\u201d mind. In 1838 Darwin wrote a journal entry recalling his soon to be wife telling him that she plays her piano pieces better when she is not consciously trying, with the ability to engage in other tasks such as talking with friends while playing. This ties into a book published by Darwin in 1877 titled \u201cDescent of Man\u201d, written as a rebuttal to Ferrier\u2019s argument that there is a solid and well-defined line between man and animal, and that humans share a level of self-awareness that animals do not. Darwin proposed instead that the difference is not a defined demarcation, but rather one of degrees. In this work he focuses on two emotions, guilt and shame, using the example of Squib (uncles\u2019 dog) and Jenny the orangutan. When Squib would be at his uncle\u2019s estate, he would often tell on himself that he had been on the dinner table before anyone knew, looking miserable and sullen, an expression commonly seen in dogs when they know they have done something wrong. This was also observed in Jenny, when she disobeys the zookeepers, she will run off and hide herself, indicating a knowledge of wrongdoing (Smith, C. 2010). Several other activities mentioned in Descent of man that were observed in animals were as follows; a bear pawing at water to bring an object closer, an elephant blowing on an object to move it, canaries having the ability to dream, and a monkey keeping a rock under his bedding as to help him crack nuts. Several of these activities can be observed in the animal kingdom (Stanford, 2021). A controversial yet influential point in Darwin\u2019s search for clarity on the role of consciousness in the animal kingdom, was the parallels drawn between those with disabilities, as well as those of other races and animals, believing that there was an overlap between the least<\/em> evolved humans (represented as those of non-European ancestry, and those with disabilities) and most evolved animals. This view functions on the misunderstanding that evolution moves towards a goal. Support for this belief was found in the works of Carl Vogt, a German anthropologist. Vogt believed that evidence of human evolution need not be found in tribal links, but rather in those with \u201carrested development\u201d. This was argued by Richard Owens in 1835, stating that the underdeveloped human was closer to a fully developed human than a chimp. He also observed certain behaviors that were significant in this belief. \u201cIdiots\u201d had been observed doing several activities such as moving, cleaning themselves, and eating. They were seen using their mouth during the process of cleaning themselves of lice, often smelling every mouthful of food, and walking on all fours, with a particular penchant for climbing trees. There is a level of irony to these observations and claims made by Darwin. Charles Waring Darwin, the son of Emma and Charles, had developmental disabilities such that he did not see his second birthday, and died at the age of months. An unnamed physician figured by what they had seen that his son had down syndrome. When reading his memorial, it is clear Darwin viewed his son as fully human, not seeing any qualities shared in his son, and of those he considered \u201cidiots.\u201d\r\n\r\nConceptions of Animal Consciousness After Darwin<\/strong>\r\nThe period spanning from the 1880s to 2000 witnessed significant shifts in paradigms, cultural attitudes, and frameworks concerning beliefs about animal consciousness due to the influence of Darwian theory (Burghardt, 2009). Notably, during this period animal consciousness became less important to proving human uniqueness or specialness, and instead we saw a focus on studying nonhuman abilities and capacities in their own rights. This section will first delve into schools of thought that engaged in this endeavor, including behaviorism, functionalism, ethology, and comparative psychology. Furthermore, a discussion of some important zeitgeist shifts and cultural differences that influenced how humans viewed animal consciousness will be explored. Lastly will be an exploration of some of the most influential researchers, psychologists, and studies of the era, including works by William James, Margaret Floy Washburn, Edward Thorndike, Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner. Importantly, this era focused less on the presence or absence of consciousness of animals, and instead sought to understand the very degrees of consciousness, self-awareness, and cognitive abilities present in various animals. Comparative psychology, though initially establishing an inherently anthropocentric framework, played a crucial role in shaping the understanding of animal consciousness during this period, and was heavily influenced by Darwinain theory (Burghardt, 2009; Dewsbury, 1992; Warden, 1927). Early comparative psychologists of the late 19th century, such as C. Lloyd Morgan and Edward L. Thorndike, sought to identify commonalities and differences in behavior across species (Dewsbury, 1992; Warden, 1927). Although their work acknowledged cognitive abilities in animals, it primarily focused on behavioral observations rather than explicitly addressing questions of consciousness or self-awareness (Burghardt, 2009; Dewsbury, 1992). With an inherently anthropocentric focus, researchers including Linus Kline sought to distinguish similarities and differences in the instincts of humans and nonhumans in the late 1900\u2019s (Dewsbury, 1992). Darwin\u2019s focus on mental continuity, in The Descent of Man, paved the way for future comparative psychologists in the 20th century to focus on testing and measuring nonhuman intelligence and other psychological processes and traits by using captive and domesticated animals, including rats and mice, dogs, and pigeons\u2014although other species were tested, too (Burghardt, 2009). Around the onset of the 20th century, we see the emergence of a paradigm shift as researchers began conducting animal studies to understand the behavior of nonhumans not for the sake of furthering understanding of humans, but for its own purpose (Dewsbury, 1992). This tendency increased as researchers recognized that investigations into animal behavior and cognition held maximal significance when the typical behaviors and lifestyles of the animals being studied occurred in their natural environments, as it provided more holistic,\u00a0 and less artificial, data (Dewsbury, 1992). For example, what resulted from this particular recognition was Willard Stanton Small\u2019s use of mazes when studying the behavior of rats (Dewsbury, 1992). Indeed, this approach to studying animal behavior laid the groundwork for ethology (Dewsbury, 1992). Ethology, emerging in the mid-20th century, represented a departure from the laboratory-based approaches of comparative psychology (Burghardt, 2009). Researchers like Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen advocated for the study of behavior in naturalistic settings, emphasizing the role of evolution, instincts, and innate behaviors (Burghardt, 1985). These ethological perspectives challenged the reductionist tendencies of behaviorism and underscored the importance of understanding behavior within its ecological and evolutionary context. Indeed, ethologists have been credited with the successful resuscitation of the study of instinctive behavior, although disagreements concerning the ethological approach to studying animal behavior led to \u201cinstinct wars\u201d during the mid-20th century (Burghardt, 2009, p.\r\n106). Although behaviorism is critiqued for being reductionistic, it was still highly influential in informing the views of animal consciousness of the time. Behaviorism, popularized in the early 20th century by psychologists such as John B. Watson and B.F. Skinner, emphasized observable behaviors over internal mental states, which meant the concept of consciousness was put on the backburner, so-to-speak. This approach led to a reductionist view of animal behavior, focusing on stimulus-response mechanisms rather than subjective experiences (Birnbaum, 1955). As a result, discussions concerning the consciousness of animals \u201cwent out of fashion,\u201d during the mid-1910\u2019s (Burghardt, 1985, p. 909), and what proceeded was a more mainstream disinterest in both ethology and comparative psychology (Burghardt, 1985). Functionalism, on the other hand, sought to understand the adaptive functions of behavior, paving the way for a deeper appreciation of the cognitive capacities of animals (Burghardt, 2009). It is important to note that views of animal consciousness were, and still are, heavily culturally informed. As Sch\u00f6nfeld (2006) discusses, many animal studies that were happening outside the American, British, and French theaters were largely being discounted due to the preference at the time to maintain Christian and Cartesian beliefs concerning disparities of animal and human minds. While studies were being conducted on language, intention, and passion in the Nordic and Baltic theaters, such studies were disregarded and passed over in favor of studies that focused on animal instincts, thus reinforcing the view of animals as biological machines (Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). Meanwhile, in the Eurasian theater, groundbreaking studies were being conducted that exemplified the complexity of animal cognition and behavior: in 1923, researcher Karl von Frisch, an ethologist, published his discovery of languages in animals\r\n(Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). Additionally, Rose (2012) posits that the differences in styles in writing between Konrad Lorenz, an Austrian researcher who has been credited as the founder of ethology, and Robert Yerkes, an American ethologist and eugenicist, in the 1930s are particularly notable in terms of the level of explanation that these authors give for animal behavior when conducting their studies. Fast forward a couple of decades to 1952, and we see researcher Kinji Imanishi discovering that culture is not a solely human experience, and instead is shared with other animals, as exemplified in his research on macaques (Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). The Anglo American and French disregard for these initial studies on the consciousness of animals were, at least to some degree, influenced by the dominant behaviorist school of thought at the time (Burghardt, 1992; Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). One of the first researchers who laid the groundwork for the development of the field of behaviorism, which dominated for the majority of the 20th century was Edward Thorndike, influenced by Lloyd Morgan and George Romanes (Warden, 1927; Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). In the late 1890\u2019s, Thorndike began to publish his influential work on learning in cats, chickens, dogs, and other animals, and is credited for introducing laboratory experiments into the field of comparative psychology (Warden, 1927; Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). Furthermore, Thorndike paved the way for comparative psychology through his emphasis on studying the behavior of animals (Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). As Thorndike was conducting his studies on \u201cinstrumental\u201d or \u201ctrial-and-error\u201d learning in animals (Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998), Ivan Pavlov was also conducting studies of similar effect and thus discovered classical conditioning (Catania & Laties, 1999). Ivan Pavlov's groundbreaking work in classical conditioning, particularly his experiments with dogs that led to the discovery of the conditioned reflex, laid the groundwork for the study of learning and behavior, and his theories continue to influence these topics today (Catania & Laties, 1999).\r\nInterested in Pavlov\u2019s research on classical conditioning, Skinner\u2019s initial research in behaviorism focussed on reflexology in order to determine the principles of operant conditioning in rats, taking a degree of inspiration from Thorndike and his puzzle box, which ultimately led to his discovery of operant conditioning (Iversen, 1992). Watson, a fellow behaviorist, also took inspiration from Pavlov and demonstrated through conditioning how environmental stimuli could elicit reflexive responses in animals, which contributed to the understanding of learning processes in both animals and humans (Horowitz, 1992). William James, a functionalist, emphasized the continuity between human and nonhuman minds, and argued that humans and animals shared different mental processes to varying degrees, concluding that understanding animal behavior can provide valuable insights to human psychology and consciousness (Nielsen & Day, 1999). James\u2019 work on instincts and emotions highlighted the importance of how both emotions and instincts influence behavior in terms of motivation, actions, and adaptation to the environment (Suplizio, 2007). Initially focusing on sensation and perception, Margaret Floy Washburn studied animal\r\nbehavior and consciousness in detail, resulting in the production of her book titled The Animal Mind, which was the first publication in the US on comparative psychology, consisting of an organized collection of literature on animal behavior ranging from primates to single-celled organisms (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). Through its various revisions, The Animal Mind highlighted the various experimental processes and methods used for the comprehensive studying of animal behavior; Washburn emphasized the importance of maintaining balance while studying animal behavior, not jumping to conclusions or using anecdotes, and through her work compared human consciousness to the behaviors and responses of animals, arguing for the necessity to identity which neurological structures and functions can be included for the criteria of defining what level of consciousness various species exhibit (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). Ultimately, through her work, Washburn concluded that consciousness must be present in higher animals, yet less present in lower ones, though pinpointing its emergence is difficult to track down (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). In conclusion, the 19th and 20th centuries experienced transformations in the views of animal consciousness, marked by a shift away from emphasizing human specialness towards acknowledging the unique qualities of animals. This evolution was influenced by developments in functionalism, behaviorism, ethology, and comparative psychology, as well as changing cultural attitudes. By embracing a more inclusive understanding of consciousness, researchers, and society as a whole, have begun to recognize the richness and diversity of mental life across species. The groundbreaking work of this era enhanced the knowledge of nonhuman minds while also challenging anthropocentric views, thus paving the way for more nuanced and inclusive conceptions of animal consciousness. The foundational principles established during this period continue to influence the more contemporary research and discourse on animal consciousness\r\nthat is still ongoing, highlighting the importance of this transformative era in the history of psychology and animal research.\r\n\r\nCurrent Evolutionary Perspectives<\/strong>\r\nBehaviorism dominated mid-20th century psychology. Behaviorists believed that internal mental states held no validity because they were not observable (Jarret, 2020). Animal behavior should focus on learning and memory because that behavior is observable and measurable, but the reasons why an animal behaves in such a way should not be inferred. Thus, the rise of behaviorism in the field of psychology resulted in the discardment of consciousness as an important phenomenon to focus on (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022). However, the cognitive revolution starting in the 1950s laid the groundwork for a man named Dr. Donald Griffin to reintroduce cognition into behaviorism in the 1970s with his Cognitive Ethology (Veit, 2022). In Cognitive Ethology animals' subjective mental experiences were studied through natural observation. His arguments for consciousness in animals were based upon neural correlates, adapting ways to solve new problems, ways of communicating between animals of the same species, mirror recognition tests as a method of measuring consciousness, memory, and the evolutionary purpose of morality (Ristau, 2013). The cognitive revolution was bringing back the study of consciousness through ways of encouraging the study of animal sentience and cognition in the context of evolution. Additionally, this resurgence of animal sentience and consciousness\r\nand new discussions on how it relates to morality fueled the animal rights movement (Jarret, 2020). Advances in the field of psychology and other related sciences allowed for novel ways to study consciousness in animals, and in 2012 animal consciousness was officially recognized as conscious beings with the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. The declaration states that although cortical structures are involved in the neural substrates of emotion because of its higher-order functions, the subcortical structures of the brain also play a very important part. Artificially stimulating the brain regions involved in emotion for humans in animals produces a comparable result. In other words, both humans and animals experience emotions and that similar subcortical brain regions are activated during emotional states. \u201cYoung human and non-human animals without neocortices retain these brain-mind functions,\u201d and neural circuits involved in attending, sleeping, making decisions, and neurophysiological patterns were previously thought to have not been possible without a neocortex (Low, 2012, para 3). Additionally, emotion in animals is assessed based on the way the animal behaviorally responds\r\nto stimuli as well as how they interact with one another. For example, pigtail macaques have the ability to understand the different meanings of facial expressions in different contexts, specifically the bearing of teeth (Beisner & McCowan, 2014). Additionally, research has found that hallucinogenic effects causing disturbances in consciousness that result in altered cognitive, affective, and behavioral states when humans take them, also produce similar effects in animals. Thus, because conscious awareness in humans is\r\ncorrelated with cortical activity and subcortical processing, and the same regions in animals produce comparable feeling states, provides \u201ccompelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal affective qualia,\u201d or internal and subjective components of sense perceptions (Low, 2012, para 5). The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness declares that \u201cThe absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates\u201d (2012, para 6). In 2016 a journal solely dedicated to studies of consciousness in non-humans titled\r\nAnimal Sentience was created. The debate is no longer about the presence or absence of consciousness in animals, and instead is about what consciousness is in the context of the animal and how conscious they are. In other words, the approach to consciousness in animals is less anthropocentric and hierarchical. However, this is not always the case because much of the research that is done on animals and animal consciousness is done in relation to the benefits it can provide humans (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022).Thus, current perspectives in evolutionary psychology echo Darwin and Romanes in that the field views consciousness as one of degree not kind, as well as its comparison of humans and animals by leveling out the hierarchy of the food chain, so to speak. Consciousness has been studied in more depth and been broken down and separated into different levels and forms. For example self-referencing, self-awareness, self-consciousness, sentience, are considered to be different levels of consciousness (Thomas, 2016). Episodic memory has also been studied in relation to consciousness, arguing that it is the most important determinant of the highest level of consciousness, and without it a being is just sentient. However, leveling out the hierarchy and separating consciousness into levels has been done by comparing children and people with so-called intellectual deficits to animals, with some researchers doing so to demonstrate speciesism (Jarret, 2020; Thomas, 2016). Selfhood does not require theory of mind or the possession of a personal identity because\r\nselfhood is just having an awareness of oneself and others for interaction. Selfhood is the awareness of having a body just to the extent that a response to things in one's environment is possible. For example, when I brush my cat Elliot, he starts to pull away and bite the brush because he understands that he is being brushed. For him to react like that he has to have selfhood, because \u201cIf there was no sense of self, even minimally for an individual, there would be nothing to which the experience belonged, or no one to experience the pain\u201d (Thomas, 2020, p. 41). Cats, dogs, pigs, cows, and certain species of birds have been studied and are thought to have not only selfhood but also self-awareness even if on a less complex level than humans and is only due to their lack of linguistic ability. Although some argue that interspecie communication is the same as the way humans communicate, we as humans cannot understand it (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022; Thomas, 2016). The field of Evolutionary Psychology believes that animals possess consciousness. Although some debate still exists about the possession of self awareness in animals, it is only about the degree to which certain animals possess. Overall, consciousness and self-awareness are seen to exist in animals, and while not every study reduces human capacity and increases animal capacity explicitly like Darwin did back in the day, the majority of the field does so implicitly through comparison (Thomas, 2016; Jarret, 2020; Ahmed and Corradi, 2022).\r\n\r\nConclusion<\/strong>\r\nThe topic of animal consciousness will likely continue to be an area of interest for decades to come. Throughout this chapter, we have explored how different periods viewed conceptions of animal consciousness. Indeed, from ancient Egypt and ancient Greece, Cartesian dualism and the Darwinian revolution, to the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness, the topic of self-awareness and consciousness in animals continues to be a topic of amusement, speculation, inquiry, and investigation, both within psychology and broader society. Of importance, pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, post-Darwinian, and contemporary views of consciousness were described. Going forward, it is important for researchers, policy makers, businesses, animal welfare advocates, ethicists, and society as a whole to collaborate and investigate holistic approaches when studying animals that may in turn benefit the animal subjects, animals as a whole, and the human species. A shift away from hierarchical conceptions of animals and humans should be replaced with education and awareness campaigns that work to inform the public concerning the complexities of animal cognition and mental processes. Promoting empathy and compassion at the societal level towards animals, as well as encouraging and facilitating an understanding of the mental lives of animals, should be considered. Ultimately, this chapter highlights how changes in societal views of \"the mind\" and the significance attributed to understanding the subjective experiences of animals influences their treatment. It is important to recognize that cultural trends, informed by the broader zeitgeist, can directly influence animal welfare, and is crucial for future considerations.\r\n\r\nDefinitions<\/strong>\r\n\r\nBehaviorism: The school of psychology, with figures like John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner, that focused on studying observable and measurable behaviors rather than internal mental states or processes, and though it is sometimes critiqued for being reductionistic, it provided groundwork for studying processes of learning.\r\n\r\nAnthropocentric framework: A framework that puts human beings in the center of the universe, so-to-speak, and all other beings and entities are put on this earth to provide use for humans.\r\n\r\nCognitive Ethology: The study of the mental experiences of animals as they behave in their natural environment in the course of their normal lives. It was made to address consciousness and the phenomenological experience of animals.\r\n\r\nSelfhood: Having individuality\/an individual identity and being aware of it.\r\n\r\nDouble Consciousness: Double-consciousness is identified as a\u00a0\u201csensation\u201d, a consciousness of one\u2019s self<\/strong>, but which falls short of a unified, \u201ctrue\u201d self-consciousness.\r\n\r\nArrested Development: Arrested development refers to the stoppage of physical development, emotional development, or mental development before reaching adulthood.\r\n\r\nPanpsychism: The belief that all entities have some level of consciousness and mind-like qualities.\r\n\r\nMind-Body Problem: The contradiction of our bodies being in space yet our mind not being in space.\r\n\r\nDiscussion Questions:<\/strong>\r\n\r\n1.<\/strong> Discuss the ways in which research on animal consciousness was disregarded by Anglo American and French researchers during the early to mid 20th century.\r\n\r\nA: Within Anglo American and French societies, there was a preference for Christian and Cartesian beliefs, resulting in disregard for animal studies that were taking place elsewhere in the world, including parts of Europe and Asia. American researchers studying animals and researchers from elsewhere around the world had very different ways of discussing their findings when it came to studying animals. Notably during this time researchers in Nordic and Baltic countries were studying language, intention, and passion in animals; during this period, Karl von Frisch published his discovery of languages in animals.\r\n\r\n2.<\/strong> Discuss the ways in which research on animal consciousness was disregarded by Anglo American and French researchers during the early to mid 20th century.\r\n\r\nA. Within Anglo American and French societies, there was a preference for Christian and Cartesian beliefs, resulting in disregard for animal studies that were taking place elsewhere in the world, including parts of Europe and Asia. American researchers studying animals and researchers from elsewhere around the world had very different ways of discussing their findings when it came to studying animals. Notably during this time researchers in Nordic and Baltic countries were studying language, intention, and passion in animals; during this period, Karl von Frisch published his discovery of languages in animals. Kinji Imanishi discovered that culture is not a solely human experience, and instead is shared with other animals, as exemplified in his research on macaques. The Anglo American and French disregard for these initial studies on the consciousness of animals were, at least to some degree, influenced by the dominant behaviorist school of thought at the time.\r\n\r\n3.<\/strong> What are the current evolutionary views\/beliefs on animal consciousness?\r\n\r\nA: Behaviorism dominated mid-20th century psychology and in response to this and its belief that internal mental states held no validity or importance, reducing human capacity and increasing animal capacity (in terms of consciousness and intellect) has had a resurgence. This resurgence is also partly fueled by the animal rights movement as well. Consciousness has been studied more and broken down and separated into different forms and levels. Evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, comparative psychology echo what Darwin and Romanes thought, but in a more in depth, advanced, less racist way, but still to some extent an ableist way. Current perspective has moved away from needing language to be conscious but also still believes in difference of degree not kind. The difference in degree is still debated but is moving towards a belief\/perspective that there is actually little difference in degree. Although some debate still exists about the possession of self awareness in animals, it is only about the degree to which certain animals possess. Overall, consciousness and self-awareness are seen to exist in animals, and while not every study reduces human capacity and increases animal capacity explicitly like Darwin did back in the day, the majority of the field does so implicitly through comparison.\r\n\r\n4.<\/strong> What were some of the factors in Darwins life that influenced his view of people with disabilities and how did these relate to his findings of animal consciousness?\r\n\r\nA: Darwins circumnavigation of the globe viewing the habits and environments of animals around the world and his encounters with certain indigenous tribes played into him drawing correlations between those with arrested development and the tribes he encountered. His time spent at the London Zoo with Jenny the orangutang also led him to see similarities between the behaviour of animals and disabled people, viewing disabled people as the \u201cmissing link\u201d between civilized people and indigenous people.\r\n\r\n5.<\/strong> What is something the Mind-Body problem contributed to in the field of psychology?\r\n\r\nA: The mind-body problem made fellow psychologists more aware of the duality of our being, making us reconsider the gravity of our mind as a non-physical entity, and our body as a physical one. This mystery has led psychologists to observe the relationship more closely between the mind and body, and this philosophical topic is present in modern cognitive behavioral therapy. A cognitive behavioral therapist may aim to encourage the client to develop a relationship between their thoughts and physiological functions to create more reliable and effective coping strategies for psychological problems. Using this relationship between mind and body has allowed psychologists to help people listen to their bodies when their mind is troubled and vice versa, allowing more effective treatment.\r\n\r\nReferences<\/strong>\r\nAhmed, A., & Corradi, C. (2022). Animal sentience and consciousness A review of current research. Nuffield Council on Bioethics.\r\n\r\nAnadale, C, (2016, Mar 29th), Aristotle\u2019s Theory of the Soul, 2017 Animal rights: A history of Charles Darwin. Think Differently About Sheep. (n.d.).http:\/\/thinkdifferentlyaboutsheep.weebly.com\/animal-rights-a-history-charles-darwin.html# :~:text=Well%2C%20the%20first%20point%20is,of%20view%20of%20the%20world.\r\n\r\nBeiser, Frederick. Gustav Theodor Fechner, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/archives\/spr2020\/entries\/fechner\/\r\n\r\nBekoff, M. (2003). Considering Animals \u2014 Not \u201c Higher \u201d Primates CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF IN ANIMALS : SOME REFLECTIONS by Marc Bekoff.\r\n\r\nBirnbaum, L. C. (1955). Behaviorism in the 1920's. American Quarterly, 7(1), 15-30. 10.2307\/2710411\r\n\r\nBurghardt, G. M. (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective.\r\nAmerican Psychologist, 40(8), 905\u2013919. 10.1037\/0003-066X.40.8.905\r\n\r\nBurghardt, G. M. (2009). Darwin\u2019s legacy to comparative psychology and ethology. American\r\nPsychologist, 64(2), 102\u2013110. 10.1037\/a0013385\r\n\r\nCatania, A. C., & Laties, V. G. (1999). Pavlov and Skinner: Two lives in science (an introduction to B F Skinner\u2019s \u2018Some responses to the stimulus \u201cPavlov\u201d\u2019). Journal of the\r\nExperimental Analysis of Behavior, 72(3), 455\u2013461. 10.1901\/jeab.1999.72-455\r\n\r\nCummings, J., & Sanders, L. (2019). Introduction to Psychology. University of Saskatchewan Open Press.\r\n\r\nDewsbury, D. A. (2000). Comparative cognition in the 1930s. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7(2), 267\u2013283. 10.3758\/bf03212982\r\n\r\nDewsbury, D. A. (1992). What comparative psychology is about. Teaching of Psychology, 19(1), 4\u201311.\r\n\r\nFragaszy, D. M. (2021). Comparative psychology\u2019s founding mother, Margaret Floy Washburn. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 135(1), 3\u201314. 10.1037\/com0000272\r\n\r\nFrith, C & Rees, G. (2017). A brief history of the scientific approach to the study of consciousness. 10.1002\/9781119132363.ch1\r\n\r\nGelb, S. (2008). Darwin's use of intellectual disability in the descent of man. Disability Studies Quarterly, 28(2). DOI:10.18061\/dsq.v28i2.96.\r\n\r\nGrennan C, (2014, Nov 14th), Descartes\u2019 Dualism of the Mind & Body, YouTube, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=5HHzt-mCCUE\r\n\r\nHarrison, P. (1992). Descartes on Animals. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 42(167), 219\u2013227. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/2220217\r\n\r\nHerrnstein, R. J. (1977). The evolution of behaviorism. American Psychologist, 32(8), 593\u2013603. 10.1037\/0003-066X.32.8.593\r\n\r\nHorowitz, F. D. (1992). John B Watson\u2019s legacy: Learning and environment. Developmental Psychology, 28(3), 360\u2013367. 10.1037\/0012-1649.28.3.360 Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. (n.d.). https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/panpsych\/#:~:text=It%20simply%20claims%20(like%20Spinoza,focus\r\ned%20primarily%20on%20plant%20life.\r\n\r\nIversen, I. H. (1992). Skinner\u2019s early research: From reflexology to operant conditioning. American Psychologist, 47(11), 1318\u20131328. 10.1037\/0003-066X.47.11.1318\r\n\r\nJarret, S. (2020). Consciousness reduced: The role of the \u2018idiot\u2019 in early evolutionary psychology. History of the Human Sciences, 33(5), 110\u2013137. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0952695120911557\r\n\r\nLow, P. (2012). Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (J. Panksepp, D. Reiss, D. Edelman, B. Van Swinderen, & C. Koch, Eds.). Marketing Communications: Web | University of Notre Dame. (n.d.). Descartes\u2019 meditations: Doubt everything: Philosophy as a way of life: University of Notre Dame. Philosophy as a\r\nWay of Life. https:\/\/philife.nd.edu\/descartes-meditations-doubt-everything\/#:~:text=This%20method%2 0is%20known%20as,with%20a%20more%20justifiable%20foundation.\r\n\r\nMerriam-Webster. (n.d.). Res extensa definition & meaning. Merriam-Webster. https:\/\/www.merriam-webster.com\/dictionary\/res%20extensa\r\nMind-body problem, (n.d.). Mind-Body Problem - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics. (n.d.). https:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/topics\/neuroscience\/mind-body-problem\r\n\r\nNielsen, M., & Day, R. H. (1999). William James and the evolution of consciousness. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 19(1), 90\u2013113. 10.1037\/h0091189\r\n\r\nPillsbury, W. B. (1940). Margaret Floy Washburn (1871-1939). Psychological Review, 47(2), 99\u2013109. 10.1037\/h0062692\r\n\r\nRistau, C. A. (2013). Cognitive ethology. Wiley interdisciplinary reviews, 4(5), 493-509. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/wcs.1239\r\n\r\nRose, A. C. (2012). Animal tales: Observations of the emotions in american experimental psychology, 1890-1940. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 48(4),\r\n301\u2013317. 10.1002\/jhbs.21562\r\n\r\nSch\u00f6nfeld, M. (2006). Animal consciousness: Paradigm change in the life sciences. Perspectives on Science, 14(3), 354\u2013381.\r\n\r\nSeide, A. (2020, September 4). Analogical inference in Gustav Theodor Fechner\u2019s inductive metaphysics. Brill. https:\/\/brill.com\/view\/journals\/gps\/98\/1\/article-p186_9.xml?language=en#:~:text=Abstract ,forms%20of%20inference%20in%20metaphysics.\r\nSmith, C. (2010) Darwin's Unsolved Problem: The place of consciousness in an evolutionary world. Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 19(2), 105-120. DOI: 10.1080\/09647040903504781\r\n\r\nStam, H. J., & Kalmanovitch, T. (1998). E. L. Thorndike and the origins of animal psychology: On the nature of the animal in psychology. American Psychologist, 53(10), 1135-1144.\r\n\r\nSuplizio, J. (2007). On the significance of William James to a contemporary doctrine of evolutionary psychology. Human Studies, 30(4), 357\u2013375. 10.1007\/s10746-007-9063-8\r\n\r\nThomas, N. (2016), Self-Awareness and selfhood in animals. In Animal Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self (pp. 37-68). Macmillan Publishers Ltd.\r\n\r\nWarden, C. J. (1927). The historical development of comparative psychology. Psychological Review, 34(2), 135\u2013168. 10.1037\/h0070104\r\n\r\nWikimedia Foundation. (2023, October 19). Gustav Fechner. Wikipedia. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Gustav_Fechner#:~:text=Fechner%20was%20a%20panpsych\r\nist%3B%20he,becoming%20known%20as%20material%20science.\r\n\r\nVeit, W. (2022). Towards a comparative study of animal consciousness. Biological Theory, 17,\r\n292\u2013303. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s13752-022-00409-","rendered":"

Learning Objectives:<\/strong>
\n1. Understand the pre-Darwinian conceptions of animal consciousness and how Darwin\u2019s
\ntheories contributed to a change in the zeitgeist.
\n2. Describe how various fields of research between 1800-2000 all contributed to developing
\na border and more nuanced understanding of the consciousness of animals.
\n3. Explain how the Pre-Darwin and Post-Darwin concepts and beliefs of animal
\nconsciousness informed the current understanding of animal consciousness.
\n4. Bonus: What is Sarah\u2019s cat\u2019s name?<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong>
\nThe study of animal consciousness, along with the implications for the natural world, have been a topic of fascination, research, and debate for centuries, with roots tracing back to ancient times, and receiving increased attention after the philosophical inquiries of Ren\u00e9 Descartes and Gustav Fechner. Furthermore, the advances made by Darwin and his theory of evolution expedited both interest and inquiry into the topic of animal consciousness. The following chapter will delve into the complex and dense history of understanding animal consciousness. We seek to explore the pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, and post-Darwinian conceptions of animal consciousness and self-awareness, with a final focus on current and contemporary understandings and conceptions.<\/p>\n

Historical Overview<\/strong>
\nThe debate surrounding animal consciousness in evolutionary psychology has its roots in the mind-body debate of Renes Descartes and the work of Gustav Feckner on metaphysics (Firth & Rees, 2017; Cummings, 2019; Beiser, 2020). Descartes dualism positioned the mind and the body as separate from one another. Today, we would call what Descartes refers to as the mind as consciousness because for him the brain was separate and had sensory and motor functions. The body was like the brain in the sense that it was tangible, it was made of matter. In Descartes’ view the body served the function of movement and extension. Therefore, the distinct and opposite functions and make-up of the mind and body meant that both could be present and work to influence each other, but were not reliant on each other. In other words, Descartes thought that the mind could influence movement in the body through will or through an automatic mechanical like process, but that not all living beings had both. For Descartes, animals had a brain and a body but no mind (Firth & Rees, 2017). In opposition to Descartes, Fechner argued that even if we could prove the existence of souls (consciousness), we could not apply that to animals and other things as proof that they are conscious . In other words, nature can still be conscious without anything else being conscious. He believed that we ascribe consciousness to animals on the basis of their similar structure and function to humans, and that could be applied equally to plants. For Fechner, consciousness was a difference in kind depending on what the conscious being was. For example, according to the philosophy of panpsychism, plants, animals, and humans all had consciousness but just in different ways (Beiser, 2020).
\nDarwin believed that cognitive abilities and emotions in animals were differences of degree not presence or absence (Bekoff, 2003; Smith, 2010). And one of the major ways he tried to prove his theory of evolution was by comparing animals and humans with intellectual disabilities to support his theories (Gelb, 2008). For example, Darwin \u201cnarrated tales of animal heroism including that of a monkey who rescued a zoo keeper from an attack by a much larger and stronger animal, and a baboon who rescued an infant from a threatening pack of dogs. Darwin lauded dogs for their sense of “conscience”, their loyalty and self-command and suggested that they had more self-awareness than some non-Europeans\u201d (Gleb, 2008, p. 3). Darwin\u2019s mentee George Romanes took over his work and really ran with this theory (Jarret, 2020). After the popularization of Darwin\u2019s evolutionary theory, many researchers endorsed the view of animal consciousness as a matter of differences of degree. What followed, then, was the development of several schools of thought that went on to inform how we view animal consciousness today. Namely, comparative psychology, behaviorism, functionalism, and ethology all provided valuable insight into understanding the degrees of consciousness and self-awareness experienced by animals (Burghardt, 2009). Rather than focusing on the consciousness of animals during this period, researchers focused on studying the specific cognitive processes and abilities of animals. The advances made by individuals in this era paved the way for the more thorough and holistic understanding of animal consciousness that exists modernly.<\/p>\n

Pre-Darwinian Conceptions of the Animal Mind<\/strong>
\nIt was a long time before Charles Darwin\u2019s spread of his views on animal consciousness in 1840. Ancient peoples likely had an idea of what animal consciousness was,, but we will be focusing on the beliefs of two key figures of this discussion: Gustav Fechner, and Rene Descartes. Rene Descartes\u2019 beliefs on consciousness could not be defined as a degree or amount with the same components rather than a type or kind. For example, a bug, compared to a human, does not have the same elements of consciousness as humans, reason, critical thinking, and emotions, but just to a smaller degree. Descartes believed non-human levels of consciousness are to serve only biological purposes in animals and is void of critical thought (Harrison, 1992). This is in line with Aristotle\u2019s viewpoint that suggests animals have a different kind of consciousness, implying an incompatibility between an insect\u2019s experience and capabilities versus that of a human. Descartes believed that the most ancient and basic animals and single-celled organisms to current non \u2013 human organisms have no capacity for reasoning, learning, or fear along with all the cognitive traits humans have (Harrison, 1992). Descartes is also known as the architect of the mind body problem, which questions whether bodily function is a result of mental state, or vice versa. In other words, which phenomena are a subset of the other (Rowlands, 2009). Descartes suggested there were two kinds of \u201csubstance\u201d with their own separate properties: matter, which its main property is that it is spatially extended, and the mind, which its property is to think (Grennan, 2014). The term he used for matter, such as bodies, rocks, and tables, was res-extensa, which directly translates from Latin to \u201can extended thing or substance\u201d (Merriam-Webster, 2024). Descartes called mental components, like thoughts or ideas, res-cognita (Grennan, 2014). This directly translates from
\nLatin to \u201ca thinking thing\u201d, as in the mind or soul (Merriam-Webster, 2024). The nature of each of these components is that they are a separate essence with different functions, and they can therefore exist without the other. One of Rene\u2019s major viewpoints on the relationship between these two components of living things is that the physical and material components follow their own laws, unless interrupted or influenced by a mind or soul, and in that case the mind or soul determines what the body does (Grennan, 2014). He suspected the pineal gland was a major site of connection between the mind and body because it\u2019s the only part of the brain that isn\u2019t a duplicate of another brain structure.
\nFurthermore, Descartes did not believe the brain was the mind, but a physical junction between the two. This is because it is a material substance that can be physically altered, while the mind or soul is eternally whole and cannot be materially tampered with. To help support this conclusion, Descartes used what some people called \u201cA Cartesian Method of Doubt\u201d, which entails doubting everything to find truth (University of Notre Dame, 2024). When he would doubt the existence of his physical form, it would prevent him from doubting whether his mind exists, given his ability to doubt in the first place proves the existence of what is responsible for that function. This signifies a difference in properties between these two, and therefore they are two different things. The problem part of this doctrine is that with this logic, if you think of something, that occurrence is a property of you and not what you are thinking of, so there isn\u2019t a proven difference between matter and potential (Grennan, 2014). Instead of viewing the body and self\/mind as the same thing, or a part of one another, the soul can be thought of as a separate skill or ability of the body (Anadale, 2017). This logic lays the framework for Descartes\u2019 view on
\nthe Mind-Body relationship that pertains to all living things. Gustav Fechner was a physicist as well as a philosopher in his own right. According to
\nthe Internet Encyclopedia of Consciousness in 2024 (IEC, 2024), Gustav Fechner was a supporter of the idea of panpsychism, that all things material had a level of consciousness, no matter the complexity of an entity. This includes bugs, sticks, and even rocks. Fechner was also a proponent of inductive metaphysics, which uses empirical and inductive inference in metaphysical discussion (Seide, 2020). In other words, it is the usage of empirical observations to build explanations about the nature of existence, consciousness, and the universe. His views were like Darwin\u2019s as they both believed animals were conscious beings (Animal Rights: A History Charles Darwin, n.d.), but Darwin didn\u2019t believe all objects were conscious as Descartes did. (Wikimedia Foundation, 2023)<\/p>\n

Each of these physicists and philosophers laid a foundation for later physicists, philosophers, and psychologists to build and speculate on the nature of our existence. Though
\nmany of these viewpoints are challenged by modern scholars, they were paramount in giving us a starting point for reasoning some of life\u2019s most complex discussions. Darwin\u2019s Contributions to Conceptions of Consciousness Charles Darwin experienced a number of life events and pursuits that shifted his view on how he viewed humanity in the theory of evolution, and the shift from viewing the \u201chumanity\u201d that we experience as a form of consciousness that is shared among many other living beings. During his circumnavigation voyage on the Beagle Darwin experienced a plethora of life forms that sparked a search for knowledge. In 1836 when he arrived back from his voyage he spent the next several years pouring over several different texts from a variety of sources, and speaking to many different individuals and organizations, one of whom being the Zoological
\nGardens in London. He became convinced of the fact that the life forms he encountered on his circumnavigation were the result of an evolutionary process of some kind. During a visit to the Zoological Gardens, Darwin spent time with an orangutan named Jenny. During his time with Jenny, there were several human behaviors and traits that were profound. Quoted from Darwin’s journal, \u201csee its intelligence when spoken to, as if it understood every word said \u2014 see its affection to those it knows, \u2014 see its passion and rage and sulkiness and every action of despair\u201d (Smith, C. 2010. Pg.6). . A distinction made in his writing was to separate the use of language from consciousness and simply observe behavior. Through his encounters with the Fuegian aboriginal peoples and Jenny, he was able to draw parallels. His view on the Fuegians, albeit dated, was that you could not find a lower level of human being than them. Through this he saw that these \u201csavages\u201d shared a strikingly similar level of behavior with animals he had spent time around. Hensleigh Wedgewood, Darwin’s brother-in-law, published a small body of works in 1848 that disagreed with the sentiment of a fundamental level of consciousness in all beings.
\nWedgewood viewed what he called \u201cbrain think\u201d as nonsense. Darwin was not convinced by this, making the point that there is a certain level of arrogance involved with that outlook, assuming that humans are inherently different in our cognition. He believed that every organ had a function, drawing a similarity between liver bile and the mind, despite the act of \u201cthinking\u201d being difficult to prove, and he believed this was shared in animals. A critical topic that played into this was the concept of \u201cdouble consciousness\u201d, creating a distinction between the \u201chabitual\u201d and \u201cconscious\u201d mind. In 1838 Darwin wrote a journal entry recalling his soon to be wife telling him that she plays her piano pieces better when she is not consciously trying, with the ability to engage in other tasks such as talking with friends while playing. This ties into a book published by Darwin in 1877 titled \u201cDescent of Man\u201d, written as a rebuttal to Ferrier\u2019s argument that there is a solid and well-defined line between man and animal, and that humans share a level of self-awareness that animals do not. Darwin proposed instead that the difference is not a defined demarcation, but rather one of degrees. In this work he focuses on two emotions, guilt and shame, using the example of Squib (uncles\u2019 dog) and Jenny the orangutan. When Squib would be at his uncle\u2019s estate, he would often tell on himself that he had been on the dinner table before anyone knew, looking miserable and sullen, an expression commonly seen in dogs when they know they have done something wrong. This was also observed in Jenny, when she disobeys the zookeepers, she will run off and hide herself, indicating a knowledge of wrongdoing (Smith, C. 2010). Several other activities mentioned in Descent of man that were observed in animals were as follows; a bear pawing at water to bring an object closer, an elephant blowing on an object to move it, canaries having the ability to dream, and a monkey keeping a rock under his bedding as to help him crack nuts. Several of these activities can be observed in the animal kingdom (Stanford, 2021). A controversial yet influential point in Darwin\u2019s search for clarity on the role of consciousness in the animal kingdom, was the parallels drawn between those with disabilities, as well as those of other races and animals, believing that there was an overlap between the least<\/em> evolved humans (represented as those of non-European ancestry, and those with disabilities) and most evolved animals. This view functions on the misunderstanding that evolution moves towards a goal. Support for this belief was found in the works of Carl Vogt, a German anthropologist. Vogt believed that evidence of human evolution need not be found in tribal links, but rather in those with \u201carrested development\u201d. This was argued by Richard Owens in 1835, stating that the underdeveloped human was closer to a fully developed human than a chimp. He also observed certain behaviors that were significant in this belief. \u201cIdiots\u201d had been observed doing several activities such as moving, cleaning themselves, and eating. They were seen using their mouth during the process of cleaning themselves of lice, often smelling every mouthful of food, and walking on all fours, with a particular penchant for climbing trees. There is a level of irony to these observations and claims made by Darwin. Charles Waring Darwin, the son of Emma and Charles, had developmental disabilities such that he did not see his second birthday, and died at the age of months. An unnamed physician figured by what they had seen that his son had down syndrome. When reading his memorial, it is clear Darwin viewed his son as fully human, not seeing any qualities shared in his son, and of those he considered \u201cidiots.\u201d<\/p>\n

Conceptions of Animal Consciousness After Darwin<\/strong>
\nThe period spanning from the 1880s to 2000 witnessed significant shifts in paradigms, cultural attitudes, and frameworks concerning beliefs about animal consciousness due to the influence of Darwian theory (Burghardt, 2009). Notably, during this period animal consciousness became less important to proving human uniqueness or specialness, and instead we saw a focus on studying nonhuman abilities and capacities in their own rights. This section will first delve into schools of thought that engaged in this endeavor, including behaviorism, functionalism, ethology, and comparative psychology. Furthermore, a discussion of some important zeitgeist shifts and cultural differences that influenced how humans viewed animal consciousness will be explored. Lastly will be an exploration of some of the most influential researchers, psychologists, and studies of the era, including works by William James, Margaret Floy Washburn, Edward Thorndike, Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner. Importantly, this era focused less on the presence or absence of consciousness of animals, and instead sought to understand the very degrees of consciousness, self-awareness, and cognitive abilities present in various animals. Comparative psychology, though initially establishing an inherently anthropocentric framework, played a crucial role in shaping the understanding of animal consciousness during this period, and was heavily influenced by Darwinain theory (Burghardt, 2009; Dewsbury, 1992; Warden, 1927). Early comparative psychologists of the late 19th century, such as C. Lloyd Morgan and Edward L. Thorndike, sought to identify commonalities and differences in behavior across species (Dewsbury, 1992; Warden, 1927). Although their work acknowledged cognitive abilities in animals, it primarily focused on behavioral observations rather than explicitly addressing questions of consciousness or self-awareness (Burghardt, 2009; Dewsbury, 1992). With an inherently anthropocentric focus, researchers including Linus Kline sought to distinguish similarities and differences in the instincts of humans and nonhumans in the late 1900\u2019s (Dewsbury, 1992). Darwin\u2019s focus on mental continuity, in The Descent of Man, paved the way for future comparative psychologists in the 20th century to focus on testing and measuring nonhuman intelligence and other psychological processes and traits by using captive and domesticated animals, including rats and mice, dogs, and pigeons\u2014although other species were tested, too (Burghardt, 2009). Around the onset of the 20th century, we see the emergence of a paradigm shift as researchers began conducting animal studies to understand the behavior of nonhumans not for the sake of furthering understanding of humans, but for its own purpose (Dewsbury, 1992). This tendency increased as researchers recognized that investigations into animal behavior and cognition held maximal significance when the typical behaviors and lifestyles of the animals being studied occurred in their natural environments, as it provided more holistic,\u00a0 and less artificial, data (Dewsbury, 1992). For example, what resulted from this particular recognition was Willard Stanton Small\u2019s use of mazes when studying the behavior of rats (Dewsbury, 1992). Indeed, this approach to studying animal behavior laid the groundwork for ethology (Dewsbury, 1992). Ethology, emerging in the mid-20th century, represented a departure from the laboratory-based approaches of comparative psychology (Burghardt, 2009). Researchers like Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen advocated for the study of behavior in naturalistic settings, emphasizing the role of evolution, instincts, and innate behaviors (Burghardt, 1985). These ethological perspectives challenged the reductionist tendencies of behaviorism and underscored the importance of understanding behavior within its ecological and evolutionary context. Indeed, ethologists have been credited with the successful resuscitation of the study of instinctive behavior, although disagreements concerning the ethological approach to studying animal behavior led to \u201cinstinct wars\u201d during the mid-20th century (Burghardt, 2009, p.
\n106). Although behaviorism is critiqued for being reductionistic, it was still highly influential in informing the views of animal consciousness of the time. Behaviorism, popularized in the early 20th century by psychologists such as John B. Watson and B.F. Skinner, emphasized observable behaviors over internal mental states, which meant the concept of consciousness was put on the backburner, so-to-speak. This approach led to a reductionist view of animal behavior, focusing on stimulus-response mechanisms rather than subjective experiences (Birnbaum, 1955). As a result, discussions concerning the consciousness of animals \u201cwent out of fashion,\u201d during the mid-1910\u2019s (Burghardt, 1985, p. 909), and what proceeded was a more mainstream disinterest in both ethology and comparative psychology (Burghardt, 1985). Functionalism, on the other hand, sought to understand the adaptive functions of behavior, paving the way for a deeper appreciation of the cognitive capacities of animals (Burghardt, 2009). It is important to note that views of animal consciousness were, and still are, heavily culturally informed. As Sch\u00f6nfeld (2006) discusses, many animal studies that were happening outside the American, British, and French theaters were largely being discounted due to the preference at the time to maintain Christian and Cartesian beliefs concerning disparities of animal and human minds. While studies were being conducted on language, intention, and passion in the Nordic and Baltic theaters, such studies were disregarded and passed over in favor of studies that focused on animal instincts, thus reinforcing the view of animals as biological machines (Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). Meanwhile, in the Eurasian theater, groundbreaking studies were being conducted that exemplified the complexity of animal cognition and behavior: in 1923, researcher Karl von Frisch, an ethologist, published his discovery of languages in animals
\n(Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). Additionally, Rose (2012) posits that the differences in styles in writing between Konrad Lorenz, an Austrian researcher who has been credited as the founder of ethology, and Robert Yerkes, an American ethologist and eugenicist, in the 1930s are particularly notable in terms of the level of explanation that these authors give for animal behavior when conducting their studies. Fast forward a couple of decades to 1952, and we see researcher Kinji Imanishi discovering that culture is not a solely human experience, and instead is shared with other animals, as exemplified in his research on macaques (Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). The Anglo American and French disregard for these initial studies on the consciousness of animals were, at least to some degree, influenced by the dominant behaviorist school of thought at the time (Burghardt, 1992; Sch\u00f6nfeld, 2006). One of the first researchers who laid the groundwork for the development of the field of behaviorism, which dominated for the majority of the 20th century was Edward Thorndike, influenced by Lloyd Morgan and George Romanes (Warden, 1927; Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). In the late 1890\u2019s, Thorndike began to publish his influential work on learning in cats, chickens, dogs, and other animals, and is credited for introducing laboratory experiments into the field of comparative psychology (Warden, 1927; Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). Furthermore, Thorndike paved the way for comparative psychology through his emphasis on studying the behavior of animals (Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998). As Thorndike was conducting his studies on \u201cinstrumental\u201d or \u201ctrial-and-error\u201d learning in animals (Stam & Kalmanovitch, 1998), Ivan Pavlov was also conducting studies of similar effect and thus discovered classical conditioning (Catania & Laties, 1999). Ivan Pavlov’s groundbreaking work in classical conditioning, particularly his experiments with dogs that led to the discovery of the conditioned reflex, laid the groundwork for the study of learning and behavior, and his theories continue to influence these topics today (Catania & Laties, 1999).
\nInterested in Pavlov\u2019s research on classical conditioning, Skinner\u2019s initial research in behaviorism focussed on reflexology in order to determine the principles of operant conditioning in rats, taking a degree of inspiration from Thorndike and his puzzle box, which ultimately led to his discovery of operant conditioning (Iversen, 1992). Watson, a fellow behaviorist, also took inspiration from Pavlov and demonstrated through conditioning how environmental stimuli could elicit reflexive responses in animals, which contributed to the understanding of learning processes in both animals and humans (Horowitz, 1992). William James, a functionalist, emphasized the continuity between human and nonhuman minds, and argued that humans and animals shared different mental processes to varying degrees, concluding that understanding animal behavior can provide valuable insights to human psychology and consciousness (Nielsen & Day, 1999). James\u2019 work on instincts and emotions highlighted the importance of how both emotions and instincts influence behavior in terms of motivation, actions, and adaptation to the environment (Suplizio, 2007). Initially focusing on sensation and perception, Margaret Floy Washburn studied animal
\nbehavior and consciousness in detail, resulting in the production of her book titled The Animal Mind, which was the first publication in the US on comparative psychology, consisting of an organized collection of literature on animal behavior ranging from primates to single-celled organisms (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). Through its various revisions, The Animal Mind highlighted the various experimental processes and methods used for the comprehensive studying of animal behavior; Washburn emphasized the importance of maintaining balance while studying animal behavior, not jumping to conclusions or using anecdotes, and through her work compared human consciousness to the behaviors and responses of animals, arguing for the necessity to identity which neurological structures and functions can be included for the criteria of defining what level of consciousness various species exhibit (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). Ultimately, through her work, Washburn concluded that consciousness must be present in higher animals, yet less present in lower ones, though pinpointing its emergence is difficult to track down (Fragaszy, 2021; Pillsbury, 1940). In conclusion, the 19th and 20th centuries experienced transformations in the views of animal consciousness, marked by a shift away from emphasizing human specialness towards acknowledging the unique qualities of animals. This evolution was influenced by developments in functionalism, behaviorism, ethology, and comparative psychology, as well as changing cultural attitudes. By embracing a more inclusive understanding of consciousness, researchers, and society as a whole, have begun to recognize the richness and diversity of mental life across species. The groundbreaking work of this era enhanced the knowledge of nonhuman minds while also challenging anthropocentric views, thus paving the way for more nuanced and inclusive conceptions of animal consciousness. The foundational principles established during this period continue to influence the more contemporary research and discourse on animal consciousness
\nthat is still ongoing, highlighting the importance of this transformative era in the history of psychology and animal research.<\/p>\n

Current Evolutionary Perspectives<\/strong>
\nBehaviorism dominated mid-20th century psychology. Behaviorists believed that internal mental states held no validity because they were not observable (Jarret, 2020). Animal behavior should focus on learning and memory because that behavior is observable and measurable, but the reasons why an animal behaves in such a way should not be inferred. Thus, the rise of behaviorism in the field of psychology resulted in the discardment of consciousness as an important phenomenon to focus on (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022). However, the cognitive revolution starting in the 1950s laid the groundwork for a man named Dr. Donald Griffin to reintroduce cognition into behaviorism in the 1970s with his Cognitive Ethology (Veit, 2022). In Cognitive Ethology animals’ subjective mental experiences were studied through natural observation. His arguments for consciousness in animals were based upon neural correlates, adapting ways to solve new problems, ways of communicating between animals of the same species, mirror recognition tests as a method of measuring consciousness, memory, and the evolutionary purpose of morality (Ristau, 2013). The cognitive revolution was bringing back the study of consciousness through ways of encouraging the study of animal sentience and cognition in the context of evolution. Additionally, this resurgence of animal sentience and consciousness
\nand new discussions on how it relates to morality fueled the animal rights movement (Jarret, 2020). Advances in the field of psychology and other related sciences allowed for novel ways to study consciousness in animals, and in 2012 animal consciousness was officially recognized as conscious beings with the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. The declaration states that although cortical structures are involved in the neural substrates of emotion because of its higher-order functions, the subcortical structures of the brain also play a very important part. Artificially stimulating the brain regions involved in emotion for humans in animals produces a comparable result. In other words, both humans and animals experience emotions and that similar subcortical brain regions are activated during emotional states. \u201cYoung human and non-human animals without neocortices retain these brain-mind functions,\u201d and neural circuits involved in attending, sleeping, making decisions, and neurophysiological patterns were previously thought to have not been possible without a neocortex (Low, 2012, para 3). Additionally, emotion in animals is assessed based on the way the animal behaviorally responds
\nto stimuli as well as how they interact with one another. For example, pigtail macaques have the ability to understand the different meanings of facial expressions in different contexts, specifically the bearing of teeth (Beisner & McCowan, 2014). Additionally, research has found that hallucinogenic effects causing disturbances in consciousness that result in altered cognitive, affective, and behavioral states when humans take them, also produce similar effects in animals. Thus, because conscious awareness in humans is
\ncorrelated with cortical activity and subcortical processing, and the same regions in animals produce comparable feeling states, provides \u201ccompelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal affective qualia,\u201d or internal and subjective components of sense perceptions (Low, 2012, para 5). The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness declares that \u201cThe absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates\u201d (2012, para 6). In 2016 a journal solely dedicated to studies of consciousness in non-humans titled
\nAnimal Sentience was created. The debate is no longer about the presence or absence of consciousness in animals, and instead is about what consciousness is in the context of the animal and how conscious they are. In other words, the approach to consciousness in animals is less anthropocentric and hierarchical. However, this is not always the case because much of the research that is done on animals and animal consciousness is done in relation to the benefits it can provide humans (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022).Thus, current perspectives in evolutionary psychology echo Darwin and Romanes in that the field views consciousness as one of degree not kind, as well as its comparison of humans and animals by leveling out the hierarchy of the food chain, so to speak. Consciousness has been studied in more depth and been broken down and separated into different levels and forms. For example self-referencing, self-awareness, self-consciousness, sentience, are considered to be different levels of consciousness (Thomas, 2016). Episodic memory has also been studied in relation to consciousness, arguing that it is the most important determinant of the highest level of consciousness, and without it a being is just sentient. However, leveling out the hierarchy and separating consciousness into levels has been done by comparing children and people with so-called intellectual deficits to animals, with some researchers doing so to demonstrate speciesism (Jarret, 2020; Thomas, 2016). Selfhood does not require theory of mind or the possession of a personal identity because
\nselfhood is just having an awareness of oneself and others for interaction. Selfhood is the awareness of having a body just to the extent that a response to things in one’s environment is possible. For example, when I brush my cat Elliot, he starts to pull away and bite the brush because he understands that he is being brushed. For him to react like that he has to have selfhood, because \u201cIf there was no sense of self, even minimally for an individual, there would be nothing to which the experience belonged, or no one to experience the pain\u201d (Thomas, 2020, p. 41). Cats, dogs, pigs, cows, and certain species of birds have been studied and are thought to have not only selfhood but also self-awareness even if on a less complex level than humans and is only due to their lack of linguistic ability. Although some argue that interspecie communication is the same as the way humans communicate, we as humans cannot understand it (Ahmed and Corradi, 2022; Thomas, 2016). The field of Evolutionary Psychology believes that animals possess consciousness. Although some debate still exists about the possession of self awareness in animals, it is only about the degree to which certain animals possess. Overall, consciousness and self-awareness are seen to exist in animals, and while not every study reduces human capacity and increases animal capacity explicitly like Darwin did back in the day, the majority of the field does so implicitly through comparison (Thomas, 2016; Jarret, 2020; Ahmed and Corradi, 2022).<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong>
\nThe topic of animal consciousness will likely continue to be an area of interest for decades to come. Throughout this chapter, we have explored how different periods viewed conceptions of animal consciousness. Indeed, from ancient Egypt and ancient Greece, Cartesian dualism and the Darwinian revolution, to the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness, the topic of self-awareness and consciousness in animals continues to be a topic of amusement, speculation, inquiry, and investigation, both within psychology and broader society. Of importance, pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, post-Darwinian, and contemporary views of consciousness were described. Going forward, it is important for researchers, policy makers, businesses, animal welfare advocates, ethicists, and society as a whole to collaborate and investigate holistic approaches when studying animals that may in turn benefit the animal subjects, animals as a whole, and the human species. A shift away from hierarchical conceptions of animals and humans should be replaced with education and awareness campaigns that work to inform the public concerning the complexities of animal cognition and mental processes. Promoting empathy and compassion at the societal level towards animals, as well as encouraging and facilitating an understanding of the mental lives of animals, should be considered. Ultimately, this chapter highlights how changes in societal views of “the mind” and the significance attributed to understanding the subjective experiences of animals influences their treatment. It is important to recognize that cultural trends, informed by the broader zeitgeist, can directly influence animal welfare, and is crucial for future considerations.<\/p>\n

Definitions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Behaviorism: The school of psychology, with figures like John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner, that focused on studying observable and measurable behaviors rather than internal mental states or processes, and though it is sometimes critiqued for being reductionistic, it provided groundwork for studying processes of learning.<\/p>\n

Anthropocentric framework: A framework that puts human beings in the center of the universe, so-to-speak, and all other beings and entities are put on this earth to provide use for humans.<\/p>\n

Cognitive Ethology: The study of the mental experiences of animals as they behave in their natural environment in the course of their normal lives. It was made to address consciousness and the phenomenological experience of animals.<\/p>\n

Selfhood: Having individuality\/an individual identity and being aware of it.<\/p>\n

Double Consciousness: Double-consciousness is identified as a\u00a0\u201csensation\u201d, a consciousness of one\u2019s self<\/strong>, but which falls short of a unified, \u201ctrue\u201d self-consciousness.<\/p>\n

Arrested Development: Arrested development refers to the stoppage of physical development, emotional development, or mental development before reaching adulthood.<\/p>\n

Panpsychism: The belief that all entities have some level of consciousness and mind-like qualities.<\/p>\n

Mind-Body Problem: The contradiction of our bodies being in space yet our mind not being in space.<\/p>\n

Discussion Questions:<\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/strong> Discuss the ways in which research on animal consciousness was disregarded by Anglo American and French researchers during the early to mid 20th century.<\/p>\n

A: Within Anglo American and French societies, there was a preference for Christian and Cartesian beliefs, resulting in disregard for animal studies that were taking place elsewhere in the world, including parts of Europe and Asia. American researchers studying animals and researchers from elsewhere around the world had very different ways of discussing their findings when it came to studying animals. Notably during this time researchers in Nordic and Baltic countries were studying language, intention, and passion in animals; during this period, Karl von Frisch published his discovery of languages in animals.<\/p>\n

2.<\/strong> Discuss the ways in which research on animal consciousness was disregarded by Anglo American and French researchers during the early to mid 20th century.<\/p>\n

A. Within Anglo American and French societies, there was a preference for Christian and Cartesian beliefs, resulting in disregard for animal studies that were taking place elsewhere in the world, including parts of Europe and Asia. American researchers studying animals and researchers from elsewhere around the world had very different ways of discussing their findings when it came to studying animals. Notably during this time researchers in Nordic and Baltic countries were studying language, intention, and passion in animals; during this period, Karl von Frisch published his discovery of languages in animals. Kinji Imanishi discovered that culture is not a solely human experience, and instead is shared with other animals, as exemplified in his research on macaques. The Anglo American and French disregard for these initial studies on the consciousness of animals were, at least to some degree, influenced by the dominant behaviorist school of thought at the time.<\/p>\n

3.<\/strong> What are the current evolutionary views\/beliefs on animal consciousness?<\/p>\n

A: Behaviorism dominated mid-20th century psychology and in response to this and its belief that internal mental states held no validity or importance, reducing human capacity and increasing animal capacity (in terms of consciousness and intellect) has had a resurgence. This resurgence is also partly fueled by the animal rights movement as well. Consciousness has been studied more and broken down and separated into different forms and levels. Evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, comparative psychology echo what Darwin and Romanes thought, but in a more in depth, advanced, less racist way, but still to some extent an ableist way. Current perspective has moved away from needing language to be conscious but also still believes in difference of degree not kind. The difference in degree is still debated but is moving towards a belief\/perspective that there is actually little difference in degree. Although some debate still exists about the possession of self awareness in animals, it is only about the degree to which certain animals possess. Overall, consciousness and self-awareness are seen to exist in animals, and while not every study reduces human capacity and increases animal capacity explicitly like Darwin did back in the day, the majority of the field does so implicitly through comparison.<\/p>\n

4.<\/strong> What were some of the factors in Darwins life that influenced his view of people with disabilities and how did these relate to his findings of animal consciousness?<\/p>\n

A: Darwins circumnavigation of the globe viewing the habits and environments of animals around the world and his encounters with certain indigenous tribes played into him drawing correlations between those with arrested development and the tribes he encountered. His time spent at the London Zoo with Jenny the orangutang also led him to see similarities between the behaviour of animals and disabled people, viewing disabled people as the \u201cmissing link\u201d between civilized people and indigenous people.<\/p>\n

5.<\/strong> What is something the Mind-Body problem contributed to in the field of psychology?<\/p>\n

A: The mind-body problem made fellow psychologists more aware of the duality of our being, making us reconsider the gravity of our mind as a non-physical entity, and our body as a physical one. This mystery has led psychologists to observe the relationship more closely between the mind and body, and this philosophical topic is present in modern cognitive behavioral therapy. A cognitive behavioral therapist may aim to encourage the client to develop a relationship between their thoughts and physiological functions to create more reliable and effective coping strategies for psychological problems. Using this relationship between mind and body has allowed psychologists to help people listen to their bodies when their mind is troubled and vice versa, allowing more effective treatment.<\/p>\n

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