{"id":271,"date":"2014-03-18T20:35:25","date_gmt":"2014-03-19T00:35:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/socialpsychologyh5p\/chapter\/social-categorization-and-stereotyping\/"},"modified":"2021-02-26T14:27:46","modified_gmt":"2021-02-26T19:27:46","slug":"social-categorization-and-stereotyping","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.bccampus.ca\/socialpsychologyh5p\/chapter\/social-categorization-and-stereotyping\/","title":{"raw":"Social Categorization and Stereotyping","rendered":"Social Categorization and Stereotyping"},"content":{"raw":"
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Learning Objectives<\/p>\n\n<\/header>\n

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    \n \t
  1. Describe the fundamental process of social categorization and its influence on thoughts, feelings, and behavior.<\/li>\n \t
  2. Define stereotypes<\/em> and describe the ways that stereotypes are measured.<\/li>\n \t
  3. Review the ways that stereotypes influence our behavior.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nThinking about others in terms of their group memberships is known as social categorization<\/strong>\u2014the natural cognitive process by which we place individuals into social groups.<\/em> Social categorization occurs when we think of someone as a man (versus a woman), an old person (versus a young person), a Black person (versus an Asian or White person), and so on (Allport, 1954\/1979). \u00a0Just as we categorize objects into different types, so do we categorize people according to their social group memberships. Once we do so, we begin to respond to those people more as members of a social group than as individuals.\n\nImagine for a moment that two college students, Farhad\u00a0and Sarah, are talking at a table in the student union at your college or university. At this point, we would probably not consider them to be acting as group members, but rather as two individuals. Farhad\u00a0is expressing his opinions, and Sarah is expressing hers. Imagine, however, that as the conversation continues, Sarah brings up an assignment that she is completing for her women\u2019s studies class. It turns out that Farhad\u00a0does not think there should be a women\u2019s studies program at the college, and he tells Sarah so. He argues that if there is a women\u2019s studies program, then there should be a men\u2019s studies program too. Furthermore, he argues that women are getting too many breaks in job hiring and that qualified men are the targets of discrimination. Sarah feels quite the contrary\u2014arguing that women have been the targets of sexism for many, many years and even now do not have the same access to high-paying jobs that men do.\n\nYou can see that an interaction that began at individual level, as two individuals conversing, has now turned to the group level, in which Farhad\u00a0has begun to consider himself as a man, and Sarah has begun to consider herself as a woman. In short, Sarah is now arguing her points not so much for herself as she is as a representative of one of her ingroups\u2014namely, women\u2014and Farhad\u00a0is acting as a representative of one of his ingroups\u2014namely, men. Sarah feels that her positions are correct, and she believes they are true not only for her but for women in general. And the same is true of Farhad. You can see that these social categorizations may create some potential for misperception, and perhaps even hostility. And Farhad\u00a0and Sarah may even change their opinions about each other, forgetting that they really like each other as individuals, because they are now responding more as group members with opposing views.\n\nImagine now that while Farhad\u00a0and Sarah are still talking, some students from another college, each wearing the hats and jackets of that school, show up in the student union. The presence of these outsiders might change the direction of social categorization entirely, leading both Farhad\u00a0and Sarah to think of themselves as students at their own college. And this social categorization might lead them to become more aware of the positive characteristics of their college (the excellent rugby\u00a0team, lovely campus, and intelligent students) in comparison with the characteristics of the other school. Now, rather than perceiving themselves as members of two different groups (men versus women), Farhad\u00a0and Sarah might suddenly perceive themselves as members of the same social category (students at their college).\n\nPerhaps this example will help you see the flexibility of social categorization. We sometimes think of our relationships with others at the individual level and sometimes at the group level. And which groups we use in social categorization can change over time and in different situations. You are more likely to categorize yourself as a member of your college or university when your rugby\u00a0or football team has just won a really important game, or at your graduation\u00a0ceremony, than you would on a normal evening out with your family. In these cases, your membership as a university student is simply more salient and important than it is every day, and you are more likely to categorize yourself accordingly.\n

    Spontaneous Social Categorization<\/h2>\nSocial categorization occurs spontaneously, without much thought on our part (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007).\u00a0Shelley Taylor and her colleagues (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978)\u00a0showed their research participants a slide and tape presentation of three male and three female college students who had supposedly participated in a discussion group. During the presentation, each member of the discussion group made a suggestion about how to advertise a college play. The statements were controlled so that across all the research participants, the statements made by the men and the women were of equal length and quality. Furthermore, one half of the participants were told that when the presentation was over, they would be asked to remember which person had made which suggestion, whereas the other half of the participants were told merely to observe the interaction without attending to anything in particular.\n\nAfter they had viewed all the statements made by the individuals in the discussion group, the research participants were given a memory test (this was entirely unexpected for the participants who had not been given memory instructions). The participants were shown the list of all the statements that had been made, along with the pictures of each of the discussion group members, and were asked to indicate who had made each of the statements. The research participants were not very good at this task, and yet when they made mistakes, these errors were very systematic.\n\nAs you can see in Table 11.1, \"Name Confusions,\"<\/a> the mistakes were such that the statements that had actually been made by a man were more frequently wrongly attributed to another man in the group than to another woman, and the statements actually made by a woman were more frequently attributed to other women in the group than to a man. The participants evidently categorized the speakers by their gender, leading them to make more within-gender than across-gender confusions.\n\nInterestingly, and suggesting that categorization is occurring all the time, the instructions that the participants had been given made absolutely no difference. There was just as much categorization for those who were not given any instructions as for those who were told to remember who said what. Other research using this technique has found that we spontaneously categorize each other on the basis of many other group memberships, including race, academic status (student versus teacher), social roles, and other social categories (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992).\n\n<\/a>Table 11.1 Name Confusions\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Instructions<\/th>\nWithin race errors<\/th>\nBetween race errors<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Memory<\/td>\n5.78<\/td>\n4.29<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    No memory<\/td>\n6.57<\/td>\n4.36<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Ruderman (1978)Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S. T., Etcoff, N. L., & Ruderman, A. J. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36<\/em>(7), 778\u2013793. demonstrated that people categorized others spontaneously. Even without any instructions to categorize, people nevertheless confused others by their sex.<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nThe conclusion is simple, if perhaps obvious: Social categorization is occurring all around us all the time. Indeed, social categorization occurs so quickly that people may have difficulty not<\/em> thinking about others in terms of their group memberships (see Figure 11.4<\/a>).\n<\/a>\n\n[caption id=\"attachment_1962\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"350\"]\"59798751_bc530426b6_o\"<\/a> Figure 11.4 If you are like most people, you will have a strong desire to categorize this person as either male or female. Source: Chillin by Sabrina C (https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/cloud10\/59798751\/) used under CC BY 2.0 (https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/2.0\/)[\/caption]\n\n \n

    The Benefits of Social Categorization<\/h2>\nThe tendency to categorize others is often\u00a0quite useful. In some cases, we categorize because doing so provides us with information about the characteristics of people who belong to certain social groups (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995).\u00a0If you found yourself lost in a city, you might look for a police officer or a taxi driver to help you find your way. In this case, social categorization would probably be useful because a police officer or a taxi driver might be particularly likely to know the layout of the city streets. Of course, using social categories will only be informative to the extent that the stereotypes held by the individual about that category are accurate. If police officers were actually not that knowledgeable about the city layout, then using this categorization heuristic would not be informative.\n\nThe description of social categorization as a heuristic is also true\u00a0in another sense:\u00a0we sometimes categorize others not because it seems to provide more information about them but because we may not have the time (or the motivation) to do anything more thorough. Using our stereotypes to size up another person might simply make our life easier (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).\u00a0According to this approach, thinking about other people in terms of their social category memberships is a functional way of dealing with the world\u2014things are complicated, and we reduce complexity by relying on our stereotypes.\n

    The Negative Outcomes of Social Categorization<\/h2>\nAlthough thinking about others in terms of their social category memberships has some potential benefits for the person who does the categorizing, categorizing others, rather than treating them as unique individuals with their own unique characteristics, has a wide variety of negative, and often very unfair, outcomes for those who are categorized.\n\nOne problem is that social categorization distorts our perceptions such that we tend to exaggerate the differences between people from different social groups while at the same time perceiving members of groups (and particularly outgroups) as more similar to each other than they actually are. This overgeneralization makes it more likely that we will think about and treat all members of a group the same way. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963)\u00a0performed a simple experiment that provided a picture of the potential outcomes of categorization. As you can see in Figure 11.5, \"Perceptual Accentuation,\" <\/a>the experiment involved having research participants judge the length of six lines. In one of the experimental conditions, participants simply saw six lines, whereas in the other condition, the lines were systematically categorized into two groups\u2014one comprising the three shorter lines and one comprising the three longer lines.\n<\/a>\n\n[caption id=\"attachment_2959\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"249\"]\"Figure<\/a> Figure 11.5 Perceptual Accentuation[\/caption]\n\nLines C and D were seen as the same length in the noncategorized condition, but line C was perceived as longer than line D when the lines were categorized into two groups. From Tajfel (1970).\n\nTajfel found that the lines were perceived differently when they were categorized, such that the differences between the groups and the similarities within the groups were emphasized. Specifically, he found that although lines C and D (which are actually the same length) were perceived as equal in length when the lines were not categorized, line D was perceived as being significantly longer than line C in the condition in which the lines were categorized. In this case, categorization into two groups\u2014the \u201cshort lines group\u201d and the \u201clong lines group\u201d\u2014produced a perceptual bias such that the two groups of lines were seen as more different than they really were.\n\nSimilar effects occur when we categorize other people. We tend to see people who belong to the same social group as more similar than they actually are, and we tend to judge people from different social groups as more different than they actually are. The tendency to see members of social groups as similar to each other is particularly strong for members of outgroups, resulting in outgroup homogeneity<\/strong>\u2014the tendency to view members of outgroups as more similar to each other than we see members of ingroups<\/em> (Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Perhaps you have\u00a0had this experience yourself when you found yourself thinking or saying, \u201cOh, them, they\u2019re all the same!\u201d\n\nPatricia Linville and Edward Jones (1980)\u00a0gave research participants a list of trait terms and asked them to think about either members of their own group (e.g., Blacks) or members of another group (e.g., Whites) and to place the trait terms into piles that represented different types of people in the group. The results of these studies, as well as other studies like them, were clear: people perceive outgroups as more homogeneous than their\u00a0ingroup. Just as White people used fewer piles of traits to describe Blacks than Whites, young people used fewer piles of traits to describe elderly people than they did young people, and students used fewer piles for members of other universities than they did for members of their own university.\n\nOutgroup homogeneity occurs in part because we don\u2019t have as much contact with outgroup members as we do with ingroup members, and the quality of interaction with outgroup members is often more superficial. This prevents us from really learning about the outgroup members as individuals, and as a result, we tend to be unaware of the differences among the group members. In addition to learning less about them because we see and interact with them less, we routinely categorize outgroup members, thus making them appear more cognitively similar (Haslam, Oakes, & Turner, 1996).\n\nOnce we begin to see the members of outgroups as more similar to each other than they actually are, it then becomes very easy to apply our stereotypes to the members of the groups without having to consider whether the characteristic is actually true of the particular individual. If men think that women are all alike, then they may also think that they all have the same positive and negative characteristics\u00a0(e.g.,\u00a0they\u2019re nurturing,\u00a0emotional). And women may have similarly simplified beliefs about men (e.g., they\u2019re strong,\u00a0unwilling to commit). The outcome is that the stereotypes become linked to the group itself in a set of mental representations (Figure 11.6<\/a>). The stereotypes are \u201cpictures in our heads\u201d of the social groups (Lippman, 1922).\u00a0These beliefs just seem right and natural, even though they are frequently distorted overgeneralizations (Hirschfeld, 1996; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994).\n<\/a>\n\n \n\n[caption id=\"attachment_2960\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"300\"]\"Figure<\/a> Figure 11.6 Stereotypes. Stereotypes are the beliefs associated with social categories. The figure shows links between the social category of college professors and its stereotypes as a type of neural network or schema. The representation also includes one image (or exemplar) of a particular college professor whom the student knows. Image courtesy of Dan Gilbert.[\/caption]\n\nOur stereotypes and prejudices are learned through many different processes. This multiplicity of causes is unfortunate because it makes stereotypes and prejudices even more likely to form and harder to change. For one, we learn our stereotypes in part through our communications with parents and peers (Aboud & Doyle, 1996)\u00a0and from the behaviors we see portrayed in the media (Brown, 1995).\u00a0Even five-year-old children have learned cultural norms about the appropriate activities and behaviors for boys and girls and also have developed stereotypes about age, race, and physical attractiveness (Bigler & Liben, 2006). And there is often good agreement about the stereotypes of social categories among the individuals within a given culture. In one study assessing stereotypes, Stephanie Madon and her colleagues (Madon et al., 2001)\u00a0presented U.S. college students with a list of 84 trait terms and asked them to indicate for which groups each trait seemed appropriate (Figure 11.7, \"Current Stereotypes Held by College Students\")<\/a>. The participants tended to agree about what traits were true of which groups, and this was true even for groups of which the respondents were likely to never have met a single member (Arabs and Russians). Even today, there is good agreement about the stereotypes of members of many social groups, including men and women and a variety of ethnic groups.\n<\/a>\n\n[caption id=\"attachment_2961\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"300\"]\"Figure<\/a> Figure 11.7 Current Stereotypes Held by College Students, from Madon et al. (2001).[\/caption]\n\n \n\nOnce they become established, stereotypes (like any other cognitive representation) tend to persevere. We begin to respond to members of stereotyped categories as if we already knew what they were like. Yaacov Trope and Eric Thompson (1997)\u00a0found that individuals addressed fewer questions to members of categories about which they had strong stereotypes (as if they already knew what these people were like) and that the questions they did ask were likely to confirm the stereotypes they already had.\n\nIn other cases, stereotypes are maintained because information that confirms our stereotypes is better remembered than information that disconfirms them. When we see members of social groups perform behaviors, we tend to better remember information that confirms our stereotypes than we remember information that disconfirms our stereotypes (Fyock & Stangor, 1994).\u00a0If we believe that women are bad drivers and we see a woman driving poorly, then we tend to remember it, but when we see a woman who drives particularly well, we tend to forget it. This illusory correlation\u00a0is\u00a0another example of the general principle of assimilation\u2014we tend to perceive the world in ways that make it fit our existing beliefs more easily than we change our beliefs to fit the reality around us.\n\nAnd stereotypes become difficult to change because they are so important to us\u2014they become an integral and important part of our everyday lives in our culture. Stereotypes are frequently expressed on TV, in movies, and in social media, and we learn a lot of our beliefs from these sources. Our friends also tend to hold beliefs similar to ours, and we talk about these beliefs when we get together with them (Schaller & Conway, 1999).\u00a0In short, stereotypes and prejudice are powerful largely because they are important social norms that are part of our culture (Guimond, 2000).\n\nBecause they are so highly cognitively accessible, and because they seem so \u201cright,\u201d our stereotypes easily influence our judgments of and responses to those we have categorized. The social psychologist John Bargh once described stereotypes as \u201ccognitive monsters\u201d because their activation was so powerful and because the activated beliefs had such insidious influences on social judgment (Bargh, 1999).\u00a0Making things even more difficult, stereotypes are strongest for the people who are in most need of change\u2014the people who are most prejudiced (Lepore & Brown, 1997).\n\nBecause stereotypes and prejudice often operate out of our awareness, and also because people are frequently unwilling to admit that they hold them, social psychologists have developed methods for assessing them indirectly. In the Research Focus box following,\u00a0we will consider two of these approaches\u2014the bogus pipeline procedure and the Implicit Association Test (IAT).\n
    \n

    Research Focus<\/h3>\nMeasuring Stereotypes Indirectly\n\nOne difficulty in measuring stereotypes and prejudice is that people may not tell the truth about their beliefs. Most people do not want to admit\u2014either to themselves or to others\u2014that they hold stereotypes or that they are prejudiced toward some social groups. To get around this problem, social psychologists make use of a number of techniques that help them measure these beliefs more subtly and indirectly.\n\nOne indirect approach to assessing prejudice is called the bogus pipeline procedure<\/strong> (Jones & Sigall, 1971).\u00a0In this procedure, the experimenter first convinces the participants that he or she has access to their \u201ctrue\u201d beliefs, for instance, by getting access to a questionnaire that they completed at a prior experimental session<\/em>. Once the participants are convinced that the researcher is able to assess their \u201ctrue\u201d attitudes, it is expected that they will be more honest in answering the rest of the questions they are asked because they want to be sure that the researcher does not catch them lying. Interestingly,\u00a0people express more prejudice when they are in the bogus pipeline than they do when they are asked the same questions more directly, which suggests that we\u00a0may frequently mask our\u00a0negative beliefs in public.\n\nOther indirect measures of prejudice are also frequently used in social psychological research; for instance, assessing nonverbal behaviors such as speech errors or physical closeness. One common measure involves asking participants to take a seat on a chair near a person from a different racial or ethnic group and measuring how far away the person sits (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974).\u00a0People who sit farther away are assumed to be more prejudiced toward the members of the group.\n\nBecause our stereotypes are activated spontaneously when we think about members of different social groups, it is possible to use reaction-time measures to assess this activation and thus to learn about people\u2019s stereotypes and prejudices. In these procedures, participants are asked to make a series of judgments about pictures or descriptions of social groups and then to answer questions as quickly as they can, but without making mistakes. The speed of these responses is used to determine an individual\u2019s stereotypes or prejudice.\n\nThe most popular reaction-time implicit measure of prejudice\u2014the Implicit Association Test (IAT)<\/strong>\u2014is frequently used to assess stereotypes and prejudice<\/em> (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).\u00a0In the IAT, participants are asked to classify stimuli that they view on a computer screen into one of two categories by pressing one of two computer keys, one with their left hand and one with their right hand.<\/em> Furthermore, the categories are arranged so that the responses to be answered with the left and right buttons either \u201cfit with\u201d (match) the stereotype or do not \u201cfit with\u201d (mismatch) the stereotype. For instance, in one version of the IAT, participants are shown pictures of men and women and are also shown words related to academic disciplines\u00a0(e.g., History<\/em>, French<\/em>, or Linguistics<\/em> for the Arts, or Chemistry<\/em>, Physics<\/em>, or\u00a0Math<\/em> for the Sciences).\u00a0Then the participants categorize the photos (\u201cIs this picture a picture of a man or a woman?\u201d) and answer questions about the disciplines\u00a0(\u201cIs this discipline a\u00a0science<\/em>?) by pressing either the Yes button or the No button using either their left hand or their right hand.\n\nWhen the responses are arranged on the screen in a way that matches a stereotype, such that the male category and the \"science\u201d category are on the same side of the screen (e.g., on the right side), participants can do the task very quickly and they make few mistakes. It\u2019s just easier, because the stereotypes are matched or associated with the pictures in a way that makes sense or is familiar. But when the images are arranged such that the female category\u00a0and the \"science\"\u00a0category are on the same side, whereas the men and the weak categories are on the other side, most participants make more errors and respond more slowly. The basic assumption is that if two concepts are associated or linked, they will be responded to more quickly if they are classified using the same, rather than different, keys.\n\nImplicit association procedures such as the IAT show that even participants who claim that they are not prejudiced do seem to hold cultural stereotypes about social groups. Even Black people themselves respond more quickly to positive words that are associated with White rather than Black faces on the IAT, suggesting that they have subtle racial prejudice toward their own racial group.\n\nBecause they hold these beliefs, it is possible\u2014although not guaranteed\u2014that they may use them when responding to other people, creating a subtle and unconscious type of discrimination. Although the meaning of the IAT has been debated (Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008),\u00a0research using implicit measures does suggest that\u2014whether we know it or not, and even though we may try to control them when we can\u2014our stereotypes and prejudices are easily activated when we see members of different social categories (Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004).\n\nDo you hold implicit prejudices? Try the IAT yourself, here: https:\/\/implicit.harvard.edu\/implicit<\/a>\n\n<\/div>\n \n\nAlthough in some cases the stereotypes that are used to make judgments might actually be true of the individual being judged, in many other cases they are not. Stereotyping is problematic when the stereotypes we hold about a social group are inaccurate overall, and particularly when they do not apply to the individual who is being judged (Stangor, 1995). Stereotyping others is simply unfair. Even if many women are more emotional than are most men, not all are, and it is not right to judge any one woman as if she is.\n\nIn the end, stereotypes become self-fulfilling prophecies, such that our expectations about the group members make the stereotypes come true (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974).\u00a0Once we believe that men make better leaders than women, we tend to behave toward men in ways that makes it easier for them to lead. And we behave toward women in ways that makes it more difficult for them to lead. The result? Men find it easier to excel in leadership positions, whereas women have to work hard to overcome the false beliefs about their lack of leadership abilities (Phelan & Rudman, 2010). This is likely why female lawyers\u00a0with masculine names are more likely to become judges (Coffey & McLaughlin, 2009) and masculine-looking applicants are more likely to be hired as leaders than feminine-looking applicants (von Stockhausen, Koeser, &\u00a0Sczesny,\u00a02013).\n\nThese\u00a0self-fulfilling prophecies are ubiquitous\u2014even teachers\u2019 expectations about their students\u2019 academic abilities can influence the students\u2019 school performance (Jussim, Robustelli, & Cain, 2009).\n\nOf course, you may think that you personally do not behave in these ways, and you may not. But research has found that stereotypes are often used out of our awareness, which makes it very difficult for us to correct for them. Even when we think we are being completely fair, we may nevertheless be using our stereotypes to condone discrimination (Chen & Bargh, 1999).\u00a0And when we are distracted or under time pressure, these tendencies become even more powerful (Stangor & Duan, 1991).\n\nFurthermore, attempting to prevent our stereotype from coloring our reactions to others takes effort. We experience more negative affect (particularly anxiety) when we are with members of other groups than we do when we are with people from our own groups, and we need to use more cognitive resources to control our behavior because of our anxiety about revealing our stereotypes or prejudices (Butz & Plant, 2006; Richeson & Shelton, 2003).\u00a0When we know that we need to control our expectations so that we do not unintentionally stereotype the other person, we may try to do so\u2014but doing so takes effort and may frequently fail (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).\n

    Social Psychology in the Public Interest<\/h3>\nStereotype Threat<\/strong>\n\nOur stereotypes influence not only our judgments of others but also our beliefs about ourselves, and even our own performance on important tasks. In some cases, these beliefs may be positive, and they have the effect of making us feel more confident and thus better able to perform tasks. Because Asian students are aware of the stereotype that \u201cAsians are good at math,\u201d reminding them of this fact before they take a difficult math test can improve their performance on the test (Walton & Cohen, 2003).\u00a0On the other hand, sometimes these beliefs are negative, and they create negative self-fulfilling prophecies such that we perform more poorly just because of our knowledge about the stereotypes.\n\nOne of the long-standing puzzles in the area of academic performance concerns why Black students in the United States perform more poorly on standardized tests, receive lower grades, and are less likely to remain in school in comparison with White students, even when other factors such as family income, parents\u2019 education, and other relevant variables are controlled. Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995)\u00a0tested the hypothesis that these differences might be due to the activation of negative stereotypes. Because Black students are aware of the (inaccurate) stereotype that \u201cBlacks are intellectually inferior to Whites,\u201d this stereotype might create a negative expectation, which might interfere with their performance on intellectual tests through fear of confirming that stereotype.\n\nIn support of this hypothesis, Steele and Aronson\u2019s research revealed that Black college students performed worse (in comparison with their prior test scores) on math questions taken from the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) when the test was described to them as being \u201cdiagnostic of their mathematical ability\u201d (and thus when the stereotype was relevant) but that their performance was not influenced when the same questions were framed as \u201can exercise in problem solving.\u201d And in another study, Steele and Aronson found that when Black students were asked to indicate their race before they took a math test (again activating the stereotype), they performed more poorly than they had on prior exams, whereas the scores of White students were not affected by first indicating their race.\n\nSteele and Aronson argued that thinking about negative stereotypes that are relevant to a task that one is performing creates stereotype threat<\/strong>\u2014performance decrements that are caused by the knowledge of cultural stereotypes<\/em>. That is, they argued that the negative impact of race on standardized tests may be caused, at least in part, by the performance situation itself. Because the threat is \u201cin the air,\u201d Black students may be negatively influenced by it.\n\nResearch has found that the experience of stereotype threat can help explain a wide variety of performance decrements among those who are targeted by negative stereotypes. For instance, when a math task is described as diagnostic of intelligence, Latinos and particularly Latinas perform more poorly than do Whites (Gonzales, Blanton, & Williams, 2002).\u00a0Similarly, when stereotypes are activated, children with low socioeconomic status perform more poorly in math than do those with high socioeconomic status, and psychology students perform more poorly than do natural science students (Brown, Croizet, Bohner, Fournet, & Payne, 2003).\u00a0Even groups who typically enjoy advantaged social status can be made to experience stereotype threat. White men performed more poorly on a math test when they were told that their performance would be compared with that of Asian men (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, & Steele, 1999),\u00a0and Whites performed more poorly than Blacks on a sport-related task when it was described to them as measuring their natural athletic ability (Stone, 2002).\n\nStereotype threat is created in situations that pose a significant threat to self-concern, such that our perceptions of ourselves as important, valuable, and capable individuals are threatened. In these situations, there is a discrepancy between our positive concept of our skills and abilities and the negative stereotypes suggesting poor performance. When our stereotypes lead us to be believe that we are likely to perform poorly on a task, we experience a feeling of unease and status threat.\n\nResearch has found that stereotype threat is caused by both cognitive and affective factors. On the cognitive side, individuals who are experiencing stereotype threat show an impairment in cognitive processing that is caused by increased vigilance toward the environment and attempts to suppress their stereotypical thoughts. On the affective side, stereotype threat creates stress as well as a variety of affective responses including anxiety (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008).\n\nStereotype threat is not, however, absolute\u2014we can get past it if we try. What is important is to reduce the self-concern that is engaged when we consider the relevant negative stereotypes. Manipulations that affirm positive characteristics about oneself or one\u2019s group are successful at reducing stereotype threat (Alter, Aronson, Darley, Rodriguez, & Ruble, 2010; Greenberg et al., 2003; McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003).\u00a0In fact, just knowing that stereotype threat exists and may influence performance can help alleviate its negative impact (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005).\n
    \n

    Key Takeaways<\/p>\n\n<\/header>\n

    \n