20 Reconciliation
What is meant by reconciliation?
Reconciliation presupposes the resolution of conflict, but conflict resolution does not imply that historical traumas are forgotten or that peace fully prevails. Rather, it marks the initiation of a process through which the central needs and fears of societies are acknowledged and addressed, and mechanisms are established to continue confronting those needs and fears over time (Kelman, 1997). In this sense, conflict resolution represents a fragile and temporary state. The role of reconciliation is to transform this tenuous peace into a stable and enduring one (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).
Reconciliation is a multifaceted construct, and different academic disciplines approach it through distinct lenses. For example, within international relations, reconciliation is often conceptualized in terms of fostering security, economic cooperation, and political collaboration between elites—with the assumption that such changes will eventually extend to peaceful relations among broader populations (Adler & Barnett, 1998).
In contrast, scholars and practitioners in the field of peacebuilding often emphasize social-psychological dimensions. In his 1994 address to the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Nelson Mandela described reconciliation as a process that unfolds in “the hearts and minds of the people” (Mandela, 1994). In terms of a unified definition, there is unfortunately none, although whole books have been devoted to the topic (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). Reconciliation is often defined in broad terms without specific clarification as to what exactly constitutes it; in contrast, when researchers have a specific aspect of reconciliation they wish to focus on, it is often described in those terms (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015). Reconciliation has also been described in terms of a continuum, rather than a dichotomy, with some groups or post-conflict societies being more reconciled than others (Hermann, 2004). While scholars agree that reconciliation is difficult to define, there is consensus that it is both a process and an outcome (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Hermann, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). It seems that, in matters of definition, it is reconciliation as an outcome that poses the most difficulty; this is due, in part, to the unique characteristics of the conflict and the cultural milieu in which it unfolds. But first, I will consider reconciliation as a process.
Reconciliation as a process
“True reconciliation is never cheap, for it is based on forgiveness which is costly. Forgiveness in turn depends on repentance, which has to be based on an acknowledgment of what was done wrong, and therefore on disclosure of truth. You cannot forgive what you do not know.” (Tutu, 1995)
Scholars agree that both sides in a conflict should mutually acknowledge wrong-doings perpetrated by their group (Gibson, 1996; Kelman, 2005; Moaz, 2004). There are, however, distinct identity threats which give rise to motivational states that bear directly on how reconciliation unfolds (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008, 2010). According to the needs-based model for reconciliation, post-conflict, aggressors experience a threat to their moral standing whereas victims experience a threat to their agency (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008, 2010). These different threats evoke distinct motivations: perpetrators are driven to restore their sense of being a moral social actor that is not innately cruel (i.e., their moral standing), whereas victims are motivated to regain a sense of power, autonomy, and esteem (i.e., agency; Shnabel et al., 2009). It is, however, rare for one group to be the sole perpetrator and the other, the sole victim (Mazziotta et al., 2014; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014); and this is certainly the case in Northern Ireland, where both Catholic and Protestant communities had numerous perpetrators and victims, some being both. Being both a perpetrator and victim of intergroup conflict, what Shnabel and Nadler (2015) refer to as “duals”, often highlights both motivational states with the need to restore power being more closely associated with reconciliatory attitudes than is restoring the group’s moral standing (Mazziotta et al., 2014; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Thus, duals behave more like victims than perpetrators (this possibility is consistent with findings suggesting that groups strategically engage in ‘competitive victimhood’ to protect their moral identity in response to accusations by outgroups (Sullivan et al., 2012).
Thus, the process of reconciliation includes several key social-psychological processes, including the need for forgiveness (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Hewstone et al., 2008), acknowledgment of wrongdoing (Gibson, 2006), expressions of remorse (de Greiff, 2008), offering of apologies (Halabi et al., 2013), and compensation or reparations (Schmittet al., 2004). These processes further encompass core psychological processes that facilitate reconciliation, such as perspective-taking (and its reciprocal form, perspective-giving; Bruneau & Saxe, 2012), empathy and re-humanization (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004)), and realistic and symbolic threat (Rupar & Graf, 2018).
Expressing remorse, acknowledging wrong-doing, and offering apologies are strategies that restore a sense of moral standing. Receiving the acknowledgments and feeling that the plight of the ingroup has been heard restore a sense of agency. Next, I will consider several of the key concepts in this area in turn.
Attitudes and respect. Attitudes held towards respective ingroups and outgroups are the quintessential measure in the study of intergroup relations, consistently showing an ingroup bias (see Hewstone et al., 2001). Attitudes feature prominently in many of studies reviewed below. But a complementary construct is that of respect, especially unconditional respect: an orientation that rests on the assumption that all people have intrinsic worth and deserve respect simply by their being human. One of our NGO partners told us (confidential, personal communication) that building respect is fundamental to their cross-community/peacebuilding programmes.
Social-psychological studies have found that unconditional respect is positively related to positive action tendencies toward other groups, and that respect is a significant negative predictor of negative action tendencies even when other key variables (e.g., outgroup attitude, empathy, and the quality and quantity of intergroup contact) were statistically controlled (Lalljee et al., 2009) and even under conditions of severe conflict, in Northern Ireland (Laham et al., 2010, Study 2). Relatedly, Nasie (2023) found, in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, that perceiving respect for one’s own group from the adversary in turn predicts improvement in attitudes and perceptions towards the adversary group.
Apology. Apologies are central to the process of reconciliation, but they bear significant risk, especially when power relations are perceived to be unstable. Ineffective apologies can stifle forgiveness and increase retributive attitudes (Skarlicki et al., 2004). When apologies are effective, however, they strongly promote forgiveness (Azar et al., 1999; Fehr & Gelfland, 2010) and constitute a form of symbolic reparation (Fehr & Gelfland, 2010; Swart, 2008). The strong positive association between apologies and forgiveness is consistent across various religious groups (Azar & Mullet, 2001). Effective apologies include expressions of remorse (de Grieff, 2008) and empathy (Schmitt et al., 2004), acknowledgement of injustice and suffering (Noor et al., 2012), and an offer of some compensation (Goffman, 1967, Schmitt et al., 2004). Insincerity (Wenzel et al., 2017) and status instability (Halabi et al., 2021) contribute to ineffective apologies. Indeed, apologies that are costly (either in terms of effort or reparations made) are perceived as more sincere, a finding that replicates across several countries and religious groups (Ohtsubo, et al., 2012).
Perspective-Taking, Perspective-Giving, and Empathy: Perspective-taking is a cognitive process in which an individual attempts to understand another person’s experiences, thoughts, or feelings from that person’s point of view. It is considered a precursor to affective empathy, which involves feelings of warmth and compassion toward the suffering of another person or group. Together, perspective-taking and affective empathy may give rise to altruistic behavior (Batson et al., 1991). These processes play a critical role in reconciliation, as apologies (McCullough et al., 1998) and expressions of remorse (Davis & Gold, 2011) evoke perspective-taking and empathy, which in turn promote forgiveness (Davis & Gold, 2011; Noor et al., 2008; Oliner, 2005; Swart et al., 2011).
However, the effects of perspective-taking appear to be asymmetric. For example, Hewstone and colleagues (2004) found that, in a Northern Irish sample, perspective-taking was associated with forgiveness among Protestant, but not Catholic respondents. Drawing on the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), Bruneau and Saxe (2012) offer a plausible explanation for such asymmetries. They argue that perspective-taking may help restore a sense of moral character among members of dominant groups, yet taking the perspective of the aggressor does little to restore a sense of power among disadvantaged groups; a parallel concept—perspective-giving—may be more effective in such contexts. Perspective-giving, when it involves feeling that the suffering of one’s own group has been acknowledged, may help restore a sense of agency and empowerment among marginalized or victimized groups. The construct of ‘ingroup criticism’ (e.g., Hornsey & Esposo, 2009) may also be linked to perspective-taking. Research has found, not surprisingly, that people are generally more receptive to criticism that comes from within their own group than from outsiders. Moreover, ingroup critics are seen as more constructive, credible, and motivated by loyalty rather than hostility. Yet, a key construct often used in faith-based peacebuilding is taking a more critical view of one’s own group (here, religion). Thus, a key challenge for peacebuilding is to promote this more critical view of one’s own group, in an atmosphere that ‘permits’ acknowledgement of each group’s suffering, and invites openness to criticism from both within and without.
Across two experiments, Bruneau and Saxe (2012) found that White Americans (Study 1) and Israeli Jews (Study 2) showed increased empathy, trust, and improved intergroup attitudes toward Hispanic Americans and Palestinians, respectively, following a perspective-taking exercise, compared to perspective-giving and control conditions. In contrast, Hispanic Americans (Study 1) and Palestinians (Study 2) showed greater improvements on these same outcomes following a perspective-giving exercise. These findings suggest that different reconciliation strategies may be needed for advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Indeed, for historically victimized groups, expressions of remorse and acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the perpetrator group have been shown to reduce hostility and resentment, promote more positive and reconciliatory attitudes toward this outgroup, and improve psychological well-being (Vollhardt et a., 2014).
Trust: Intergroup trust—the positive expectations around the intentions and behaviours of the outgroup towards the ingroup (Lewicki et al., 1998)—is particularly difficult to cultivate in contexts marked by protracted conflict (Paolini et al., 2007). Developing trust requires substantial changes in cognition, beliefs, and emotions about the outgroup (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004), since placing trust in former adversaries who have inflicted significant harm can be perceived as a direct threat to the ingroup (Tam et al., 2009). Trust involves a positive bias in interpreting incomplete or ambiguous information (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), a belief that the ingroup’s vulnerabilities will not be exploited (Kramer, 2010), and a shared assurance that both groups are genuinely working towards peace. Kelman (2005) highlights a central challenge: reconciliation depends on trust, yet trust often depends on reconciliation. Despite this paradox, trust is widely recognized as a critical stepping-stone toward reconciliation (Hewstone et al., 2008), as it is key to the development of intergroup forgiveness (Swart et al., 2011), which is typically found to reflect the standard ingroup-favouring bias (i.e., greater forgiveness for ingroup than outgroup perpetrators; see meta-analysis by Van Tongeren et al., 2014), and may even extend to perceptions of God’s forgiveness for acts by perpetrators from ingroup and outgroup (Swart et al., in prep.). Trust enables individuals to accept the risks involved in contact with the outgroup (see below on the centrality of intergroup contact in our ‘theory of change’). In the absence of trust, however, even positive behaviors by the outgroup may be interpreted as manipulative, fostering suspicion rather than forgiveness (Kelman, 2005).
Competitive Victimhood: Conflict is inherently competitive, often involving struggles over physical or psychological resources (Hewstone et al., 2002). In many cases, both sides perpetrate harmful acts against the outgroup and are, in turn, recipients of harm. Consequently, both groups may develop a sense of victimhood. This can lead to a contest over which group has suffered more, a phenomenon known as competitive victimhood (Noor et al., 2008; Noor et al., 2012). Central to competitive victimhood is the belief that the outgroup’s suffering is less legitimate or its claim even unjustified (Noor et al., 2008). Such framing undermines the processes of forgiveness, inhibits perspective-taking and empathy, and erodes intergroup trust (Voca et al., 2022). Notably, individuals do not need to have personally suffered during the conflict to experience competitive victimhood; witnessing harm inflicted on fellow ingroup members can be sufficient (Lickel et al., 2006).
In contrast, inclusive victimhood, the recognition that both groups have experienced suffering, has been associated with increased empathy, greater intergroup trust, enhanced willingness to forgive, and more openness to future contact with the outgroup (Shnabel et al., 2013; Voca et al., 2022). By acknowledging shared pain rather than engaging in comparative victimization, inclusive victimhood can serve as a foundation for reconciliation.
Forgiveness: Forgiveness in the Judeo-Christian culture is one of the basic qualities of God; it embodies acts of love and mercy that surpass the pursuit of justice (Auerbach, 2004). Forgiveness is one of the most difficult aspects of reconciliation to promote or achieve, but is considered by some scholars as the hallmark of reconciliation (Tavuchis, 1991). As Darby (1983) notes, “[d]ates from the past are fixed like beacons in the folklore and mythology of Irishmen” (p. 13). Forgiveness, then, should not require that one forgets the pain and suffering that was caused during the conflict (Levy & Sznaider, 2006; Manzi & Gonzalez, 2007), but it considers the debt is paid (Exline & Baumeister, 2000). By offering forgiveness, both groups are seen as treated on equal terms which erases the roles of victim and perpetrator (Exline & Baumeister, 2000).
Reconciliation as an outcome
It is clear that all the key processes of reconciliation outlined above can also be outcomes. For example, common outcomes of reconciliation noted in the literature include fostering positive attitudes (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; DeTezanos-Pinto et al., 2017; Nadler & Shnabel, 2015), forgiveness (Auerbach, 2004; Worthington, 2006), more harmonious intergroup relations across the divide (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004), and support for policies that advance political and structural dimensions of reconciliation (Canadian Reconciliation Barometer, 2023 ; Northern Ireland Executive Office, 2013; Sanderson , 2012). However, although some victims may experience dramatic, almost ‘Damascene’ conversions to taking the perspective of the outgroup, trusting them, and forgiving them, a more likely process is one in which, over time, people reach closure with respect to these outcomes.
Many definitions of reconciliation refer to it as a cognitive-emotional process through which functional, interdependent relationships are re-established following conflict, but it is also referred to as the outcome of this process: the development of positive intergroup relations characterized by mutual trust, forgiveness, favorable attitudes, and a shared desire to foster ongoing cross-group engagement. While the process of reconciliation involves looking to the past to address the atrocities of conflict, the outcome of reconciliation is future-focused with the goals of healing and rebuilding.
The role of religion in peacebuilding and reconciliation
Religious differences have been identified as a primary cause of intergroup conflict (Auerbach, 2005). It is therefore unsurprising that many peacebuilding initiatives aimed at reconciliation incorporate religiously motivated approaches (Sampson, 2007). In the aftermath of conflict, religious institutions often provide reservoirs of credibility, trust, and moral authority (Sampson, 2007).
Many of the central mechanisms and outcomes of reconciliation—such as those noted above (e.g., forgiveness) but also related ones (e.g., repentance, mercy, compassion)—have theological underpinnings (Sampson, 2007). For example, although South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established as a secular body, it incorporated strong religious elements, largely due to the influence of Bishop Desmond Tutu.
Gibson (2004) found that for Black South Africans, accepting the “truth” presented by the TRC was associated with greater reconciliation only among those who attended church infrequently (B = .15), but not among frequent churchgoers (B = –.02). While Gibson concluded that the TRC was less effective for religious Black South Africans, he did not acknowledge that this group already expressed more reconciliatory attitudes (–1.16) compared to infrequent attendees (–5.80). He did, however, suggest that the reconciliation process may differ between religious and non-religious individuals. This distinction may stem from the fact that religious individuals tend to value forgiveness more highly and report a greater willingness to forgive (Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2010; Fox & Thomas, 2008; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993).
Auerbach (2005) contends that religion is likely to enhance the positive effects of forgiveness on reconciliation only when the conflicting groups share similar religious precepts regarding forgiveness. In cases where such alignment is absent, religion may instead hinder the reconciliation process. How messages of reproach are brought about also plays an important role.
Reconciliation Through Contact: Intergroup Contact as a Theory of Change
Peacebuilding programmes are often predicated on the belief that bringing people from different groups together can foster forgiveness and reconciliation. While this underlying sentiment has intuitive appeal, it must be approached with caution. As Allport (1954), pioneer of the ‘Contact Hypothesis’, cautioned, “It has sometimes been held that merely by assembling people without regard for race, color, religion, or national origin, we can thereby destroy stereotypes and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not so simple” (p. 261). Contact with an outgroup after protracted conflict, even when undertaken in the spirit of peacebuilding, can, as noted in the introduction to this proposal, be perceived as traitorous by one’s ingroup (Little, 2007). This notwithstanding, and as also noted earlier, intergroup contact between members of the two main religions in Northern Ireland (‘cross-community’ contact) plays a central role in many religious peacebuilding initiatives there (see Brewer, 2024). I argue that such programmes are effective not in spite of, but because of, the cross-group contact they foster. Indeed, a reanalysis of the 2003 Northern Ireland Youth Life and Times data showed that positive contact during cross-community projects was strongly associated with more favourable attitudes toward, and greater support for social integration with, the ethno-religious outgroup, two key outcomes of reconciliation. As such, I propose that intergroup contact theory provides a viable and empirically grounded theory of change.
Intergroup contact is one of the most effective strategies for reducing intergroup bias and negative stereotypes (Paluck et al., 2021). Allport (1954) originally argued that intergroup contact under ‘optimal conditions’ (equal status, cooperative goals, and institutional support) was required to reduce prejudice; but several subsequent meta-analyses have provided robust support for the prejudice-reducing effects of contact as long as it is positive (Lemmer & Wagner, 2015; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). There is also evidence of the reverse causal direction (e.g., the finding that promoting both intergroup trust and forgiveness between adversaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina positively impacted intergroup contact (Leonard et al., 2016); but bidirectional effects are to be expected, and do not detract from the strongest causal evidence for intergroup contact provided by experimental studies showing the direction of causality from contact to attitudees (see Paluck et al., 2021; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
The mechanisms through which contact fosters more positive intergroup attitudes (e.g., increased empathy, reduced intergroup anxiety, and diminished threat) are well-established (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). Moreover, the effects of intergroup contact are especially pronounced in contexts characterized by active conflict (De Tezanos-Pinto et al., 2017; Hewstone et al., 2014; Lemmer & Wagner, 2015). Direct, face-to-face contact has been linked to several reconciliation-relevant outcomes, including increased trust (Tam et al., 2009), greater willingness to forgive (Hewstone et al., 2008), and reduced dehumanization (Bruneau et al., 2020). With regard to religiosity, a study of the pre-conflict phase of ethno-religious conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines reported that more religious people have better, though not more frequent, interreligious contact (Kanas et al., 2016). Whereas a study in Indonesia found that higher levels of religious institutionalisation decrease the likelihood of communal violence and make peaceful conflict resolution more likely (De Juan et al., 2015), perhaps by providing opportunities for both inter- and intra-group contacts to promote bridging identities (Svensson et al., SCORE2 White Paper, 2025).
Beyond direct contact, indirect forms of contact, such as extended contact—merely knowing that an ingroup member has a relationship with an outgroup member—can also reduce prejudice through distinct mediating pathways (Wright et al., 1997; Turner et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2018). Further, beyond contact with a main, or ‘primary’ outgroup changing attitudes towards that primary outgroup, evidence has amassed that contact with members of that outgroup can additionally change attitudes towards other, ‘secondary’ outgroups, controlling for contact with those groups (see Vezzali et al., 2021, for a review of this so-called ‘secondary transfer effect’ [Pettigrew, 2009] of contact). This broadening effect of contact, effectively, generalizing across outgroups, is crucial in the case of Northern Ireland, where concerns have been raised that ‘old’ sectarianism may have reduced, but ‘new’ racism has increased (assemblyresearchmatters.orgirishnews.com). Although anti-immigrant negativity is no more prevalent in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the UK, levels of negativity towards Muslims and Eastern Europeans are significantly higher than in Great Britain and have increased in recent years, particularly among young adults (Doebler et al., 2018). These authors also found that contact with minority members was negatively related with negativity towards immigrants, but they did not test for secondary transfer effects of contact; however, their findings that both (religiously) mixed schooling (negatively) and segregation (positively) were associated with negative attitudes to immigrants is consistent with the logic of secondary transfer effects.
Several scholars highlight the critical role that intergroup contact plays in reconciliation. Indeed, it serves a dual role: not only is it difficult to imagine a meaningful reconciliation process without intergroup contact, but it is also essential that reconciliation efforts actively promote the development and maintenance of positive intergroup relations, and ideally intergroup friendships. Numerous studies cited above have demonstrated the key role that intergroup contact plays in the reconciliatory process. Gibson (2004), for instance, found that interracial contact in South Africa, after theTRC, was associated with racial reconciliation over and above several pertinent control variables (including: confidence in the TRC, level of education, social class). This association was consistent for White, Black, Asian, and Coloured South Africans and represented a medium-to-large effect size (βs ranged from .24 to .45). Moreover, intergroup contact remained a significant correlate of reconciliation while controlling for accepting truths about the harms of the apartheid regime.
Similarly, studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have reported positive associations of intergroup contact, with Serbs (for Bosniaks), with intergroup forgiveness and lower social distance (Čehajić et al., 2008); with increased perspective-taking and lower perceived victimhood (Cehajić & Brown, 2010); and with intergroup forgiveness, acceptance of an apology and financial compensation (Rupar & Graf, 2019). These relationships were differentially mediated. Realistic threats mediated the relationship between positive contact and acceptance of financial compensation, whereas symbolic threat mediated the relationship between contact and the acceptance of an apology and forgiveness. In the wake of the civil war in Liberia, De Tezanos-Pinto and colleagues (2017) found that intergroup contact was associated with positive intergroup attitudes which were then related to more trusting attitudes, forgiveness, and empathy. Moreover, they found a stronger association between direct and extended contact with the outgroup and positive outgroup attitudes for those who had higher compared to lower war experiences. Last not least, multiple studies from Northern Ireland itself, attests to its role in Northern Ireland (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2004, 2008, 2014; Paolini et al., 2007; Tam et al., 2009).
This conceptual analysis of reconciliation thus far has been framed from a social-cognitive, psychological lens. Other important contributors to reconciliation include structural, institutional, and political change; however, these changes often rely on slow-moving political processes. Northern Ireland remains segregated 25 years after the Good Friday Agreement (e.g., Dixon et al., 2022), and opportunities for mixing, or cross-community contact, are still more limited than would be expected more than a quarter century after the peace agreement – due, on the one hand to residential and educational segregation, and, on the other hand, to the physical barriers of ‘peace walls’ erected to reduce conflict. These walls, erected between the 1960s and the 1980s to prevent cross-community killings, remain largely in place, as many residents are still reluctant to see them dismantled, citing persistent safety concerns (Byrne et al., 2012; Gormley-Heenan et al., 2013). Not only do the peace walls serve as a reminder of past political violence and the potential for its resurgence, but they also exacerbate economic inequality (McCord et al., 2017) and restrict cross-community contact (Dixon et al., 2020) further entrenching existing patterns of segregation (Gray et al., 2009). Although the Northern Ireland Executive (2013) proposed to remove all peace walls by 2023, many still stand (Carroll, 2023). According to the most recent round of the Northern Ireland Life and Times (ARK, 2024), only 31.51% of the respondents reported wanting the peace walls to come down now, compared to 68.49% who wanted them to come down sometime in the future or not at all.
As discussed, intergroup contact can play a positive role in reconciliation. Can it also promote support for policy change around the peace walls? Dixon and colleagues (2020) found that among Catholic and Protestant respondents, proximity to a peace wall was associated with lower support for its removal. However, this relationship was moderated by intergroup contact: for those reporting low levels of positive contact with the ethno-religious outgroup, support for removal declined the closer they lived to the wall. In contrast, for those reporting moderate to high levels of positive contact, support for removal of the peace walls was unrelated to their proximity to the wall.
As such, intergroup contact poses a rich theory of change, especially when embedded in the context of religious peacebuilding programmes. The de facto segregation within Northern Ireland limits the possibilities for cross-community contact. Peacebuilding initiatives not only promote such contact but do so under conditions shown to enhance its effectiveness: institutional support, equal status, and collaboration toward shared goals (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 2006). Positive intergroup contact, especially when it promotes perspective-taking and empathy, fosters intergroup forgiveness and trust, and reduces intergroup anxiety and anger, can cultivate friendly attitudes, promote social integration, and encourage support for policies to dismantle structural barriers. In other words, intergroup contact is a crucial part of any path to reconciliation.
