CHAPTER 7: JUVENILES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

• First, youthful offending was viewed as a symptom of a disease (delinquency) caused by society and the family. Delinquency could cause a young person to engage in harmful activities, such as violating a provision of the criminal code or truancy, promiscuity, and incorrigibility, all of which could attract criminal sanctions. What is important here is that truancy, promiscuity, and incorrigibility could be subject to criminal sanction if committed by a young person but not if they were committed by an adult.
• Second, young persons were denied many of the procedural rights guaranteed to adults, such as a public hearing, the option of a jury trial, representation of legal counsel, and many avenues of appeal. These rights were denied because the juvenile justice system was in place to help youth, not to punish them. The purpose of adjudicative proceedings was to determine if the youth was in need of help and to decide the best way to deliver the service. Procedural rights were thought to add unnecessary complications and delays that could compromise rehabilitation. They were seen to be unnecessary and even harmful to the youth.
• Third, indeterminate sentences were permitted under the Juvenile Delinquency Act. When a young person was found to be delinquent, a disposition was made to treat and cure the youth. The appropriate length of treatment varied from case to case and could not be determined before treatment began. Indeterminate sentences provided the means by which extended treatment could be ordered.

Fourth, the new system of youth justice established separate courts and correctional facilities. Theoretically, this system was to be staffed with specially trained judges and court personnel, such as social service personnel, clinicians, and probation officers, all of whom understood developmental issues, were sensitive to the special needs of delinquents, and were qualified to make appropriate therapeutic decisions that were in the best interest of the youth. By the mid-1960s there was renewed debate in Canada and the United States about juvenile justice (Anand, 1999; Feld & Bishop, 2012). In particular, there were concerns about the lack of due process rights, the inequity of trying and holding youth for non-criminal behaviours, the efficacy of treatment programs, and the need to hold youth accountable for criminal behaviour. Major cases in the United States, such as Kent v. United States and In re Gault (reviewed in the next section of this text), were followed closely by Canadian policy makers and supported the growing movement toward procedural rights for youthful offenders. Consequent legislative changes provided youth with some procedural rights, implemented determinate sentences, established that young people could only be charged with criminal code offences, and increased the emphasis on accountability and responsibility (e.g., Young Offenders Act, 1984). Changes over the following several decades include increased maximum penalties for very serious crimes, and provisions to facilitate youths’ transfer (waiver) to adult court. Today, the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), brought into force in 2003, governs youthful offending.

Landmark United States Cases

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases in the 1960s that likely had an influence on the subsequent changes to the Canadian juvenile laws. We will review them here as a background to these changes. Kent v. United States (1966) was a landmark case establishing the rights of young offenders in juvenile court (see Case Study 7.1). Morris Kent’s waiver to adult court, and his subsequent conviction and sentence, were appealed. His case ultimately was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, in a 5–4 decision, that a juvenile court may not waive jurisdiction in the absence of a hearing and accompanying safeguards. Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas commented,

“We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults with respect to a similar issue would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society’s special concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not.”

In the case In re Gault (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court extended the procedural safeguards noted in Kent to all juveniles in any delinquency proceeding. Gerald Francis Gault was a 15-year-old boy living with his parents in Arizona. He was accused, with a friend, of making an obscene telephone call to a neighbour and was taken into custody at his home by the sheriff of Gila County. Gerald’s parents were not home at the time of his arrest and received no notice that he had been taken into custody. His mother came home later that day and became worried about her son’s absence. She later learned from a friend of her son that he had been arrested. She attempted to visit him in custody but was not allowed to see him. She was informed that there would be a hearing the next day. Mrs. Gault attended the hearing, but no record was made, so it is not clear what transpired at this hearing or at a subsequent hearing a week later. It is known that Gault was not represented by counsel and that the complainant neighbour did not appear to testify at either hearing.

The court was highly critical of the legal and philosophical premises of juvenile court:

“The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals . . . The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be “treated” and “rehabilitated” and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be “clinical” rather than punitive. These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae . . . The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance . . . If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions—that is, if the child is “delinquent”—the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none.”

The court concluded that “Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.” It held that juveniles must be afforded certain constitutional rights, including the right to have notice of the charges against them, the right to an attorney, the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

The next section provides an overview of how these cases have affected the operation of the juvenile court in both the United States and Canada.

The Juvenile Justice System Today

Chapter 2 provided an overview of the criminal justice system and its court process. In many respects, particularly given the Kent and In re Gault decisions in the United States and the passage of the Young Offenders Act (YOA) and later the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) in Canada, the juvenile justice system (JJS) now parallels the adult system. Juveniles have the same procedural rights afforded adults, including the right to an attorney. There are, however, some important differences. For example, juveniles do not have a right to a trial by jury (unless they are at risk of receiving an adult sentence), and the juvenile court retains a philosophy that focuses more on rehabilitation than punishment.

With the passage of the Young Offenders Act (YOA) in 1984, the juvenile justice system moved to a better balance between rights and intervention, placing more emphasis on legal procedures and due process. The YOA had four guiding principles:

• Young people must assume responsibility for their illegal behaviour.
• Society has a right to be protected from illegal behaviour.
• Youths are entitled to traditional legal rights and some additional protections.
• Young people, because they are not fully grown or mature, have special needs and should not be held accountable in the same manner or to the same extent as adults.

The YOA covers youth who are least 12 years old and under 18. Children under 12 who commit a criminal act cannot be charged with a criminal offence but instead are dealt with by the child and family courts.

The YOA was heralded as a major reform, with its emphasis on the rights of young offenders while at the same time acknowledging that youth are different from adults in terms of accountability. The YOA also promoted the treatment of youth and supported the increase in community-based alternatives, such as diversion. Diversion results in a dismissal of charges, provided the youth fulfills certain conditions, such as completing educational or community service programs. While the YOA was initially viewed positively, it soon became controversial, particularly for its overuse of custody when youth were charged with minor offences and for not being punitive enough with more serious, violent offenders. Professor Raymond Corrado, one of Canada’s leading experts on juvenile justice, commented that the YOA “paradoxically is more punitive regarding less serious offenses and not punitive enough, at least symbolically, for the most violent offenses” (Corrado & Markwart, 1994, p. 343).

The dissatisfaction with the YOA led to its replacement in less than 20 years. Youth crime is currently governed by the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). This act came into force in 2003 and introduced significant changes to criminal law involving young people. In particular, it placed a greater emphasis on diversion and rehabilitation than the YOA had done. Indeed, a primary goal of the YCJA was to reduce the use of custody as a sanction for youth. An analysis of the impact of the YCJA after five years of implementation shows that it has achieved this goal as the use of custody has declined substantially (Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 2009). Since 2003, more youth are diverted than charged by police (Brennan, 2012b), reversing the pre-YCJA practice of charging the majority of youth. As would be expected, custodial sentences have also dropped, as shown in Figure 7.1. The proportion of youth sentenced to custody fell from 29 percent just before the passage of the YCJA to about 16 percent in 2010–11.

Figure 7.1 Youth court custody versus deferred custody and supervision sentences, 2000–2011

Note: A case is one or more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at the same time and received a final disposition. Deferred custody and supervision is a sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act effective April 1, 2003. Included are only those jurisdictions for which YCJA sentencing data was available as of 2004/2005: Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.

Source: Brennan, S. (2012a). Youth court statistics in Canada, 2010/2011. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Chart 6, p. 13. Accessible at www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11645-eng.pdf. Reproduced and distributed on an “as is” basis with the permission of Statistics Canada.

The YCJA reinforces the perspective that the justice system for youth must be separate from that of adults. Section 3(b) places an emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration; fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity; enhanced procedural protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to privacy, are protected; timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences; and the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act (referring to the YCJA) must act, given young persons’ perception of time.

Perhaps the best way to describe the YCJA is to provide a fictional example of what may happen to young people who are suspected of committing an offence. Some of the issues raised in this chronology will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of the chapter. We will call our fictional character Peter, and we include the relevant sections of the YCJA in parentheses.

First, in order for Peter to attract criminal attention, he must be suspected of having committed an offence created by an Act of Parliament (s. 2)—most commonly the Criminal Code. In the case of relatively minor offences, the police or the Crown, may use “extrajudicial measures,” including warnings or cautions (ss. 6, 8), to reprimand Peter. Extrajudicial measures may be taken without an admission or finding of guilt.

If extrajudicial measures are not seen as appropriate, Peter may be arrested or detained. He must be told, in language appropriate for a young person, that he has the right to counsel and the right to have an appropriate adult present (e.g., a parent) (s. 146). If Peter admits guilt, the Crown or police may apply “extrajudicial sanctions” (e.g., he may be referred to a designated program or community service, or he may be told to write a letter of apology), but Peter must agree to the sanctions (s. 10).

If neither extrajudicial measures nor extrajudicial sanctions are appropriate, Peter may be charged with an offence and arrested. He will go before a Youth Court Justice who will decide if Peter should be released or detained in jail pending his appearance in court. Except in the case of the most serious offences, the presumption is that Peter should be released (s. 31).

At this first appearance, Peter will be told if the Crown intends to apply for an adult sentence if he is convicted (s. 64). If Peter is charged with murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or aggravated sexual assault, or if he has had two prior convictions for serious violent offences (s. 2) it is presumed that the Crown will ask for an adult sentence; the Crown may also declare its intent to apply for an adult sentence in other circumstances (s. 62). Recall that youth court is a provincial court; preliminary hearings and jury trials are not available. If Peter is at risk of receiving an adult sentence, he may elect to be tried by a judge and jury and/or to have a preliminary hearing. If he does this, Peter will be tried in superior court—a court that has been designated an adult court. For the purposes of Peter’s trial, however, the superior court judge will conduct the trial in accordance with the privacy provisions of the YCJA (i.e., Peter’s identity cannot be revealed) and will make any other trial modifications deemed appropriate given Peter’s young age (s. 67(9)).

If Peter is convicted, he may be given an adult sentence or a youth sentence. If Peter is given a youth sentence, he will probably be detained in a youth facility (s. 84). If Peter is given an adult sentence, he may be detained in a youth facility, a provincial jail, or a federal penitentiary (s. 76(1)). If he turns 20 during his sentence, he will likely spend the period to be served after his 20th birthday in an adult facility (s. 76(9)).

Juvenile Crime Rates

Youth are disproportionately engaged in criminal activity. Figure 7.2 shows the 2010 rate of crime by age. It is immediately apparent that crime peaks at about 17 and 18 years of age and then gradually decreases, with only a small percentage of crime committed by those over 50. Thus, adolescents account for a larger percentage of crime than any other age group, and as people age, they become less likely to engage in criminal behaviour.

Over 135,600 youth were accused of a Criminal Code offence in 2011, about 18,100 fewer than in 2010 (Brennan, 2012b). It is important to remember, however, that the volume and severity of youth crime has generally declined during the first decade of the 21st century, as Figure 7.3 shows. Overall, there was a 22 percent drop during this period. While murder rates have also been declining (there were 46 youth accused of homicide in 2010; down from 56 in 2010), the severity of youth crime has shown a more modest drop compared to overall crime rates (see Figure 7.3), as the youth violent crime severity index declined about 3 percent.

Figure 7.2 Persons accused of crime, by age; Canada, 2011

Source: Brennan, S. (2012b). Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2011. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Chart 15, p. 20. Accessible from www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11692-eng.pdf.

Reproduced and distributed on an “as is” basis with the permission of Statistics Canada.

Figure 7.3 Police-reported youth crime severity indexes; Canada, 2001 to 2011

Source: Brennan, S. (2012b). Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2011. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Chart 17, p. 22. Accessible from www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11692-eng.pdf.

Reproduced and distributed on an “as is” basis with the permission of Statistics Canada.

Property crime is the most frequent offence for young offenders, as about 38 percent of youth arrested are charged with property crimes, while about 26 percent are arrested for charges against persons, primarily major or minor assault. Most murders are committed by adults, not young people. Males account for the majority of youth crime—about 72 percent of the youth who appear in court (Brennan, 2012a). Probation is the most common sentence given to youth.

As is true for adult crime and incarceration rates, Aboriginal youth are overrepresented in the juvenile justice system. Latimer and Foss (2004) conducted a snapshot study, in which data were collected on youth in custody on a single day in June, 2003. Compared to non-Aboriginal youth, Aboriginal youth were incarcerated at higher rates in every province and territory except Prince Edward Island.

Figure 7.4 Incarceration rates for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal youth in Canada

Note: Rates based on a small population may be inflated. It is important to therefore consider the population of Aboriginal youth in each province. For instance, there were only 177 Aboriginal youth counted in Prince Edward Island during the 2001 Census. If two Aboriginal youth were incarcerated on Snapshot Day, the rate would have been 113 per 10,000 Aboriginal youth.

Source: Latimer, J., & Foss, L. C. (2004). A one-day snapshot of Aboriginal youth in custody across Canada: Phase II. Ottawa: Justice Canada, 2004, Figure 1, p. 4. Accessible from www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/yj-jj/yj2-jj2/yj2.pdf. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2013.

 As Figure 7.4 shows, there was considerable variability in the rates across jurisdictions. Aboriginal youth were 30 times more likely to be in custody in Saskatchewan, 18 times more likely in the Yukon, and 16 times more likely in Manitoba (Latimer & Foss, 2004). The incarceration rate of Aboriginal youth was 64.5 per 10,000 population, while the incarceration rate for non-Aboriginal youth was 8.2 per 10,000 population. Across all jurisdictions, Aboriginal youth were about eight times more likely to be in custody compared to their non-Aboriginal counterparts. La Prairie (2002) argues that poverty is the single most important factor contributing to this overrepresentation. Other studies have identified poor school achievement as a contributing factor, given the differential high school completion rates and poor school attachment of Aboriginal youth (van der Woerd & Cox, 2003). Latimer and Foss also noted that “possible discrimination within the youth criminal justice system may lead to the differential treatment of Aboriginal youth” (p. 22).

Developmental Theory and Psychosocial Development

Dr. Terrie Moffitt, a researcher who pioneered longitudinal studies of the development of criminal behaviour over the course of life, has contributed substantially to our understanding of developmental pathways to delinquent and criminal behaviour (Moffitt, 2003). Drawing initially on research conducted in New Zealand, Moffitt identified two groups of delinquents. The first group, called life-course-persistent offenders, have conduct problems that begin in early childhood. The childhood predictors Moffitt identified in her research showed that the life-course-persistent path is characterized by undercontrolled temperament and delayed motor development by age 3, low verbal ability, attention-deficit and hyperactivity problems, and neuropsychological impairments. These children may engage in bullying behaviour in elementary school and have difficulties in interpersonal peer relations. These individuals are at higher risk for later delinquent and adult criminal behaviour. Fortunately, this group of offenders accounts for a small proportion of delinquent offenders (less than 10 percent of all delinquents). The other group, called adolescent-limited offenders, don’t begin offending until their teen years, and they typically do not have the early childhood antisocial and behavioural problems seen in life-course-persistent offenders. As Moffitt and Caspi (2001) comment, “Their delinquent activity emerges alongside puberty, when otherwise healthy youngsters experience dysphoria during the relatively roleless years between their biological maturation and their access to mature privileges and responsibility, a period we call the maturity gap” (p. 356). Moffitt and Caspi consider delinquent behaviour to be normative for this group, as a way of establishing autonomy from parents and to gain acceptance from peers. Indeed, adolescent-limited offenders are heavily influenced by peers when engaging in delinquent behaviour. Adolescent-limited offending is by far the most common type of offending. However, although they are smaller in number, the life-course-persistent offenders are more persistent and pathological.

It is important to keep in mind that the delinquent behaviours of the adolescent-limited and life-course-persistent offenders may not be substantively different. Both groups can be involved in the same range of criminal activity, including violent offences. What is different is that the delinquent behaviour of life-course-persistent offenders is predicted by early onset developmental and behavioural problems. It is also the case that a small proportion of adolescent-onset offenders will continue to commit crimes as adults (Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington, & Milne, 2002).

Moffitt’s research was initially conducted on male samples, but she has since extended her studies to females. She finds that her model does predict antisocial behaviour of both sexes, but at a much smaller ratio due to the fact that life-course-persistent criminal behaviour is extremely rare for females. While the ratio of life-course-persistent criminality is about 10:1 for males identified with early onset conduct problems, the ratio is 100:1 for females. Thus, most female delinquent behaviour best fits the adolescence-limited type.

Sampson and Laub (2003) provide a test of Moffitt’s typology. They conducted a follow-up of 500 male delinquents born in Boston between 1924 and 1932 and aged 10 to 17 at the time of their delinquent behaviour, as well as 500 male non-delinquents matched case-by-case on age, ethnicity, IQ, and low-income residence. They followed them to the age range of 61–70, searching both state and national criminal databases. Consistent with the research presented earlier in this chapter showing a decline in criminal behaviour with aging, they found a similar pattern, with crime peaking in the 16–25 age group and then declining. Sampson and Laub tested whether a typology such as Moffitt’s would differentially predict who will persist. What they found was that both life-course-persistent offenders and adolescent-limited offenders peak and then decline toward zero in a similar pattern. This was true across a range of violent and non-violent offences. In other words, childhood risk markers did not predict long-term patterns of offending, including violent offending. Bear in mind, however, that this is just one study, and more research is needed to show whether this continues to be true in other samples, with data collected at different time periods.

Psychosocial Maturity

Another line of developmental theory has focused on psychosocial maturity. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard (1995) proposed a framework for understanding adolescent judgment and decision making, arguing that legal policy should take into account that adolescents make decisions quite differently than adults do, because of differences in peer influences, risk taking, and temporal perspectives.

Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) expanded on this theory by defining the concept of psychosocial maturity as “the complexity and sophistication of the process of individual decision-making as it is affected by a range of cognitive, emotional, and social factors” (p. 743). They delineate three developmental capacities that affect decision making:

• Responsibility. This involves the adolescent’s capacity to make autonomous choices, independent of external influences, including adults but particularly peers. As adolescents mature, they become less responsive to peer influences but also more independent of parental influences. Responsibility also involves the development of a coherent sense of identity.
• Temperance. Risk taking is higher among adolescents. They are more impulsive, more likely to be sensation seekers, and more susceptible to mood changes due to hormonal changes. Temperance involves the ability to control impulses and exercise self-restraint. Steinberg argues that the increased risk taking of adolescents is due to heightened sensation seeking that increases with puberty; this is not held in check by the development of regulatory competence as this occurs later in adolescence. He adds that this risk-taking behaviour is unlikely to be changed by educational interventions and suggests that interventions instead focus on reducing harm associated with the risk-taking behaviour.
• Perspective. This involves adolescents’ ability to see both shortand longterm consequences (time perspective), their ability to understand how one’s actions might affect others (perspective taking), and their ability to weigh costs and benefits of a decision. Borum and Grisso (2007) note that, “before adulthood, greater weight is given to acquiring potential gains than to avoiding potential losses, and to short-term rather than long-term (future) consequences” (p. 559).

Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) examined these three dimensions in a sample of over 1,000 individuals ranging in age from 12 to 48. They found that individuals did differ significantly on the three domains of psychosocial maturity depending on their age. These results provide support for the conclusion that psychosocial maturity does develop over the period of adolescence. By age 19, the level of maturity was the same as that of the adult sample. In general, the average adolescent is less psychosocially mature than the average adult, and younger adolescents are less mature than older adolescents. But age alone does not account for differences in decision-making abilities, because there was considerable variation in judgment within each age group. Cauffman and Steinberg note that “psychosocially mature 13-year-olds demonstrate less antisocial decision-making than psychosocially immature adults” (p. 757). This is an important point; the research describes average differences between adults and youth, but there is considerable variation within and between age groups. Thus, some 13-year-olds may be more mature, and better decision makers, than some 17-year-olds, even though, on average, 17-year-olds are more mature than 13-year-olds.

Monahan, Steinberg, Cauffman, and Mulvey (2009) tested the relationship between maturity and the end of criminal behaviour as adolescents move into adulthood. Using a sample of youth in two American cities, they found that youth who had higher gains in measures of psychosocial maturity were less likely to be involved in antisocial behaviour as adults. Specifically, they found that increases in two components of temperance (see above) were linked to a cessation of criminal behaviour. They caution, however, that we should not necessarily view psychosocial maturity as a single construct. They commented, “Youths who persisted in antisocial behaviour did not show universal deficits in psychosocial maturity and were in some ways indistinguishable from desisting youths. This suggests that, at least for purposes of understanding the underlying psychological contributors of antisocial behaviour, it is valuable to distinguish among different aspects of psychosocial development” (pp.1664–1665).

The research on psychosocial maturity is relevant for understanding the capacities of youth to engage in functions essential to participation in the justice system, including their capacity to waive arrest rights and fitness to stand trial, as we discussed in Chapter 3. Maturity and decision-making deficits also increase the likelihood that youth might falsely confess to crimes, as we will discuss in Chapter 9.

The Developing Brain

One of the reasons that adolescents may have lower capacities in key decision-making areas is that adolescent brains have not reached adult maturity, particularly in the frontal lobes, which control executive functions of the brain related to decision making. This area of the brain is typically not fully developed until the early to mid-twenties (Giedd et al., 1999). As adolescents mature, they typically become better problem solvers and are less influenced by peers, less impulsive, and more sophisticated in the way they think and make decisions. The research on brain development (as well as the developmental research on maturity and other factors) was cited in several U.S. Supreme Court cases in which the court held that punishments such as the death penalty or life sentences without parole should not be applied to youth. For example, in Graham v. Florida (2010), the court noted that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.” Despite these cases, a question remains about how useful this research is when determining the culpability of adolescents. Aronson (2007) comments that while some researchers support its use in the legal system, “others are uncomfortable with introducing scientific evidence into the legal system before it is understood exactly how specific brain traits relate to the real-life decision making and behavior of teens in high-stress situations” (p. 134).

Assessment of Youth in the Juvenile Justice System

The rights reforms brought on by Kent and In re Gault, and reflected in the YCJA, established an increased need for forensic assessments of youth with respect to a number of issues (Grisso, 2003). These include assessments related to whether a youth has the capacity to understand arrest rights or is fit to stand trial, whether a court should exercise its power to pass an adult sentence, or whether a youth is a danger or risk to the community. Assessments can also be useful to the court when it is making sentencing or dispositional decisions specifically focused on the treatment needs of a youth. This section will provide an overview of assessment practices related to these key issues in the juvenile justice system.

Capacity to Understand Arrest Rights

The Kent and Gault decisions established the rights of youth in a variety of legal contexts (referred to as “Miranda rights” in the United States—see Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). These include rights at arrest, which are now explicitly stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as in the YCJA. As noted in Chapter 2, the arrest rights established in the Charter apply equally to youth. Youth who are arrested or detained must be informed that they are under no obligation to make a statement, that any statement made may be used as evidence in proceedings against them, and that they have the right to consult counsel and a parent or another appropriate adult. The YCJA specifically states that the youth’s rights must be explained “in language appropriate to his or her age and understanding.” These rights can be waived, and such an action may be considered valid if the court is satisfied that the youth was informed of his or her rights and voluntarily waived them. Supreme Court cases have established that the principles set forth in YCJA Section 3(b), discussed earlier in this chapter, provide youth with enhanced procedural protections due to their reduced moral sophistication and maturity (e.g., R. v. L.T.H., 2008).

A large body of research demonstrates that young persons, especially individuals under the age of 15, show poor comprehension of these rights generally (Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali, & Rohan, 1995; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that research also shows that the majority of youth opt to waive their rights when being questioned by police (PetersonBadali, Abramovitch, Koegl, & Ruck, 1999; Roesch, McLachlan, & Viljoen, 2007; Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005).

Research on capacity to waive arrest rights has shown that many youth lack understanding of these rights, often due to cognitive deficits that impair their ability to comprehend their rights. In a Canadian sample of adolescents 12 to 19 years of age, McLachlan, Roesch, and Douglas (2011) found that younger adolescents and adolescents with lower intellectual ability showed greater levels of comprehension impairment, both in terms of their understanding and in their appreciation of arrest warnings. This study also found that youth who were more highly suggestible were less likely to understand or appreciate their rights. Their understanding of waiver forms was also impaired by the reading level required to comprehend their rights. Eastwood, Snook, and Luther (in press) conducted a study of waiver forms used in jurisdictions across Canada. They found that the waiver forms “are lengthy, contain complex sentences, require a relatively high level of reading ability, and contain difficult and infrequent words” (p, 16). Eastwood and colleagues tested one youth waiver form considered to have a medium level of complexity. They read the waiver to a sample of high school youth and found that these young people understood less than half of the rights presented in the waiver form. Despite this finding, the youth reported high levels of confidence that they understood their rights. Results from this study and the one by McLachlan and colleagues raise serious questions about typical police practices in which youth are presented their rights and simply asked to respond yes or no to a question about whether they understand them.

Fitness to Stand Trial

The issue of fitness to stand trial was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Section 140 of the YCJA imports the Criminal Code sections on fitness to stand trial, with “modifications that the circumstances require.” Thus, fitness to stand trial laws that affect adults are applied similarly to youth. Fitness issues have come to the forefront in juvenile court.

There has been considerable discussion about whether the criteria that define adult fitness to stand trial can be readily used as a foundation for a finding of unfitness in juvenile populations. Certainly, the functional component of fitness that has been established for adults (e.g., their ability to understand charges and possible consequences of trial, to understand and appreciate the role of participants in the legal process—defence attorney, Crown prosecutor, judge—and to make choices when it comes to such decisions as pleading guilty or deciding to testify) would also apply to juveniles. However, as Grisso (2003) comments, the causal component is less clear for juveniles. For adults, psychosis, particularly in the form of delusional symptoms, or mental retardation are the primary reasons for a finding of incompetence when a defendant’s functional abilities are impaired (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). Although many juveniles have mental health problems, most do not show signs of severe mental illness, as research has shown that fewer than 20 percent of incompetent adolescents have psychotic disorders (McGaha, Otto, McClaren, & Petrila, 2001). For juveniles, issues related to age, cognitive development, and maturity are more salient. Factors such as attention deficits and hyperactivity, impaired verbal abilities, and low intelligence may also impair an adolescent’s ability to stand trial (Viljoen, Penner, & Roesch, 2012).

Although many forensic assessment instruments have been developed for assessing competency in adults (see Chapter 3), this has not been the case for youth. Only one instrument, the Juvenile Competency Assessment Interview ( JACI) has been designed specifically for youth fitness assessments (Grisso, 2005). The JACI is a structured interview that can be used by forensic psychologists to obtain information about the relevant legal capacities and developmental issues in assessing juveniles’ adjudicative competence. The Fitness Interview Test—Revised (FIT-R; see Chapter 3 for a review), although developed for adult assessments, has also been used with juveniles. Viljoen, Vincent, and Roesch (2006) provided support for its reliability and validity with adolescents and also noted that younger adolescents, particularly those with low IQ scores, showed greater impairment than those for older adolescents and adults (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005).

If a youth is found to be unfit to proceed with a trial, juvenile restoration services are usually provided in the community, unless there is evidence that an inpatient setting is needed (Redding & Frost, 2001). Restoration may be difficult to achieve, though, especially for youth who have been found unfit due to developmental deficits. For example, Viljoen, Odgers, Grisso, and Tillbrook (2007) found that teaching did not affect developmental differences in youths’ and adults’ legal understanding. Nevertheless, it is likely that most unfit youth can be treated and returned to court as fit to stand trial within a relatively brief restoration period (McGaha et al., 2001).

Adult Sentences

In the United States, a great deal of research has been done on young people transferred to adult court. In practice, in the United States there will be a pretrial hearing to decide if a particular youth should be transferred to adult court and thereby subject to adult sanctions. If the court finds that a transfer is appropriate, the trial will commence in adult court. If the court declines to transfer the youth, the trial will commence in youth court.

In Canada, transfer proceedings occurred under the YOA until the YCJA came into effect in 2003. Now all young people are tried either in youth court or, if the youth is to be tried with a preliminary inquiry and/or a jury, in superior court. Before the youth enters a plea, the Crown declares whether it may apply for an adult sentence if the youth is convicted. This does not mean that the Crown must apply for an adult sentence, but it must declare its intent at this stage or it is prohibited from applying for an adult sentence later. An adult sentence is presumed for certain very serious offences, called presumptive offences (e.g., murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault), or if this is the youth’s third conviction for a serious violent offence. In such cases, the youth is always notified that he or she will be sentenced as an adult. If the Crown declares that it may apply for an adult sentence, additional procedural safeguards are available to the youth (i.e., a preliminary hearing and a jury trial). After trial, an adult sentence may be passed. When deciding if an adult sentence is appropriate in the circumstances, the court will consider the seriousness and circumstances of the offence; the age, maturity, character, background and previous record of the young person; and any other factors that the court considers relevant.

In both Canada and the United States, the primary issue that has been the subject of research is whether a young person should be subject to an adult sentence—regardless of how the courts arrive at the decision. As summarized in Case Study 7.2, the presumptive adult sentence for youth who commit some crimes has been found to infringe their s. 7 right to fundamental justice.

In the United States, the transfer of juveniles to adult court has increased since the Kent decision. A recent estimate shows that about 2,000 youth are incarcerated in adult prisons (Ryan & Ziedenberg, 2007). This may be due, in part, to the support of a majority of citizens for increased sanctions on young offenders, and may be driven by both a fear of violent crime and a goal of holding youth more accountable for their offences.

The increase in transfers is attributed to a justice philosophy that holds that some youth are too violent to be managed in the juvenile justice system, that some youth cannot be rehabilitated, and that a more punishment-oriented approach with longer potential sentences would provide better protection for the public. Research has not generally supported the assumptions underlying the use of transfers to adult court; for example, the belief that sentencing a youth as an adult will better protect the public. Redding (2008) summarized the results of six large-scale studies that examined the specific deterrent effects of transfer in five states. All six studies found higher recidivism rates among offenders who had been transferred to criminal (adult) court, compared with those who remained in the juvenile system. A more recent study, however, found contrary outcomes (Loughran et al., 2010). In a sample of 654 youth in two states, 29 percent of whom were transferred, the researchers found that transfer did not have a differential effect on recidivism rates overall. However, they did find some other differential effects of transfer. Those transferred youth charged with crimes against people had lower rates of re-arrest, a finding that is contrary to the six studies summarized by Redding. It remains to be seen if the Loughran et al. results are replicated in future studies.

If there is an increased risk of recidivism, it is thought to be due to a number of factors, including the negative effects of labelling juveniles as convicted felons, reduced opportunities for employment and community integration due to a felony conviction, and negative effects of imprisonment. According to a report of the National Criminal Justice Association (1997), “youth incarcerated in adult institutions are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and 50 percent more likely to be attacked with a weapon than their counterparts in a juvenile facility” (p. 47).

Psychologists may be asked to evaluate juveniles who are being considered for transfer to adult court or for sentencing as an adult. The evaluations typically focus on three factors: risk (dangerousness) to the community, maturity and sophistication, and amenability to treatment. Psychologists might use standard risk instruments such as the SAVRY (see review of this instrument later in this chapter), personality testing such as the MMPI-A, tests of intellectual functioning, and measures of responsiveness to treatment. Salekin (2004) has developed a measure of all three of these factors. The Risk-Sophistication-Treatment-Inventory (RSTI) is a semi-structured interview and rating scale that is scored based on an interview with the youth; information from collateral sources such as school, police, and detention; and previous treatment records. Interviews with parents and guardians can also provide important information. A study in British Columbia found that the characteristics of risk, criminal sophistication, treatment amenability, and protective factors influence transfer/adult sentencing decisions (Spice, Viljoen, Gretton, & Roesch, 2010).

Youth Risk Assessment

Research findings support the conclusion that no single cause accounts for all delinquency, and no single pathway leads to a life of crime (Loeber & Farrington, 1998). Thus, no single intervention is appropriate for all young offenders, and the risk research can help us identify factors that might guide intervention strategies as well as identify those youth who are at the highest risk for reoffending.

Identification of risk factors is important for two reasons. One, it provides information about the likelihood of future criminal behaviour, although it is always important to remember that longer-term predictions can be made with less certainty, especially for youth. Two, it identifies areas in which appropriate interventions might be targeted that would serve to reduce this likelihood of recidivism. Risk assessment should always focus on both of these uses of risk information, since it is essential that risk be both identified and managed. A risk assessment provides an opportunity to identify interventions that could change the expected outcomes.

Risk for violence can be assessed in terms of present and future risk. The difficulties of risk prediction have been well documented (Borum, 1996; Monahan & Steadman, 1994). While the accuracy rate has improved in the past two decades, there continues to be a high false positive rate (i.e., incorrectly predicting an individual will be violent). For youth in particular, short-term predictions are generally more accurate than long-term ones, because most delinquent youth do not continue to engage in criminal acts as adults. This is the case even for youth who have committed violent acts, as most studies show that less than 30 percent of these youth are arrested for violent acts as adults. For example, a report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy presented follow-up data on violent juvenile offenders (Elliott, Huizinga, & Morse, 1986). The researchers found that, through age 25, only 20 percent of these violent young offenders were subsequently sentenced for a violent felony as an adult. Thus, the majority of violent youth do not represent a substantial long-term risk of violence. The reasons for this are complex, but from a developmental perspective it is likely due to the fact that adolescents are more likely than adults to respond impulsively, to be influenced by peers, to take greater risks, and to think less about long-term consequences of their behaviour (Arnett, 1992).

Risk Instruments

Several instruments are available that are useful for assessing the risk of criminal behaviour in youth and for identifying areas in which intervention might serve to reduce future risk of criminal behaviour. We will briefly review two of these instruments, one for children under 12 and the other for youth aged 12 to 18, in this section.

Augimeri, Koegl, Webster, and Levene (2001) developed the Early Assessment Risk List for Boys (EARL-20B), and a similar version slightly adjusted for girls (EARL-20G), which measures several areas of risk for children under 12, including family (e.g., stressors, parenting style), child (ADHD, peer socialization), and responsivity to interventions for both child and family. The advantage of these instruments is that they assess risk factors at an early age, which can be used to identify interventions that target the areas of risk that may be amenable to change.

Table 7.1 shows the items from perhaps the most comprehensive structured professional judgment instrument. Borum, Bartel, and Forth (2002) developed the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY), a 30-item structured guide for evaluating risk for violence in adolescents age 12 to 18.

The items are based on factors that research has identified as being related to risk for future violence (see Loeber & Farrington, 1998). The categories included are historical, social/contextual, and clinical risk factors, as well as protective factors. Each risk item is given a rating of low, medium, or high risk based on scoring criteria contained in the manual. The protective factors are rated as either present or absent. All items are rated on the basis of interview information, prior record information, and, when appropriate, psychological test data and interviews with family members.

Research has provided promising initial results showing significant correlations of the SAVRY and various violence outcome indicators (Borum & Verhaagen, 2006). In a study of violent young offenders in British Columbia, Catchpool and Gretton (2003) found that youth classified as high risk were significantly more likely to reoffend. Perhaps most important, the protective factors have been negatively associated with violent outcomes, indicating that factors such as pro-social involvement, strong attachments and social support, and resilient personality traits can indeed serve a protective function.

Gender Differences in Risk Factors

Much of the research on risk factors for juvenile offenders has focused on male samples. Research on female adolescent offenders has shown that the rate of violent offending is increasing, although the level of violence is much less severe when compared to male offenders (Moretti, Odgers, & Jackson, 2004). Further, while there is some overlap in risk factors, there are many factors that are more prevalent in adolescent female offenders. For example, Cauffman, Feldman, Waterman, and Steiner (1998) found that 65 percent of girls in custody in California had symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) compared to 11 percent in the general female adolescent population. This is likely due to higher rates of sexual or physical victimization and other forms of family violence. Studies of incarcerated girls have shown rates as high as 50 percent of the girls with a history of sexual victimization, whereas boys were rarely sexually victimized. Depression and suicide rates were also found to be higher among girls. Moffitt, Caspi, Rutter, and Silva (2001) found that 21-year-old women diagnosed with conduct disorders in childhood or adolescence were significantly more likely to have mental health symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depression, psychosis, mania, and suicidality), have more medical problems, require social assistance, be victimized by their partners, and perpetrate physical abuse against them in return. It is important to recognize that much of the research on risk and interventions is based on male samples. There is less research on girls and aggression, but we do know that the level of violence as well as the type of risk factors differ substantially, as boys significantly outnumber girls in the prevalence, frequency, and severity of their violent behaviour (Odgers, Schmidt, & Reppucci, 2004). These gender differences suggest that risk assessments based on the norms of a male populations may not be suited for use with females (Moretti et al., 2004).

Mental Health and Co-Occurring Disorders

One risk factor that merits particular attention is the presence of mental health problems. The rate of mental disorders is higher among youth in the juvenile system than for peers in the general population (Penner, Roesch, & Viljoen, 2011). Suicide threats and actual suicide attempts by young offenders are not uncommon, and many of these youth have experienced physical and sexual abuse, as well as parental neglect (Smith & Thornberry, 1995). These experiences have a marked effect on the mental health and self-esteem of victims, and they are clear risk factors as they are correlated with delinquent behaviour.

A study by Teplin and colleagues (2002) of 1,829 youth in detention in Cook County, Illinois, showed that two-thirds of the male youth and three-quarters of the female youth had one or more psychiatric disorders, about half of the sample had indications of substance abuse, about 20 percent had a major depression, and approximately 16 percent of male offenders and 21 percent of female offenders were considered to have attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). While psychotic disorders were rare, about 21 percent of male offenders and 31 percent of female offenders had an anxiety disorder. Other research has shown that the occurrence of conduct disorder is quite high, in some studies up to 90 percent, so the presence of conduct disorder is not particularly useful as an assessment focus or a guide for intervention.

Many youth experience more than one type of disorder, which is known as co-morbidity. Co-morbidity may be common among young offenders, especially mental health problems such as depression and anxiety co-occurring with other problems such as substance abuse or ADHD (Lexcen & Redding, 2002). In a study of 419 adolescents aged 12 to 18 years, Sterling and Weisner (2005) found that treating substance abuse alone is often not effective due to the high percentage of co-occurring disorders. Over half of the sample had at least one psychiatric diagnosis in addition to a substance use disorder. They also found that those youth who received treatment for both substance abuse and mental health problems were more likely to refrain from both alcohol and drugs compared to youth who received substance abuse treatment only.

Given the prevalence of mental health problems in adolescent offender groups, it is important that juvenile facilities assess all incoming youth to identify appropriate interventions. This is not yet a widespread practice, but that is slowly changing with the introduction of screening instruments. One such instrument is the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI-2), developed by Grisso and Barnum (2003). The MAYSI-2 is a 52-item screening instrument that can be administered by nonprofessionals in about 15 minutes and was designed to identify signs of mental/emotional disturbance or stress. The youth are asked to describe their behaviour over the past few months by responding yes or no to statements about their behaviour (e.g., Have you had a lot of problems concentrating or paying attention? Have you felt lonely too much of the time?). There are seven subscales: Alcohol/Drug Use, Angry-Irritable, Depressed-Anxious, Somatic Complaints, Suicide Ideation, Thought Disturbance, and Traumatic Experience. Scores allow a determination of whether the youth is above either of two critical scores: “caution” or “warning.” “Caution” indicates a possible clinical significance of the scale score. Grisso (2004) found that 66 percent of boys and 79 percent of girls had at least one scale score in this range, and percent of boys and 57 percent of girls had at least two scales above this range. “Warning” indicates that the youth has scored exceptionally high on a scale. For example, in the top 10 percent compared to other juvenile youth (27 percent of boys and 40 percent of girls had at least one scale score in this range; 11 percent and 18 percent at least two scales above this range).

The importance of identifying youth with mental health problems and ensuring appropriate treatment is demonstrated in research showing that recidivism can be delayed or prevented when mental health problems are treated (Cuellar, McReynolds, & Wasserman, 2006).

Dispositional Assessments

Grisso (2003, p. 319) identified four questions that should be addressed in forensic evaluations of youth who have been convicted of an offence:

• What are the youth’s important characteristics (e.g., personality, family factors, mental or intellectual problems, delinquency history)?
• What needs to change (e.g., what factors that have contributed to delinquency will need to be modified to reduce the likelihood of recidivism)?
• What modes of intervention could be applied toward the rehabilitation objective?
• What is the likelihood of change, given the relevant interventions?

A report to the court that addresses these questions will be useful for determining the most appropriate sentence, including rehabilitation programs that will help the youth address areas in need of change.

Interventions for Reducing Delinquency

There is considerable evidence that intervention, especially early intervention, can reduce delinquency, including serious and violent offending. Corrado and Freedman (2011) identified five distinct pathways to persistent antisocial behaviour: 1) prenatal risk factors (e.g., fetal alcohol spectrum disorders, cigarette smoke, poor maternal nutrition); 2) childhood personality disorders (e.g., conduct disorder, oppositional defiant disorder); 3) extreme child temperament (high and low levels of emotional reactivity); 4) childhood maltreatment (physical, sexual, and emotional abuse); and 5) adolescent onset (see discussion of Moffitt’s theory on adolescent-limited offending earlier in this chapter). Importantly, Corrado and Freedman identified effective prevention and early intervention strategies for each of these pathways.

Lipsey (1995) conducted a meta-analysis (a statistical analysis of a large number of empirical studies) of about 400 studies on treatment of juvenile delinquency and found that treatment was effective in reducing general delinquent recidivism by an average of approximately 10 percent. This may not seem like a substantial difference, but the impact is important in terms of reduced incarceration costs and victim costs, and the positive benefits of contributions by youth who do not recidivate. Subsequent reviews have come to similar conclusions (e.g., Lipsey, 2009), reinforcing the perspective that effective treatments are available.

Research on risk assessment has identified risk factors that can be used as a foundation for interventions designed to reduce or manage that risk. For example, research has shown that the children of young, single mothers are at higher risk for delinquency (Yoshikawa, 1994). Programs such as the Nurse– Family Partnership (NFP), a home-visitation program in which nurses work with low-income, first-time parents and their children, can have both immediate and long-term effects. The goal of NFP is to enhance parenting skills, increase health promotion activities, and improve economic self-sufficiency. In a follow-up conducted 15 years after one such program, 15-year-old children of low-income, unmarried mothers who were visited by nurses had fewer arrests, fewer convictions, lower measures of alcohol and cigarette usage, and fewer sexual partners than the children from similar families who did not receive home visits (Olds et al., 1999).

Programs such as the NFP clearly demonstrate that early interventions can have long-term positive benefits. Risk research has also shown that youth with early indications of problems in school, such as bullying, attention problems, and interpersonal difficulties, are more likely to be involved in later delinquency (Loeber & Farrington, 1998). School-based interventions can be effective in addressing these problem behaviours and perhaps lowering the incidence of later problems, including delinquent behaviour (see the discussion of the bullying program developed by Olweus later in this section).

In Chapter 12 of this book, we review the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model as the dominant approach to adult offender treatment. This model matches treatment needs based on the level of risk posed by the offender. While this model has been mostly applied to adults, it is increasingly used effectively with young offenders. For example, one Canadian study found that when youth probation officers adhered to these principles, youth were 18 times less likely to reoffend than in cases for which there was low adherence to RNR principles (Vieira, Skilling, & Peterson-Badali, 2009).

Conceptually, we can think of interventions along two dimensions: the timing of the intervention and the target of the intervention (Roesch, 1995). Both the timing and the target dimensions have been found to be important in the development of interventions for young offenders. Timing of interventions is usually considered in the context of prevention activities. While each prevention activity includes a target population generally or specifically, it is important to note these activities exists on a continuum of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.

Primary prevention interventions take place before a problem develops and are directed at a general population rather than specific individuals. The goal is to prevent a problem (such as a health issue or criminal behaviour) before it occurs. An example of a primary prevention activity is a media campaign warning of the risks of alcohol use for expectant mothers. It is now well established that use of alcohol or drugs during pregnancy can result in fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASD), which in turn is related to the onset of behavioural and mental health problems. According to some research, individuals with this disorder are at higher risk for juvenile and adult criminality. Streissguth and Kanter (1997) followed 400 individuals with FASD into adulthood and found that 60 percent had been suspended or expelled from, or had dropped out of, school; 60 percent had been charged with or convicted of a crime; 50 percent had been confined—either as an inpatient for mental health or substance abuse treatment or as a convict, incarcerated for committing a crime; 50 percent exhibited inappropriate sexual behaviour; and 30 percent had alcohol and/or drug problems. A program to address peer victimization in elementary schools, providing curriculum for teachers and students and teaching skills to cope with aggressive behaviour, is another type of primary prevention (Leadbetter, Dhami, Hoglund, & Dickinson, 2004). Programs such as Project Head Start (Zigler & Styfco, 2004), for high-risk preschool children, promote school readiness by enhancing social and cognitive development, and thus may prevent later school adjustment problems. An example of a largely primary intervention program designed to prevent violent behaviour can be found in the creative programs designed by Olweus (2003) in Norway. His program targeted the problem of bullying behaviour in elementary schools. Using a multilevel approach, he focused on changes in the school, the classroom, and individuals that would create an atmosphere less conducive to such behaviour. The interventions were successful in reducing bullying behaviour and also seemed to have a broader effect on antisocial behaviour.

Secondary prevention programs are directed at specific high-risk groups, but the intervention takes place before significant problems have developed. Youth who show the early risk signs discussed previously in this chapter might be targeted for special programs. An example is the Montreal Preventive Treatment Program, a two-year program aimed at sevento nine-year-old boys who were identified as having high levels of disruptive behaviour in kindergarten. The program focuses on school-based social skills and parent training (Tremblay, Masse, Pagani, & Vitaro, 1996). Follow-up studies showed improvements in school performance and lower levels of delinquent behaviour for treated boys compared to a group of untreated boys. Another example is a diversion program, in which first-time, less-serious offenders are diverted out of the juvenile justice system (Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 2009).

Tertiary prevention programs are usually quite costly, as they often involve institutional care and intensive case management. Furthermore, they usually take place after serious criminal behaviour, including violence, has taken place. Obviously, the focus is to reduce risk of future criminal behaviour, but the opportunity is lost to prevent any criminal behaviour at all. This is why earlier intervention programs can potentially have a greater impact, but there remains a high need to provide treatment for youth who are further along the delinquent path. Most of these programs are in detention facilities, but one example of a tertiary program that provides an alternative to detention is Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, in which trained foster families provide treatment and intensive supervision at home, school, and in the community (Chamberlin, 2003). Notably, follow-up studies show that, when compared to a control group, treated youth had lower arrest rates, less drug use, and better school attendance.

The other conceptual dimension is the target of the intervention. We can focus interventions on individuals who are at risk or who have already offended (e.g., psychotherapy with an identified youth in conflict with the law), but we can also focus on families, schools, peers, and communities as important components of effective intervention. A good example of a multi-target approach is multisystemic therapy (MST), which targets all the groups as essential parts of an overall intervention program (Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, Rowland, & Cunningham, 2009). MST provides intensive individual, family, and community support, with an average of 60 hours of direct services. The initial research found significant positive effects on behavioural problems, family relations, and self-reported offences. In a 59-week, after-referral follow-up, the treated group had less than half as many arrests as controls, had 73 fewer days incarcerated, and had reduced peer aggression. Over two years later, youth who underwent MST were half as likely to be rearrested. These results appear to be long-lasting. Sawyer and Borduin (2011) found in a 22-year follow-up that the felony arrest rate for participants was only about 35 percent, compared to about 55 percent for non-participants, and their violent felony rate was 4.3 percent compared to over 15 percent. MST has since been implemented in 12 countries worldwide, including Canada.

While there are many effective programs that reduce delinquency, it is important to bear in mind that some programs are either ineffective or actually increase the risk of future criminal behaviour. For example, a program that was popular in the 1980s and 1990s had young offenders visit prisons, where adult offenders would tell stories about the consequences of criminal behaviour. The stories were designed to terrify the youth so they would lead crime-free lives. Research on these programs showed that they had the opposite effect, as youth who participated in the Scared Straight program were more likely to engage in future criminal behaviour (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Buehler, 2003).

Cost Benefits of Interventions

Interventions such as MST, while costly, can provide long-term benefits. Sawyer and Borduin (2011) found that the net cumulative benefit of providing MST to a single juvenile offender resulted in a savings to taxpayers and crime victims of $75,110 to $199,374 over nearly 14 years.

Table 7.2 shows that there are substantial long-term cost benefits of prevention programs. Aos, Phipps, Barnoski, and Lieb (2001) calculated the benefit of a range of prevention programs in a 30-year follow-up. They estimated the impact that reduced recidivism would have in terms of benefits resulting from reduced costs of incarceration, increased employment, and lower welfare costs. Programs specifically for juvenile offenders (e.g., multisystemic therapy, functional family therapy) had the largest and most consistent economic returns. Programs targeting younger children and youth not already involved in the criminal justice system (e.g., early childhood education programs) had smaller but still positive benefits.

Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the juvenile justice system, from its early history to the present day, showing that our approach toward youth has undergone many changes. Developmental theories were reviewed, suggesting that adolescents, particularly younger ones, are less capable of making decisions compared to adults. We also reviewed approaches to assessing youth in terms of capacity to waive arrest rights, fitness to stand trial, level of risk, and sentencing as an adult. Finally, interventions with youth were reviewed, revealing that rehabilitation can be effective in reducing recidivism for high-risk youth.

Key Terms

adolescent-limited offenders

co-morbidity

life-course-persistent offenders

meta-analysis

primary prevention

psychosocial maturity

risk assessment

secondary prevention

tertiary prevention

transfer (waiver) to adult court

Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA)

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Suggested Readings and Websites

Kruh, I., & Grisso, T. (2008). Evaluation of juveniles’ competence to stand trial.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Vincent, G. M., Grisso, T., & Terry, A. (2008). Mental health screening and assessment in juvenile justice. In C. L. Kessler & L. J. Kraus (Eds.), The mental health needs of young offenders (pp. 270–287). New York: Cambridge University Press.

The evolution of youth justice in Canada: www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/ icg-gci/jj2-jm2/jj2-jm2.pdf.

Youth Criminal Justice Act: ww.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/yj-jj/ycja-lsjpa/index.html.