CHAPTER 8: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: MEMORY AND IDENTIFICATION

We will discuss the effect of retrieval on memory reports in more detail in the section on interview protocols. For now, we briefly introduce the topic by noting that the type of question asked during retrieval attempts may have a substantial impact on what is recalled. According to Fisher, Brewer, and Mitchell (2009), memory of complex events is made up of multiple components: spatial, temporal, person details, verbal, sensory, etc. The nature of a retrieval cue will affect the kind of information that is retrieved. A retrieval cue on one occasion may activate a different subset of details than a different retrieval cue that is administered on another occasion. This explains not only the retrieval of different information on different occasions, but also explains why information in both reports can be accurate.

Situational Factors That May Affect Eyewitness Identification

Situational factors may play a role in mistaken eyewitness memory. The following sections review the research on various situational factors.

Stress/Arousal

First, we distinguish arousal and stress. The terms are not well-defined in the literature, so it is impossible to provide a generally accepted or even a good definition. It might be useful to think of emotional arousal as a physiological response and stress as the subjective interpretation. That is, an event is emotionally arousing and an individual subjectively interprets that arousal as negative (stressful) or not (not stressful). In this very brief introduction to a complex issue, we discuss arousal generally and add a few comments on the possible additional impact of stress.

Generally, we recall the gist and central elements of emotional events more accurately than we do the gist and central features of non-emotional events. There are at least four possible reasons for this: (1) events are emotional because they relate to things or include details that we care about, and this leads to better memory for those details; (2) we tend to rehearse arousing events more than neutral events, and rehearsal enhances memory; (3) arousing events may activate amygdala-based processing that leads to particularly vivid memories (not necessarily accurate, but memories that are experienced as vivid); and (4) there is a narrowing of attention to the central details of events that are arousing, leading to good memory for the central details at the expense of memory for peripheral details.

This last point is known as the Easterbrook hypothesis, which states that as arousal increases, attention to the most salient elements of the event is sharpened at the expense of attention to the less central elements of the event. Thus, compared to memory for a neutral event, memory for the central details of a negative event is superior but memory for peripheral details is poorer. Reisberg and Heuer (2007) suggest that the narrowing of attention may not be entirely due to arousal. Part of the effect could be explained because the central details of emotionally arousing events are typically unusual in some way, and unusual details command attention. Because we have limited attentional resources, some attention is diverted from peripheral details to the central details, leading to improved memory for the central details and impoverished memory for peripheral details. (A similar hypothesis is offered in the section on weapon focus.)

If arousal is subjectively experienced as stressful, another biological mechanism may operate. Recall that emotionally arousing events may involve amygdala-based processing, which leads to vivid memories. Stress during an event may interfere with the consolidating mechanism of the hippocampus, making the “vivid” memories fragmented (Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2009; Greenhoot, McCloskey, & Glisky, 2005).

As a final and essential gloss on all research on memory for arousing and stressful events, much depends on how the individual experiences the event. The effects of arousal and stress will only take place if the event is experienced as such. Some events are inherently stressful and will be experienced as such by most people. However, in the “normal” course of the day, some events may be experienced as highly stressful for some and moderately upsetting or even benign for others (Hervé, Cooper, & Yuille, 2007; Reisberg & Heuer, 2007). As an example, think about beginner swimming lessons—fun for some and terrifying for others!

Weapon Focus

Research has shown that eyewitnesses are significantly influenced by the visual presence of a weapon. When a weapon, such as a knife or gun, is present, witnesses’ memory for other details is impaired (Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990). It appears that eyewitnesses narrow their attention, spending more time focusing on the weapon and less time on other aspects of the situation, including the physical characteristics of the event and the perpetrator (Figure 8.1). This weapon focus effect has been demonstrated even when people watch a film of a crime being committed (Tooley, Brigham, Maass, & Bothwell, 1987).

Originally, the weapon focus effect was explained as a consequence of arousal and stress. Recent researchers have investigated an alternative explanation for the weapon focus effect: unusualness. In Hope and Wright (2007), participants viewed a slide show of a man entering a grocery story, where he removed a gun (threatening and unusual), a feather duster (non-threatening and unusual), or a wallet (control) from his pocket. At the same time, participants were completing a secondary reaction-time (RT) task that was presented on the same screen.

The experimenters reasoned that if the objects commanded differential attention, RTs should vary as a function of the object removed from the man’s pocket. Indeed, RTs were slower in both the weapon and feather duster conditions relative to the control condition. Interestingly, accuracy was not affected similarly. Accuracy scores were similar in the weapon and feather duster conditions (59 percent and 70 percent, respectively), and they were lower in the weapon condition than in the control condition (82 percent accuracy in the control condition). Unusualness may explain some of the weapon focus effect, but not all of it.

Post-Event Factors That May Affect Eyewitness Identification

Aside from situational factors that occur at the time of the event, post-event factors may also play a role in mistaken eyewitness reports. Let’s consider some of the more common post-event factors that may account for mistaken eyewitness testimony.

Passage of Time

The passage of time affects memory for events and eyewitness identification. A more complete discussion of this factor is presented in the section on eyewitness identification.

Misleading Information

Misleading information can affect the accuracy of an eyewitness’s recall. The research that was pioneered by Loftus and colleagues has demonstrated that the reports of eyewitnesses can be influenced by information introduced after the event.

In one series of studies, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed participants a film of a car crash. Half of the participants were asked about the speed of the car when it “turned right,” and half were asked to estimate the speed when the car “ran the stop sign.” Later, participants were asked whether they saw a stop sign; 35 percent of the group who were asked about the speed of the car when it turned right indicated that they saw a stop sign, whereas 53 percent of the group who had been asked about the speed of the car when it ran the stop sign reported seeing a stop sign. When a suggestion about the presence of a barn was included in the questioning, 17 percent of participants reported seeing a barn when, in fact, there was no barn in the film.

In addition to showing that suggestions implanted within questions can influence the recall of eyewitnesses, Loftus and her colleagues showed that the way in which questions are worded could also influence eyewitness recall. Participants were asked to estimate the speed of two cars when they “contacted,” “hit,” or “smashed” each other. The estimated speeds varied significantly as a function of the wording used. Participants estimated the cars to be travelling at a slower speed when the word “contacted” was used than when the word “smashed” was used in the question. In addition, participants were much more likely to recall seeing a broken headlight when they were asked whether they saw “the” broken headlight than when they were asked whether they saw “a” broken headlight. Thus, subtle variations in wording or subtle suggestions implanted in a question or statement about an event can result in substantial variation in the eyewitness’s recall of the event.

Wells, Wright, and Bradfield (1999) delineated three conditions under which misleading information tends to affect the accuracy of eyewitness accounts: (1) when the strength of the original memory trace is weaker rather than stronger (such as when an eyewitness does not get to observe the event for very long, or when a great deal of time has passed since the event); (2) when the misinformation is not recognized as being incorrect at the time (such as when the misinformation is about a peripheral detail rather the central gist of the event); and (3) when the misinformation is delivered by a credible source (such as a police officer).

There is an interaction between passage of time and suggestion. The more time that passes between a witnessed event and a misleading question or other attempt to implant a suggestion, the more effective the suggestion will be in distorting the accuracy of the eyewitness’s report (Hoffman, Loftus, Greenmun, & Dashiell, 1992).

Three explanations for the suggestibility effect have been offered (e.g., Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007):

• Misinformation Acceptance: This is the process in which participants guess or respond in a way they think the questioner wants them to respond. Because the questioner presented the misinformation or otherwise expressed a desire to hear the misinformation, it seems reasonable to participants that the suggestion is the desired response.
• Source Misattributions: Participants recall both the experienced detail and the suggested detail but cannot remember how each detail was learned, and sometimes inaccurately attribute the suggested detail to the experience.
• Memory Impairment: The misinformation impairs participants’ ability to remember the experienced details (that is, it either renders the experienced detail inaccessible or destroys/alters it).

Memory for past events can be influenced by a wide range of variables, some of which the justice system can control (system variables) and some of which it cannot control (estimator variables). One very important system variable is the manner in which witnesses are interviewed. We turn to that topic next.

Interviews with Witnesses

The process of interviewing a witness so as to maximize the amount of accurate information and minimize the amount of inaccurate information retrieved has been the subject of a considerable amount of research. In this section, we describe six general principles of interviewing witnesses and introduce one particular protocol that has been very successful, the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI).

General Principles for Interviewing Witnesses

This section describes some general principles for interviewing cooperative witness, as set out by Fisher (2010). Woven into our discussion of general principles of interviewing cooperative witnesses is our description of a study done by Wright and Alison (2004), who evaluated 19 police interviews from two jurisdictions in Canada. The interviews were conducted between 1994 and 2000, and the average length of an interview was 39.7 minutes.

Begin the interview by developing rapport with the witness. This serves two important goals. First, the witness is being asked to work hard to provide a detailed description of an unpleasant experience to a stranger (the police officer) who is assumed to be an expert on crime. This request will be more successful if the police officer can reduce some of the stress by developing rapport. Second, rapport building is also a first step in transferring control of the interview to the witness.

Remain neutral and objective. Interviewers must not direct the dialogue or reveal their biases. There are a number of ways interviewers can inadvertently introduce their beliefs about the event to the witness: by selectively reinforcing responses that are consistent with their hypothesis, verbally and non-verbally; by ignoring or otherwise discounting statements that are inconsistent with their biases; by asking leading questions; and by taking control of the interview.

Ask open-ended questions that become more structured only if necessary and only as the interview progresses. Open-ended questions are recommended for a number of reasons. Of significance is the notion that cognitive resources are limited, and if witness resources are taken up listening to the questions (and, perhaps, trying to figure out what the interviewer wants to hear), fewer resources are available to search memory. Similarly, interviewers may not have the cognitive resources needed to listen carefully to the witness if they are thinking about the next question. Moreover, if open-ended questions are used, interviewers avoid the problems associated with closed questions. What is wrong with closed questions? The information obtained is likely to be limited. That is, asking closed questions discourages witnesses from offering unsolicited information, because they believe the interviewer is only interested in the answers to the specific question. Closed questions may foster compliance, with witnesses guessing or providing answers that are consistent with what they think the interviewer wants to hear. Finally, witnesses may modify subsequent reports so they are consistent with their previous responses to the closed question. Wright and Alison (2004) found that open questions and questions of clarification made up only 17 percent of the questions asked, and closed questions made up 74 percent of all questions asked.

Avoid the use of leading (or misleading) questions. Recall the suggestibility research discussed earlier. Closed questions are more likely than open questions to contain misleading information, and this could contaminate and compromise subsequent testimony. Wright and Alison (2004) found that 9 percent of the questions asked by the police officers were leading questions.

Allow the interviewee to control the interview. The interviewer should talk 20 to 30 percent of the time, and the interviewee should talk 70 to 80 percent of the time. Wright and Alison (2004) found that interviewers spoke 32.62 percent of the time and witnesses spoke 67.01 percent of the time (lawyers spoke .37 percent of the time).

Witness should be allowed to provide uninterrupted responses and encouraged to say everything that comes to mind—whether or not it seems trivial or irrelevant. However, witnesses should be cautioned not to guess or make anything up. Interviewers cannot know all forensically relevant details of a past crime. If the police do not allow witnesses to report all that they can recall about a particular detail, important information may not be elicited (e.g., tattoo, scar, accent). Wright and Alison (2004) found that interviewees were interrupted by police officers about once every 4 minutes and 36 seconds, and there was an environmental interruption (e.g., a pager went off) every 5 minutes and 48 seconds. So in an average interview of 39.7 minutes, there were more than 15 interruptions!

The Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI)

Now let’s look at a specific interviewing technique. The original Cognitive Interview (CI) was developed in response to requests made to two psychologists to help in training and guiding police interviews (Fisher, 2010; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985). Its theoretical bases were strongly influenced by cognitive psychology. The CI was further enhanced by social psychology and communication research to become the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI). It has all of the characteristics of a good interview, including beginning with rapport building and transferring control of the interview to the witness.

From a cognitive perspective, the ECI relies on two principles: feature overlap and multiple retrieval paths. The principle of feature overlap states that effective memory retrieval is related to the degree of similarity (overlap) between the retrieval cue and the original event (also known as encoding specificity— Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The principle of multiple retrieval paths recognizes that there are several retrieval paths to an encoded event; if all of the relevant information is not available with one retrieval cue, more information may be available with another retrieval cue.

The ECI advocates the use of four particular prompts. The mental context reinstatement prompt helps witnesses maximize the amount of overlap between the encoding and retrieval contexts. Witnesses are guided to reconstruct the context, including surroundings, emotions, and thoughts. It may help to ask them to close their eyes when recalling the crime (Perfect et al., 2008). Mental context reinstatement is, of course, most effective when there is a delay between the crime and the interview.

 It makes little sense to recreate the context of a crime when the witness is at the crime scene. The prompt to report everything also relies on the feature overlap principle. Witnesses are instructed to include everything in the report, even partial details and details that seem irrelevant. When this prompt is administered, they should be reminded not to guess or make anything up.

Two prompts derive from the multiple retrieval path principle: to report the event in a variety of orders and to report the event from a variety of perspectives. Witnesses may, for instance, be asked to report the event from the end to the beginning or from the most memorable point to the end. Also, they may be asked to describe the event from a different spatial location (e.g., “What would you have seen if you had been standing across the street?”) or from a different person’s perspective.

The Enhanced Cognitive Interview directs police to use witness-compatible questioning. Retrieval is most likely to be successful if the details reported are consistent with a witness’s current mental record. So if witnesses are currently thinking about the perpetrator, it is not a good idea to ask about the getaway car. First, a question about the getaway car is likely to end their mental record of the perpetrator, perhaps before they have reported all they can recall about the perpetrator. Second, they may answer questions about the getaway car before they have an ideal mental record of it.

In several studies that compared the amount and accuracy of details obtained from the ECI to those obtained from standard police interviews, the results were startling. Some researchers reported a 35 percent increase in correct information reported with the ECI compared to a standard police interview. Based on meta-analyses, Kohnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull (1999) and Memon, Meissner, and Fraser (2010) concluded that the majority of the research has found that the cognitive interview elicits more correct information compared to a control interview; however, there is also a small increase in the amount of incorrect information reported.

Eyewitness Identification

When you think about a lineup what do you picture? Most people would see a live lineup: a group of persons entering a room, with the witness behind a one-way mirror looking closely to decide if the perpetrator is present. In fact, for the following reasons, live lineups are rare in Canada: (a) the real inconvenience of constructing an adequate live lineup, particularly in smaller communities, where the number of foils (i.e., members of the lineup other than the suspect) that are unknown to the witness is limited; (b) the suspect has a right to refuse to participate in a live lineup or to request that counsel is present during the lineup procedure (however, the police can conduct a photo lineup or a video lineup without consent of the suspect (R. v. Parsons, 1993)); (c) photo lineups are less time-consuming to prepare; (d) photo lineups are portable, making them much more convenient; (e) photo lineups are static, so the police do not have to be concerned with the behaviour of any member of the lineup that could introduce bias; (f) the witness may be less anxious about examining a photo lineup than a live lineup; and (g) all witness see the same photo. So now, when you think about lineups, you should think about a witness being asked if the perpetrator is present in a group of photos.

In practice, photos are the most common mode of presenting a lineup. In most research on eyewitness identification, participants view an event that includes a target individual, after which they are presented with a set of photographs and asked to identify the target individual. In both practice and in research, the presentation of photos is called a lineup, and that is the term we use in this section.

Estimator Variables that Affect Eyewitness Identification Accuracy

There are many factors that can affect the accuracy of identifications, including passage of time, the environment and duration of the event, the race of individuals involved, and unconscious transference. We will look at each of these factors in the following sections.

Passage of Time

As with any memory, recall drops off as time passes. Ebbinghaus (1964) determined that the rate of forgetting is steepest immediately after the event and then levels off. The amount of time that passes between the event witnessed and the opportunity to describe the event or make an identification will decrease the accuracy of an eyewitness account. It may be that eyewitnesses were unaware they were observing an event that would later come under the scrutiny of the criminal justice system, or it may be that the police did not make an immediate arrest. Regardless, eyewitnesses forget things over time and, therefore, accuracy diminishes as more time passes (Flin, Boone, Knox, & Bull, 1992).

Shepard (1983) exposed witnesses to an irate stranger for 45 seconds and then asked the witnesses to pick the stranger out of a video lineup after varying lengths of time. After a one-week delay, 65 percent of the witnesses were able to make an accurate identification, but after an 11-month delay, only 10 percent of the witnesses made an accurate identification. Thus, the rate of accurate identifications decreased over time. Cutler, Penrod, and Martens (1987) also found this to be true: that false identifications increase over time.

Environmental Factors

Several environmental factors can affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification (Figure 8.2). The amount and type of light available at the crime scene affect how well eyewitnesses are able to see and, therefore, how well they are able to perceive the events as they unfold.

Research has indicated that it is difficult to accurately detect colours in monochromic lighting, such as that given off by a streetlight. Fog, as well as the presence of rain, snow, or other precipitation, also affects visibility and thus serves to lower the potential for accurate eyewitness information. The distance between the witness and the observed event is a factor, as is the presence of additional simultaneous activity or other distractors.

Duration of Event

Research on facial recognition suggests a positive relationship between time and accuracy such that the longer witnesses are exposed to a perpetrator, the more accurate their eyewitness testimony will be (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003). There is, however, a tendency for people to overestimate the duration of brief events and underestimate the duration of lengthy events. Thus, since the majority of crimes occur during a brief period of time, witnesses tend to overestimate the amount of time they were exposed to the perpetrator. Penrod and Cutler (1999) have indicated that these overestimates tend to be about three or four times the actual length of the event. Therefore, witnesses who see a perpetrator for only 30 seconds may estimate that they were exposed to the perpetrator for two minutes. An exposure time of 30 seconds does not allow witnesses much time to pay attention to, and note facial and other physical features of, the perpetrator. Of course, as discussed previously, if the perpetrator has a weapon, witnesses will spend even less time observing facial and physical features.

Cross-Race Identification

There is no evidence that members of one race are better or worse at eyewitness identification than members of another race. However, there is evidence to suggest that people are better at recognizing the faces of members of their own race than they are at recognizing the faces of members of other races. Meissner and Brigham (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies and found that within-race identifications were significantly more likely to be accurate than cross-race identifications (also known as own-race bias). Various reasons have been proposed for why people are better at identifying others from their own race more accurately. Some researchers have suggested that we classify the facial features of someone from our own race in more detail, and less superficially, than we do the facial features of someone from another race (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). This may be a result of a greater familiarity with those from our own race. Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that as our contact with members of different racial groups increases, our ability to recognize faces from those racial groups improves.

Unconscious Transference

When witnesses remember a face but inaccurately attribute the face to a different context, they are demonstrating unconscious transference. Unconscious transference occurs when you see a barista from your favourite coffee shop on the street and place her as someone you’ve seen at your health club. Similarly, unconscious transference occurs when an eyewitness mistakenly identifies an innocent bystander who was present at the crime scene as the perpetrator. Robert Buckhout (1974), a psychologist who studied eyewitnesses, staged a mock assault in front of 141 students in his psychology class. When he asked the students in his class to pick the perpetrator out of a photo lineup seven weeks later, only about 40 percent were able to make an accurate identification. What is interesting is that two-thirds of those who were unable to make an accurate identification selected someone from the lineup who was present in the classroom on the day of the “crime” as an innocent bystander. Thus, the phenomenon of unconscious transference is one means by which innocent people may be considered suspects within the criminal justice system.

Construction and Administration of Lineups

The belief that the suspect is the culprit increases substantially once that suspect has been selected from a lineup. Of course, the police believe that the suspect is the culprit, but they can be wrong; their suspect could be innocent.

If the suspect is the culprit, the lineup is said to be a target-present lineup. If the suspect is not the culprit (e.g., the police made a mistake), the lineup is said to be a target-absent lineup. Wells and colleagues (1999) identified three broad domains as sources of eyewitness identification errors in lineups that could lead to an incorrect identification of an innocent suspect: instructions, structure, and procedure.

Pre-Identification Instructions

Asking a witness to select a perpetrator from a lineup places a high degree of demand on the witness. Most witnesses will assume that the perpetrator is present (otherwise, why conduct the lineup?), and many will select the individual who most closely approximates the perpetrator. Most witnesses feel a desire to assist the police and, therefore, experience psychological pressure to identify someone from the lineup as the perpetrator. It appears to be difficult for witnesses to indicate that the perpetrator is not present in a lineup. Malpass and Devine (1981) found that 78 percent of eyewitnesses identified someone from a perpetrator-absent lineup when they were led to believe that the perpetrator was in the lineup. However, this false identification rate fell to 33 percent when the eyewitnesses were warned that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup.

If police instruct the witness prior to viewing the lineup that the perpetrator might or might not be present, inaccurate or false identifications can be reduced substantially (Brewer & Palmer, 2010). Steblay (1997) found that this warning resulted in reduced identifications when the perpetrator was not in the lineup but had no effect when the perpetrator was in the lineup. In addition, instructions to witnesses should include a warning that they are not to guess.

Structure of the Lineup

The lineup should contain only one suspect. All other members of the lineup (i.e., the foils) should be known innocents (Wells & Turtle, 1986). Selection of foils is critically important. On one hand, there should be nothing about the suspect that makes him or her stand out from the foils. On the other hand, if the foils look too much like the suspect, it will be impossible to make an identification. Typically, foils are selected by matching them to the description of the perpetrator. If the witness describes the perpetrator as a Caucasian man who is short and stocky with brown hair, the foils should be short stocky Caucasians with brown hair. Research shows that the rate of selecting an innocent person who fits the description of the perpetrator increases substantially when the innocent suspect matches the description but others in the lineup do not (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993).

But what if the suspect does not match the description of the perpetrator? What if, for instance, the suspect is described as having brown hair but the suspect has blond hair? In this case, the police must be particularly careful to ensure the lineup is not biased. Because hair colour is a very salient feature, police may decide to include foils that have blond hair. They may then test the fairness of the lineup. To test lineup fairness, police give a non-witness the description of the perpetrator provided by the witnesses and ask the non-witness to make an identification. If the lineup is fair, the suspect should be selected at chance levels only.

Administration of the Lineup

Should the lineup members be presented sequentially (one at a time) or simultaneously (all at once)? First, we go over a bit of terminology. Two types of judgment processes may be used in lineup decisions. A relative judgment involves comparing lineup members to one another and choosing the one who looks most like the culprit. An absolute judgment involves comparing a lineup member with memory of the perpetrator and deciding if the lineup member matches the memory record. Sequential presentations tend to encourage absolute judgments, whereas simultaneous presentations tend to encourage relative judgments. False identifications in target-absent lineups are more likely to occur when the witness adopts a relative judgment strategy rather than an absolute judgment strategy (a sequential superiority effect).

However, some have argued that a sequential lineup reduces correct selections from target-present lineups, so sequential presentation may not be the panacea for incorrect identification judgments (e.g., Lindsay, Mansour, Beaudry, Leach, & Bertrand, 2009). In a recent meta-analysis, Steblay, Dysart, and Wells (2011) confirmed the sequential superiority effect. Across 72 tests from 23 different labs, the rate of choosing dropped for both target-present and target-absent lineups when a sequential presentation was used instead of a simultaneous mode. However, the drop in choosing was larger for target-absent than target-present lineups, meaning that, overall, sequential presentation was superior to simultaneous presentation.

In addition, the use of dual lineup procedures can reduce false identifications. The dual lineup procedure involves the use of a blank lineup (i.e., a lineup in which all the members are known to be innocent by the police; thus, a blank lineup does not contain any suspects). With the blank lineup, the witness is not told that there are no suspects in the lineup but, rather, is given instructions with the warning that the perpetrator might not be present. Blank lineups can be used as a “lure” to determine whether the witness is able to resist the temptation of selecting someone when the actual perpetrator is not present (Wells et al., 1998). Wells (1984) found that eyewitnesses who did not make an identification when shown a blank lineup were significantly less likely to make a false identification on the actual lineup than were those who either were not given the blank lineup test or who failed the blank lineup test (i.e., they selected someone from the blank lineup as the perpetrator). It seems that the use of a blank lineup can help to weed out those eyewitnesses who are prone to make mistakes.

A final issue related to the administration of the lineup is the experimenter expectancy effect. This occurs when test administrators (in)advertently express their opinion and influence responses. For example, consider the story of Clever Hans. Clever Hans was a horse who could supposedly answer math questions; he would count out the correct answer by tapping his hoof on the ground. It was discovered, however, that Clever Hans was just very good at reading his trainer. He would tap until he received a clue from his trainer that he had arrived at the correct answer, at which point he would stop tapping. The trainer would lean forward slightly until Clever Hans approached the correct number of taps; then the trainer would lean back. He was unaware that he was providing any clues to Clever Hans. Likewise, human research participants can pick up on the nonverbal cues of an experimenter and can alter their behavior accordingly. This has been demonstrated in lineup situations in which the detective administering a photo spread mistakenly obtained a photograph of someone he believed to be the suspect but who was not. The eyewitness selected the photo of the person who the detective believed to be the suspect. When the error was discovered and the photo spread reconstructed with the correct photo, the eyewitness chose the correct suspect. In addition, when 50 people were shown the actual photo of the suspect and asked to select the person from the original photo spread that most closely resembled the suspect, none of these people chose the person selected by the eyewitness (Wells et al., 1998). It seems that, as in the case of Clever Hans, the eyewitness was picking up on some non-verbal cues from the detective, which influenced the initial identification.

If the police have a suspect, and if lineup administrators know the identity of the suspect, there are many ways they can express this opinion: they may re-administer the identification test until the witness identifies the suspect (the only person who remains constant across lineups is the suspect); the administrator’s body language may change when the witness looks at the suspect (that is, the administrator may lean forward or raise an eyebrow); or the administrator may spend more time looking at the suspect than at any of the foils (see Brewer & Wells, 2009, for a list of ways this can be done). To avoid the experimenter expectancy effect, the officer administering the test should be blind to the identity of the suspect.

Witness Confidence

Research indicates that highly confident witnesses are persuasive with jurors. The problem, however, is that confidence is not necessarily related to accuracy. Highly confident witnesses may be inaccurate while less confident witnesses may be accurate.

Why is the relationship between confidence and accuracy uncertain? Research indicates that confidence is highly malleable and can be affected by factors that either do not affect accuracy or that affect accuracy in opposite ways. Confidence increases over time; accuracy decreases over time. Confidence increases if positive feedback is given; accuracy does not. Confidence increases the more times a witness is questioned; accuracy may not. So a witness who was only slightly confident when making an identification becomes somewhat more confident when making an identification during a live lineup, and ends up being very confident when identifying the accused while on the witness stand during the trial. Of course, this happens whether or not the identified person is the actual perpetrator. Successive identifications increase the confidence of witnesses, which, in turn, increase their persuasiveness but not their accuracy.

Wells and Bradfield (1998) demonstrated the malleability of eyewitness confidence when they had hundreds of witnesses view a security video of a man entering a store and then told the witnesses that the man had killed a security guard. They asked the witnesses to identify the man from a photo spread. The 352 witnesses who made a false identification (selected the wrong man from the photo spread) were then randomly assigned to one of three groups. One group was told that they identified the correct perpetrator, one group was told that they identified the wrong man and was told which individual in the photo spread was the actual perpetrator, and the third group was not given any feedback. At the time of the initial identification, the three groups were equally confident about their selections. Later on, the witnesses were asked to indicate how certain they were at the time they made the initial identification. Those who had been given the confirming feedback that they had selected the correct perpetrator recalled being very certain at the time of the initial identification; those who were told that they had identified the wrong man recalled being uncertain. In addition, those who were told that they made the correct identification indicated that they made the identification more easily, recalled having a better view of the perpetrator, and indicated that they paid more attention to the event than those who were told they had made an incorrect identification. This research indicates how easily witness confidence can be manipulated.

If more variables are present that influence confidence but not accuracy, the confidence-accuracy relationship will be weaker. It stands to reason that if fewer such variables are present, the confidence-accuracy relationship will be stronger. There is some evidence for this. Brewer and Palmer (2010) concluded that when considering only witnesses who made an identification, if the confidence ratings are taken immediately after selection, the reported confidence may be helpful to police. That is, if witnesses are very confident of their identification, the suspect is worthy of further investigation. If witnesses are not confident at all, other hypotheses should be pursued. Among witnesses who do not make a selection (i.e., who reject the lineup), confidence is not helpful in determining if the culprit is or is not present in the lineup.

There are many factors that may contribute to a mistaken identification. The multitude of factors ensures that mistaken identifications can occur at any of a number of points, from the time of the crime (poor lighting conditions, brief encounter, presence of a weapon) through the investigation procedures used by the police (witness questioning, photo spreads, lineups), and up to the point where witnesses identify the perpetrator in the courtroom (witness confidence, situational demand characteristics). For many of these factors (estimator variables), there is not much that can be done to limit their impact on inaccurate identifications. However, for other factors (system variables), there are some procedures that can be used to reduce the number of mistaken or inaccurate identifications. We will discuss these safeguards next.

Safeguards and Protections

To this point, we have discussed many of the factors that contribute to mistaken identifications. We now turn to some of the safeguards or protections that can be used to decrease the chances that innocent people will be mistakenly identified, and if they are identified, that they will not be convicted of a crime. These safeguards or protections fall into two main categories: those that can be implemented during police investigation procedures, especially lineups, and those that can be implemented within the courtroom.

Investigation Procedures

In 1996, the American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS; Division 41 of the American Psychological Association) assembled a subcommittee to review the research on eyewitness identifications and to put forth recommendations regarding the best procedures for conducting lineups. Gary Wells, one of the preeminent research psychologists in the area of eyewitness identification, led this subcommittee, which recommended four rules (Wells et al., 1998). In addition to the recommendations made by Wells and the AP-LS subcommittee, other researchers have offered recommendations that would serve to reduce the number of mistaken identifications.

Rule 1: Who Conducts the Lineup

Wells and his colleagues (1998) recommended that the first rule be that “the person who conducts the lineup or photo spread should not be aware of which member of the lineup or photo spread is the suspect” (p. 627). This rule comes from studies that demonstrate the powerful effects of experimenter expectancy (Rosenthal, 1976). Participants in research studies are able to pick up on the experimenter’s expectations when the experimenter is not blind to the condition, and many times the participants will act according to that expectation.

The lead detective or investigator on a case is most often the person who assembles and conducts the lineup or photo spread. Thus, as in the experimenter situation, it is possible that the lead investigator will convey verbal and non-verbal cues to the eyewitness regarding which member of the lineup is the suspect. For these reasons, it has been recommended that the person who conducts the lineup or photo spread should be blind as to which member is the suspect.

Rule 2: Instructions on Viewing

The second rule proposed by Wells and colleagues (1998) is that “eyewitnesses should be told explicitly that the person in question might not be in the lineup or photo spread and therefore should not feel that they must make an identification. They should also be told that the person administering the lineup does not know which person is the suspect in the case” (p. 629). As discussed earlier in this chapter, eyewitnesses find it difficult not to select someone from a lineup or photo spread; instead of indicating that the perpetrator is not present, they will most often select the person from the lineup or photo spread who most closely resembles the perpetrator. Instructing the eyewitnesses that the suspect might not be in the lineup or photo spread reduces the chances that they will make a false identification.

The second part of this rule is related to the first rule; the eyewitnesses must be told that the person conducting the lineup does not know who the suspect is, thereby reducing the possibility that the eyewitnesses will look to the person conducting the lineup for cues as to which person to select or whether the person selected is the “correct” choice.

Rule 3: Structure of Lineup or Photo Spread

The third rule that Wells and colleagues (1998) recommended was that “the suspect should not stand out of the lineup or photo spread as being different from the distractors based on the eyewitness’ previous description of the culprit or based on other factors that would draw extra attention to the suspect” (p. 630). The critical issue here is to ensure that an innocent suspect in the lineup or photo spread does not stand out from the foils in any significant way that would cause this person to be selected more than would be expected on the basis of chance. One way to test whether this rule has been met with any particular lineup is through the use of a mock witness procedure. Mock witnesses (people who have never seen the perpetrator) are given the eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator and then shown the lineup and asked to select the person they believe is the perpetrator. If the mock witnesses are able to figure out who the suspect is, this suggests a problem with the lineup. In theory, if there are six members of a lineup or photo spread, each member should be selected by one-sixth of the mock witnesses.

Rule 4: Obtaining Confidence Statements

The fourth rule recommended by Wells and colleagues (1998) is that “a clear statement should be taken from the eyewitness at the time of the identification and prior to any feedback as to his or her confidence that the identified person is the actual culprit” (p. 635). As discussed earlier in this chapter, an eyewitness’s confidence tends to increase over time, with successive identifications, and with post-identification information provided to the eyewitness. In addition, we know that jurors can be strongly persuaded by a witness’s level of confidence. If eyewitnesses are given feedback that they identified the person the police suspected, their confidence in the identification will be raised. In addition, asking eyewitnesses to recall the level of confidence they had at the time of the identification is not reliable, especially when they have been given feedback about the identification. Thus, the only way to accurately assess eyewitnesses’ confidence in the identification is to ask for their confidence level at the time of the identification. This way, any significant discrepancy between the level of confidence indicated by the eyewitness at the time of the identification and during testimony at trial can be noted by the jury and considered accordingly.

Rule 5: Videotaping the Lineup and Witness Identification

Kassin (1998) argued that a fifth rule should be added to the recommendations: the lineup and identification procedures should be routinely videotaped. Kassin argued that videotaping would allow for an objective record of the structure of the lineup (rule 3), the person conducting the lineup and the instructions used (rules 1 and 2), and the length of time that an eyewitness took to make the identification, as well as his or her confidence in the identification (rule 4). Wells and colleagues (1998) were reluctant to include videotaping as one of their rules because they made a concerted effort to include only those rules that would serve to reduce the likelihood of a mistaken identification and that would not cause unnecessary burden to police departments. However, it seems that Kassin’s proposed fifth rule would give police departments an opportunity to document adherence to the four rules proposed by Wells and colleagues (see Insight 8.1).

Courtroom Procedures

In the first part of this chapter we noted that eyewitness evidence plays a significant role in over 75,000 cases each year in the United States, but mistaken identifications account for approximately 4,500 wrongful convictions each year. These numbers are staggering and underscore the importance eyewitness evidence plays in our criminal justice system. We know from research that the likelihood of a conviction is far greater when there is an eyewitness than when there is not. In addition, it appears that jurors are so swayed by eyewitness evidence that even testimony indicating that an eyewitness did not view the perpetrator under adequate conditions does not change the chances of conviction significantly.

In a classic study, Loftus (1979) presented three groups of mock jurors with evidence from a criminal case. The first group heard circumstantial evidence only; the second group heard the circumstantial evidence plus eyewitness identification evidence; and the third group heard the circumstantial evidence, the eyewitness identification evidence, as well as evidence regarding the fact that the eyewitness had very poor eyesight and was not wearing glasses on the day of the crime. Of the first group, 18 percent voted to convict the defendant; of the second group, 72 percent voted to convict the defendant; and of the third group, 68 percent voted to convict the defendant. Thus, the mock jurors appear to have been strongly influenced by the eyewitness evidence, regardless of whether the evidence appeared to be credible. Research on eyewitness testimony has demonstrated that many variables can influence the accuracy of witness testimony. Some are system variables, such as interview protocols and lineup procedures, while others are estimator variables, such as arousal and stress, duration of the event, and the presence of a weapon. Thus, one of the challenges for the defence in any trial is to attempt to educate the jury about the factors that may impact the accuracy of an eyewitness’s testimony. Aside from cross-examining eyewitnesses in an attempt to bring to light possible weaknesses in their testimony, the defence can educate the jury about some of these factors in two other ways: expert testimony about eyewitness testimony and judicial instructions.

Expert Testimony

Psychologists may be called as experts to testify about eyewitness testimony. In general, this type of testimony focuses on the factors that may impact the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in an attempt to educate the jury about the possibility of false or mistaken testimony. The psychologist will explain the research on eyewitness testimony to the judge or to the jury but will not comment on the accuracy of the particular witness.

In many cases, judges are reluctant to allow expert testimony on eyewitness testimony; they may fear that the trial will turn into a battle of the experts, or they may believe that much of the information that the expert will provide is common knowledge or that the research in this field has not been sufficiently established. However, research suggests that mock jurors (laypersons) are insensitive to some of the factors that can cause mistaken eyewitness testimony (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990a). In addition, it appears that many of the findings from research in this area have been sufficiently established (see Insight 8.2).

Cutler and his colleagues (1990b) conducted a series of studies to examine the impact of expert testimony. In one study, as part of the trial evidence presented, some participants heard expert testimony regarding the limitations of eyewitness identifications, while other participants were not presented with expert testimony. The results indicated that the presentation of expert testimony at trial caused participants to place less emphasis on eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy and sensitized participants to the importance of considering factors that may reduce or enhance eyewitness accuracy. Those participants who were not presented with expert testimony on eyewitness identifications at trial were more likely to use confidence as an indicator of accuracy and did not consider those factors that are known to reduce accuracy (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990b). Thus, it seems that the presentation of expert testimony at trial can serve to educate jurors about the relevant factors for evaluating eyewitness testimony.

Judicial Instructions

An alternative to expert testimony is for the judge to provide instructions to the jury to alert them to some of the limitations of eyewitness identification (see Insight 8.3 for recommended jury instructions in cases involving eyewitnesses).

While this alternative may avoid the concern that the trial will turn into a battle of the experts, research on judicial instructions has demonstrated that juries often have a difficult time understanding and implementing the instructions. Often, the instructions, which can be quite lengthy, are read aloud to the jury, and jurors are not given a copy of the instructions to read for themselves. In addition, although the defence will usually request that the judge provide instruction to the jury on the limitations of eyewitness identification, the judge will not always oblige.

Summary

Eyewitness identification and testimony are important components of our criminal justice system. Unfortunately, errors frequently occur and can lead to wrongful convictions. Many types of factors may account for errors in eyewitness testimony, including witness characteristics (such as age, race, or gender) or situational factors (such as stress, the presence of a weapon, environmental conditions, or the duration of the event). Post-event factors can also account for mistaken eyewitness testimony. These factors include the simple passage of time, misleading information, unconscious transference, demand characteristics, witness confidence, and many aspects of the administration of lineups and photo spreads.

Estimator variables, which have to do with the characteristics of the eyewitness or the situation, are not under the control of the criminal justice system; therefore, their effects cannot be minimized. System variables, those factors that are under the control of the criminal justice system and that have to do with interrogation tactics or the collection of evidence, can be minimized by careful consideration of the research in this area. Some of the most important procedural considerations include evidence-based interviewing practices, as well as the four rules for investigation procedures proposed by Wells and colleagues (1998).

Various safeguards and protections, for both investigation procedures and courtroom procedures, have been used to minimize the chances that an innocent person will be convicted on the basis of false or mistaken eyewitness testimony.

Key Terms

blank lineup

Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI)

estimator variables

eyewitness’s suggestibility

own-race bias

system variables

unconscious transference

weapon focus effect

References

Bartlett, F. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brewer, N., & Palmer, M. A. (2010). Eyewitness identification tests. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 15, 77–96.

Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2009). Obtaining and interpreting eyewitness identification test evidence: The influence of police-citizen interactions. In T. Williamson, R. Bull, & T. Valentine (Eds.), Handbook of psychology of investigative interviewing: current developments and future directions (pp. 205–220). Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Buckhout, R. (1974). Eyewitness testimony. Scientific American, 231, 23–31 Canadian Judicial Council. ( June, 2012). “Final instructions: Eyewitness

identification evidence.” In Model Jury Instructions. Retrieved from www

.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/lawyers_en.asp?selMenu=lawyers_modeljuryinstruction_en.asp.

Chun, M. M., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2007). Interactions between attention and memory. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 17, 177–184.

Connolly, D. A., & Price, H. L. (2013). Repeated interviews about repeated trauma from the distant past: A study of report consistency. In B. Cooper, M. Ternes, & D. Griesel (Eds.), Applied issues in investigative interviewing, eyewitness memory, and credibility assessment (pp. 191–217). New York: Springer.

Costanzo, M. (1997). Just revenge: Costs and consequences of the death penalty. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Cutler, B. L., & Penrod, S. D. (1995). Mistaken identification: The eyewitness, psychology and the law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1990a). Juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 185–191.

Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1990b). Nonadversarial methods for sensitizing jurors to eyewitness evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20, 1197–1207.

Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). Improving the reliability of eyewitness identification: Putting context into context. Journal of Applied Psychology,72, 629–637.

Department of Justice Canada FTP Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group. (2005). Report on the prevention of miscarriages of justice. Accessed at www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/pdf/Report_on_the_ Prevention_of_Miscarriages_of_Justice_2005.pdf.

Ebbinghaus, H. E. (1964). Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology. New York: Dover.

Fisher, R. P. (2010). Interviewing cooperative witnesses. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 15, 25–38.

Fisher, R. P., Brewer, N., & Mitchell, G. (2009). The relation between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony: Legal versus cognitive explanations. In R. Bull, T. Valentine, & T. Williamson (Eds.), Handbook of psychology of investigative interviewing: current developments and future directions (pp. 121–136). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Flin, R., Boone, J., Knox, A., & Bull, R. (1992). The effect of a five-month delay on children’s and adult’s eyewitness memory. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 323–336.

Geiselman, R., Fisher, R. P., MacKinnon, D. P., & Holland, H. L. (1985). Eyewitness memory enhancement in the police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics versus hypnosis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 401–412.

Goldstein, A. G., Chance, J. E., & Schneller, G. R. (1989). Frequency of eyewitness identification in criminal cases: A survey of prosecutors. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 27, 71–74.

Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., & Ogle, C. M. (2009). Child maltreatment and memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 325–351.

Greenhoot, A. F., McCloskey, L., & Glisky, E. (2005). A longitudinal study of adolescents’ recollections of family violence. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 719–743.

Greenwald, A. G., Oakes, M. A., & Hoffman, H. G. (2003). Targets of discrimination: Effects of race on responses to weapon holders. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 399–405.

Hervé, H. F., Cooper, B. S., & Yuille, J. C. (2007). Memory formation in offenders: Perspectives from a biopsychosocial model of eyewitness memory. In

S. A. Christianson (Ed.), Offenders’ memories of violent crimes (pp. 38–74). West Sussex, England: Wiley.

Hoffman, H. G., Loftus, E. F., Greenmun, N., & Dashiell, R. L. (1992). The generation of misinformation. In F. Losel, D. Bender, & T. Bliesener (Eds.), Psychology and law: International perspectives (pp. 292–301). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Hope, L., & Wright, D. (2007). Beyond unusual? Examining the role of attention in the weapon focus effect. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 951–961.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, T. M., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.

Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3–28.

Kassin, S. M. (1998). Eyewitness identification procedures: The fifth rule. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 649–653.

Kassin, S. M., Ellsworth, P. C., & Smith, V. L. (1989). The “general acceptance” of psychological research on eyewitness testimony: A survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 44, 1089–1098.

Kohnken, G., Milne, R., Memon, A., & Bull, R. (1999). The cognitive interview: A metaanalysis. Psychology, Crime and Law, 5, 3–28.

Kramer, T. H., Buckhout, R., & Eugenio, P. (1990). Weapon focus, arousal, and eyewitness memory: Attention must be paid. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 167–184.

Lindsay, R. C. L., Mansour, J. K., Beaudry, J. L., Leach, A.M., & Bertrand,

M. I. (2009). Sequential lineup presentation: Patterns and policy. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14, 13–24.

Lindsay, R. C. L., & Wells, G. L. (1980). What price justice? Exploring the relationship between lineup fairness and identification accuracy. Law and Human Behavior, 4, 303–314.

Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560–572.

Loftus, E. F. (1979). Eyewitness testimony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Loftus, E. F. (1984). Expert testimony on the eyewitness. In G. L. Wells & E.

F. Loftus (Eds.), Eyewitness testimony: Psychological perspectives (pp. 273–283). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Loftus, E. F. (2000). Suggestions, imagination, and transformation of reality. In

A. A. Stone, J. S. Turkkan, C. A. Bachrach, J. B. Jobe, H. S. Kurtzman, &

V. S. Cain (Eds.), The science of self-report: Implications for research and practice

(pp. 201–210). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of an automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 585–589.

Malpass, R. S., & Devine, P. G. (1981). Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, 482–489.

Malpass, R. S., & Kravitz, J. (1969). Recognition of faces of own and other race.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 330–334.

Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). Thirty years of investigating the ownrace bias in memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 3–35.

Memon, A., Hope, L., & Bull, R. (2003). Exposure duration: Effects on eyewitness accuracy and confidence. British Journal of Psychology, 94, 339–354.

Memon, A., Meissner, C. A., & Fraser, J. (2010). The Cognitive Interview: A meta-analytic review and study space analysis of the past 25 years. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16, 340–372.

Penrod, S. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1999). Preventing mistaken convictions in eyewitness identification trials. In R. Roesch, S. D. Hart, & J. R. P. Ogloff (Eds.), Psychology and law: The state of the discipline (pp. 89–118). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Perfect, T. J., Wagstaff, G. F., Moore, D., Andrews, B., Cleveland, V., Newcombe, S., . . . Brown, L. (2008). How can we help witnesses to remember more? It’s an (eyes) open and shut case. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 314–324

Powers, P. A., Andriks, J. L., & Loftus, E. R. (1979). Eyewitness accounts of females and males. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64, 339–347.

R. v. Parsons, [1993] O. J. No. 1937. (C. A.)

Reisberg, D., & Heuer, F. (2007). The influence of emotion on memory in forensic settings. In M. P. Toglia, J. Read, D. F. Ross, & R. L. Lindsay (Eds.), The handbook of eyewitness psychology: Vol. 1. Memory for events (pp. 81–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rosenthal, R. (1976). Experimenter effects in behavioral research. New York: Irvington.

Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2004). Stability in autobiographical memory. Memory, 12, 715–721.

Shepard, J. W. (1983). Identification after long delays. In S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. R. Clifford (Eds.), Evaluating witness evidence (pp. 173–187). Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Steblay, N. (1997). Social influence in eyewitness recall: A meta-analytic review of lineup instruction effects. Law and Human Behavior, 21, 283–298.

Steblay, N., Dysart, J. E., & Wells. G. L. (2011). Seventy-two tests of the sequential lineup superiority effect: A meta-analysis and policy discussion. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17, 99–139. Tooley, V., Brigham, J. C., Maass, A., & Bothwell, R. K. (1987). Facial recognition: Weapon effect and attention focus. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 17, 845–859.

Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352–373.

Wells, G. L. (1978). Applied eyewitness testimony research: System variables and estimator variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1546–1557.

Wells, G. L. (1984). The psychology of lineup identifications. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 14, 89–103.

Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1998). “Good, you identified the suspect”: Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 360–376.

Wells, G. L., Rydell, S. M., & Seelau, E. P. (1993). On the selection of distractors for eyewitness lineups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 835–844.

Wells, G. L., Small, M., Penrod, S. D., Malpass, R. S., Fulero, S. M., & Brimacombe, C. A. E. (1998). Eyewitness identification procedures: Recommendations for lineups and photospreads. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 603–647.

Wells, G. L., & Turtle, J. W. (1986). Eyewitness identification: The importance of lineup models. Psychological Bulletin, 99(3), 320–329.

Wells, G. L., Wright, E. F., & Bradfield, A. L. (1999). Witnesses to crime: Social and cognitive factors governing the validity of people’s reports. In R. Roesch,

S. D. Hart, & J. R. P. Ogloff (Eds.), Psychology and law: the state of the discipline

(pp. 53–87). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Wright, A. M., & Alison, L. (2004). Questioning sequences in Canadian police interviews: Constructing and confirming the course of events? Psychology, Crime and Law, 10, 137–154.

Zaragoza, M. S., Belli, R. F., & Payment, K. E. (2007). Misinformation effects and the suggestibility of eyewitness memory. In M. Garry & H. Hayne (Eds.), Do justice and let the sky fall: Elizabeth Loftus and her contributions to science, law, and academic freedom (pp. 35–63). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Suggested Readings and Websites

Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2011). Eyewitness identification. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 24–27.

Desmarais, S. L., & Read, J. D. (2010). After 30 years, what do we know about what jurors know? A meta-analytic review of lay knowledge regarding eyewitness factors. Law and Human Behavior, 35, 200–210.

Wells, G. L., & Loftus, E. F. (2003). Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

CanadianJudicialCouncil:www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/lawyers_en.asp?selMenu= lawyers_juryinstruction_en.asp.

Gary L. Well, Professor of Psychology, Iowa State University, website with links to resources on eyewitness memory: www.psychology.iastate.edu/˜glwells.

The Innocence Project: Eyewitness Identification: www.innocenceproject.org/ fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php.